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Abstract 
 “Civil War in the Delta” describes how the American Civil War came to Helena, 
Arkansas, and its Phillips County environs, and how its people—black and white, male and 
female, rich and poor, free and enslaved, soldier and civilian—lived that conflict from the spring 
of 1861 to the summer of 1863, when Union soldiers repelled a Confederate assault on the town.  
Scholars have been writing Civil War community studies since the 1960s, but few have 
investigated communities west of the Mississippi River.  Historians also have written widely 
about Arkansas during the war, but there are no comprehensive studies of a single community in 
the state.  “Civil War in the Delta” fills these voids by detailing the wartime experiences of 
soldiers and civilians in Helena and its surrounding countryside. 
 “Civil War in the Delta” also describes the 1863 Helena campaign, one of the most 
significant engagements of the war west of the Mississippi.  On July 4, 1863, approximately 
7,600 rebels attacked and were repulsed by 4,100 Federals at Helena.  The attack was launched 
to relieve pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg and secure an important 
rebel position on the Mississippi River.  In the end, it was too little and too late to save 
Vicksburg, which capitulated on the same morning.  However, over 1,800 men were killed, 
wounded, or captured in the engagement, and its outcome ensured Union control of the 
Mississippi.  The campaign also illustrates the natural environment’s pivotal role in the Civil 
War.  The Confederates believed if they moved against Helena with “celerity and secrecy,” they 
would easily capture the post.   However, the natural environment of the Arkansas Delta—and 
the Federals’ strategic use of that environment—prevented the Confederates from achieving 
those ends.  Harsh environmental conditions during the rebel approach to Helena in tandem with 
the Federals’ adaptation of the landscape as a key ally led to Confederate defeat and, by 
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In the spring of 1860, journalist John P. Pryor recounted his tour of eastern Arkansas for 
a Memphis newspaper.  Arkansas, which Pryor called “the rising ‘Crystal State’ of the Union,” 
had become a state only twenty-four years earlier, and Pryor hoped to satisfy his readers’ 
curiosity about their neighbors to the west.  A resident of the Memphis area, Pryor could have 
crossed the Mississippi River at his home.  Instead, he galloped his horse some seventy miles 
south into Mississippi, rode a steamboat across the river, and entered Arkansas at Helena, “a far 
more populous, prosperous, and growing place” than he had anticipated.  “Helena presents all the 
appearances of a rapidly growing place,” he reported.  “Elegant business houses are going up by 
the score in the trading part of town, and many comfortable and even palatial mansions are 
beginning to cluster upon and crown the picturesque hights [sic] which, from the West, so 
handsomely overlook the ‘future commercial metropolis of Arkansas.’” 
 The area surrounding Helena, especially its natural features, also impressed the colorful 
columnist.  Traveling west from the town along the St. Francis Road—“one of the finest dirt 
roads” he had ever seen—Pryor mounted Crowley’s Ridge, an upland “broken into thousands of 
‘spurs’ and well-wooded crags, and covered by timber of the largest and richest growth.”  On the 
ridge’s western slopes, only a few miles outside Helena, he discovered “the finest upland 
farming country” he had ever seen.  For twenty or more miles, he observed “almost one 
unbroken column of fair-lying plantations, all in a high state of cultivation,” and in his view, the 
region’s soil was “second only to the Mississippi bottom” in its ability to produce both cotton 
and corn.  In fact, Pryor deemed Helena’s “back country superior in extent, and far exceeding in 
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quality, that of any other town on the western bank of the Mississippi river, between St. Louis 
and New Orleans.”1 
 Less than three years after Pryor wrote his celebratory account, another correspondent 
described Helena in the same Memphis newspaper.  In late February 1863, the Mississippi River 
was rising, and the reporter predicted the town would soon be inundated.  “If Helena—the accent 
of the first syllable is eminently proper—is overflowed,” he declared, “I do hope it will be 
cleansed of a few of its impurities; for a more corrupt, intolerable place than it now is, cannot 
well be imagine[d].  The atmosphere is such that men who were once honest become tainted in 
principle and depraved in conduct.”  Since July 1862, tens of thousands of Union troops had 
bivouacked at Helena, and the author lamented that “soldiers and officers alike” became 
demoralized in the town.  “The latter drink, and the former die,” he bemoaned.  “It is a noisome 
graveyard.  There is no health, moral or physical, in it; no energy in its outgivings, no benefit in 
its influences.  Helena is ethically, as well as philologically, hell, with additions.”   
The correspondent estimated that 4,000 soldiers had perished in Helena’s hospitals since 
the Federals arrived in the summer of 1862, and he predicted that more would expire in coming 
months if “some great reform” was not made.  “The hospitals are fearful to behold, and horrible 
to imagine,” he proclaimed.  “They are grossly mismanaged, and nine out of every ten who enter 
them are certain to die. . . .  Many of our soldiers, brought from transports have died here, like 
dogs, in the street, while our officers have occupied the best houses in the town as their quarters.  
Disease is in the atmosphere,” he concluded, “and the presence of death is attested by thousands 
                                                          
1 “A Trip to Arkansas,” Memphis Daily Appeal, April 11, 1860; General Thomas Jordan 
and J. P. Pryor, General Nathan Bedford Forrest and of Forrest’s Cavalry, ed. Albert Castel 
(Boston:  Da Capo, 1996), iv-v. 
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of graves, filled by brave men murdered by neglect, lost to the republic through the stupidity and 
carelessness of unworthy and heartless officials.”2 
In 1860, Helena was a prosperous port of 1,500 people (some 500 of whom were 
enslaved), abundant amenities, environmental advantages, and a promising future.  By February 
1863, however, the town had become a disease-ridden, mud-caked garrison of 16,000 federal 
soldiers, more than 3,000 black refugees, thousands of horses and mules, hordes of traders, a 
handful of aid workers, and hundreds of disgruntled white civilians whose homes, businesses, 
and farms had been confiscated and plundered.  What prompted these profound changes?  As 
Abraham Lincoln so poignantly put it in his second inaugural address, “[T]he war came.”3  
The pages that follow describe how the Civil War came to Helena, and how its people—
black and white, male and female, rich and poor, free and enslaved, soldier and civilian—lived 
that conflict from the spring of 1861 to the summer of 1863, when federal soldiers repulsed a 
Confederate attack on the town.  Scholars have been writing Civil War community studies since 
the 1960s, and consequently, we know a great deal about a number of southern towns, especially 
those that were attacked or occupied by Union armies.4  Few, however, have investigated 
                                                          
2 “Helena and Memphis,” Memphis Daily Appeal, February 28, 1863; “Dreadful 
Condition of Helena, Arkansas – Yankee Soldiers Dying off like Sheep,” Memphis Daily Appeal, 
April 3, 1863. 
3 U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Statistics of the Population of the United States, 
Compiled, from the Original Returns of the Ninth Census, (June 1, 1870) (Washington:  
Government Printing Office, 1872), 87; U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion:  A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 parts 
(Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Ser. 1, vol. 24, pt. 3, p. 74 (hereafter 
cited as OR with all references to Series 1 unless otherwise noted); The Emancipation League, 
Facts Concerning the Freedmen.  Their Capacity and Their Destiny (Boston:  Press of 
Commercial Printing House, 1863), 7-9; Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 
1865, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 8, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, 
N.J.:  Rutgers University Press, 1953), 332. 
4 For a list of the most important Civil War community studies published up to 1990, see 
Daniel E. Sutherland, “Getting the ‘Real War’ Into the Books,” Virginia Magazine of History 
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communities west of the Mississippi River.5  Historians also have written widely about Arkansas 
during the Civil War, but there are no comprehensive studies of a single community in the state.6  
                                                          
and Biography 98 (April 1990):  203n16-17, 206n18.  Since 1990, the most important 
community studies include Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr., Confederate Mobile (Jackson:  University 
Press of Mississippi, 1991); Daniel W. Crofts, Old Southampton:  Politics and Society in a 
Virginia County, 1834-1869 (Charlottesville:  University Press of Virginia, 1992); Sutherland, 
Seasons of War:  The Ordeal of a Confederate Community, 1861-1865 (New York:  Free Press, 
1995); Chester G. Hearn, Six Years of Hell:  Harpers Ferry during the Civil War (Baton Rouge:  
Louisiana State University Press, 1996); William Blair, Virginia’s Private War:  Feeding Body 
and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1998); William 
Marvell, A Place Called Appomattox (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2000); 
Edward L. Ayers, In the Presence of Mine Enemies:  The Civil War in the Heart of America, 
1859-1863 (New York:  W. W. Norton, 2003); A. Wilson Greene, Civil War Petersburg:  
Confederate City in the Crucible of War (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 2006); 
Robert Tracy McKenzie, Lincolnites and Rebels:  A Divided Town in the American Civil War 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard R. Duncan, Beleaguered Winchester:  A 
Virginia Community at War, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2007); 
and Nicole Etcheson, A Generation at War:  The Civil War Era in a Northern Community 
(Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 2011).  
5 See, for example, Louis S. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis (Lawrence:  University Press of 
Kansas, 2001), and Adam Arenson, The Great Heart of the Republic:  St. Louis and the Cultural 
Civil War (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2011).  Historians of the Civil War 
traditionally have regarded the territory west of the Mississippi River as something of a 
backwater, but in recent years, that has begun to change.  For a passionate defense of the Trans-
Mississippi’s importance, see William L. Shea, “The War We Have Lost,” Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 70 (Summer 2011):  100-108.  For the latest synthesis on the war west of the 
Mississippi, see Thomas W. Cutrer, Theater of a Separate War:  The Civil War West of the 
Mississippi River, 1861–1865 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 
6 Important articles about how the Civil War affected an Arkansas community include 
Nate Coulter, “The Impact of the Civil War upon Pulaski County, Arkansas,” Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 41 (Spring 1982):  67-82; Carl H. Moneyhon, “The Civil War in Phillips 
County, Arkansas,” Phillips County Historical Quarterly 19 (June 1981/September 1981):  18-
36; Moneyhon, “The Impact of the Civil War in Arkansas:  The Mississippi River Plantation 
Counties,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 51 (Summer 1992):  105-118; and Moneyhon, “The 
Civil War’s Impact in Arkansas:  Phillips County as a Case Study,” Locus 5 (Fall 1992):  19-32.  
The best narrative history of Arkansas in the Civil War is Thomas A. DeBlack, With Fire and 
Sword:  Arkansas, 1861-1874 (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 2003).  The best 
analytical history of how the war affected the state socially, politically, and economically is Carl 
H. Moneyhon, The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on Arkansas:  Persistence in the 
Midst of Ruin (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1994).  Other important works 
on Civil War Arkansas include Michael B. Dougan, Confederate Arkansas:  The People and 
Policies of a Frontier State in Wartime (Tuscaloosa:  University of Alabama Press, 1976); Mark 
K. Christ, ed., Rugged and Sublime:  The Civil War in Arkansas (Fayetteville:  University of 
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“Civil War in the Delta” fills these voids by detailing the wartime experiences of soldiers and 
civilians in Helena and its Phillips County environs. 
In 1990, Daniel E. Sutherland called for scholars to heed Walt Whitman’s call to “get the 
‘real war’ into the books” by producing “stories of individual communities and their inhabitants” 
in order to “come to grips with the diversity and reality of the war.”  More specifically, he urged 
scholars to write county-level studies of the war years.  “Civil War in the Delta” represents an 
attempt to heed Sutherland’s call.  The best way to understand the Civil War is to study its 
causes, conduct, and consequences at the local level, and, as Sutherland noted, viewing the war 
from the vantage of a single community is a realistic way of telling its story because “most 
people [in the 1860s], even the soldiers to a large extent, were spectators of the war, much like 
us” today.  Phillips County is an ideal place to study the war because its residents and visitors 
experienced the conflict’s social, economic, military, political, and environmental effects from 
1861 to 1865 and beyond.7 
Before the Civil War, Phillips County was planter-dominated slave society whose white 
residents exploited their Delta environment (and African American labor) to grow cotton and 
corn for export to outside markets.  Thanks to rivers, roads, telegraphs, steamboats, railroads, and 
newspapers, they were linked to a larger antebellum world defined by Protestant Christianity, 
passionate politics, a slave-based economy, and a devotion to a Union that most white residents 
                                                          
Arkansas Press, 1994); Anne J. Bailey and Daniel E. Sutherland, eds., Civil War Arkansas:  
Beyond Battles and Leaders (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 2000); Mark K. Christ, 
Civil War Arkansas, 1863: The Battle for a State (Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 
2010); and Mark Christ and Patrick G. Williams, eds., I Do Wish This Cruel War Was Over:  
First-Person Accounts of Civil War Arkansas from the Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
(Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 2014). 




believed was mankind’s best hope for democratic government.  A number of prominent 
secessionists hailed from Phillips County, but as late as December 1860, they represented a 
minority of the county’s citizens.   
When Abraham Lincoln—a Republican devoted to halting the expansion of slavery—was 
elected U.S. president in November 1860, unionism waned in Phillips County, but it was by no 
means extinguished.  Three weeks after Lincoln’s election, the county’s residents adopted a 
resolution urging the Arkansas legislature to call a convention of the southern states to demand 
southerners’ constitutional rights in the Union.  Most Phillips County citizens, though concerned 
about their future in the United States, remained hopeful they could continue to be a part of it.  
When South Carolina seceded from the Union in late December, support for separation grew in 
both Phillips County and Arkansas at large.  On January 15, 1861, the state Senate scheduled a 
February election in which voters would decide whether to hold a secession convention and 
choose delegates to that hypothetical convention.  Three weeks before that election, rumors that 
U.S. troops were reinforcing Little Rock’s federal arsenal swept the state.  Although the rumors 
were false, an estimated eight hundred to one thousand militiamen—including five hundred from 
Phillips County—descended upon the capital and seized the arsenal, thus exacerbating sectional 
tensions in the state. 
Ten days after the arsenal’s capture, Arkansans overwhelmingly voted to hold a secession 
convention, and the citizens of Phillips County—like most of their fellow southern and eastern 
Arkansans—sent pro-separation delegates to the meeting.  Most of the counties in northern and 
western Arkansas, on the other hand, chose unionists, so when the convention adjourned on 
March 21, Arkansas remained in the United States.  By that time, however, most Arkansas 
unionists were conditional unionists.  Sometimes called “cooperationists,” they shared the 
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secessionists’ conviction that slavery had to be protected, but because they believed this could 
best be accomplished in the United States, they strove to prevent Arkansas’s separation.  If, 
however, the U.S. government proved unwilling to protect slavery and southern rights, the 
cooperationists were willing to secede.  Most also opposed any federal attempts to force the 
states that had already seceded to rejoin the Union.  
In April 1861, the U.S. government attempted to do just that.  After Confederate troops 
captured Fort Sumter, South Carolina, President Lincoln requested that states still in the Union 
supply a total of 75,000 troops, including 780 from Arkansas, to put down the Confederate 
rebellion.  Arkansas’s governor refused, and in the ensuing days, cooperation in the state 
collapsed.  By late April, support for secession in eastern Arkansas was almost unanimous.  In 
Phillips County, anti-northern vigilante activity escalated, Helena’s newspapers endorsed 
separation, and the militia drilled in anticipation of secession and war.  Militiamen in Helena 
seized northern-owned steamboats that passed on the Mississippi River.  By the time a 
reconvened convention announced Arkansas’s secession on May 6, some 500 militiamen from 
five counties, including Phillips, had already mobilized to fight for the Confederacy. 
 In the spring and summer of 1861, mobilization in Phillips County was both rapid and 
widespread.  In the war’s opening months, approximately 400 of the county’s 2,000 adult white 
males volunteered to fight, and over the next four years, at least seven infantry regiments came 
from the Arkansas Delta.  Women frequently spearheaded the region’s mobilization festivities, 
pressured males to enlist, and founded aid societies to support the troops.  Enslaved Arkansans—
who constituted some one-third of the state’s population and a majority of Phillips County’s—
quietly took advantage of the tumult to rebel against their owners.   
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 By early June 1861, all of the companies raised in Helena had departed to fight 
elsewhere, but residents continued to feel the effects of the conflict.  In the war’s opening year, 
slaves, civilians, and rebel soldiers moved in and out of Phillips County, while white residents 
suffered from crippling inflation, cash and manpower shortages, the collapse of credit, and 
eventually, draconian Confederate impressment and conscription.  Nature also wreaked havoc on 
the county’s citizens.8  A hog cholera epizootic reduced its swine population, a drought 
diminished its corn crop, and the “great [Mississippi] flood of 1862” inundated its buildings and 
fields.  All of these trials paled in comparison to those spurred by the Union invasion of the 
county on July 12, 1862. 
 On that day, the van of General Samuel R. Curtis’s Army of the Southwest trotted into 
Helena, and over next three days, some 20,000 federal troops overwhelmed Phillips County.  The 
soldiers appropriated buildings, confiscated crops and livestock, ransacked homes, and 
emancipated more than 2,000 slaves, most of whom ran to Union lines to secure their freedom.  
Many of these refugees, labeled “contrabands” by the soldiers, tragically found that freedom did 
not live up to its promise.  They lived in dilapidated camps on the outskirts of town, worked 
various jobs for wages that most never received, and died in droves due to hunger and disease. 
                                                          
8 Scholars are divided on the definition of “nature,” especially humans’ place within it.  
Some argue that humans are a part of nature and thus cannot be separated from it, while others 
assert that because humans have altered the natural environment so significantly throughout 
history, there is little that is “natural” in nature anyway, so it is futile to try to remove humans 
from the equation.  While these arguments have merit, for the sake of clarity, my definition of 
“nature” does not include humans.  Rather, like Lisa M. Brady, I define nature as “the nonhuman 
physical environment in its constituent parts or as a larger whole.”  Moreover, I use “natural 
environment” and “environment” as synonyms for “nature.”  Brady, War Upon the Land:  
Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes During the American Civil 
War (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 2012), 12-13.    
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The arrival of Curtis’s army marked the beginning of an uninterrupted federal occupation 
of Helena that spanned the remainder of the war.  The town served as a permanent Union 
enclave, supply depot, cotton-trading hub, coaling station, and staging ground for federal 
operations in the Mississippi valley, particularly those aimed at the Confederate bastion at 
Vicksburg.  Union occupation posed a continual threat to the Confederacy’s control of the 
Mississippi River and the Arkansas interior, and throughout 1862 and 1863, the rebels 
contemplated removing that threat.  At one time or another, recommendations for attacking 
Helena were made by such high-ranking Confederates as General Samuel Cooper, Secretary of 
War George W. Randolph, General Joseph E. Johnston, Secretary of War James A. Seddon, 
General Robert E. Lee, and President Jefferson Davis.  Ultimately, however, responsibility for 
capturing the town fell to General Theophilus H. Holmes, whose 7,600 rebels attacked and were 
repulsed by the 4,100-man Union garrison on July 4, 1863. 
On that day, federal armies scored key victories in three different locations.  One of those 
was at Gettysburg, where on July 1-3 Union forces defeated Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, 
which retreated on July 4.  On that same day, federal forces under Ulysses S. Grant forced the 
surrender of Vicksburg, the most important rebel stronghold on the Mississippi River.  By far the 
smallest military engagement of the day occurred at Helena, but while overshadowed and mostly 
forgotten, Helena was by no means insignificant.  The rebel attack on the Union post was 
conceived at the highest level of the Confederate command.  It was intended as an important 
strategic move to relieve pressure on the collapsing Confederate garrison at Vicksburg and 
secure a crucial rebel position on the Mississippi River in the case of Vicksburg’s surrender.  The 
Union occupation of Helena menaced the Confederacy’s control of the Mississippi River and 
Arkansas, and the Helena campaign was initiated to eliminate that menace.  In the end, the July 4 
10 
 
attack was too little and too late to save Vicksburg, which capitulated on the same morning.  
Still, the battle of Helena proved to be among the most significant engagements of the Civil War 
west of the Mississippi.  Over 1,800 men were killed, wounded, or captured in the campaign 
(15% of those involved), and its outcome ensured federal control of the Mississippi River.  It 
also preserved the Union foothold in eastern Arkansas, which, in turn, allowed the Federals to 
capture Little Rock only two months later. 
The Helena campaign deserves consideration for all of these reasons.9  It also merits 
attention because it lucidly illustrates a number of ways in which the natural environment shaped 
the course and conduct of the Civil War.  In recent years, scholars have shown that nature played 
an important, sometimes crucial, role in the conflict.10  The Helena campaign offers yet another 
                                                          
9 There are no books on the Helena campaign.  Scholarly works that consider it in detail 
include Edwin C. Bearss, “The Battle of Helena, July 4, 1863,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
20 (Autumn 1961):  256-297; Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the 
West (Baton Rouge, LA:  Louisiana State University Press, 1968), chap. 8; Warren E. Grabau, 
Ninety-Eight Days:  A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign (Knoxville:  University of 
Tennessee Press, 2000), chap. 40; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “A Very Disastrous Defeat:  The Battle 
of Helena, Arkansas,” North & South 6 (December 2002):  26-39; G. David Schieffler, “Too 
Little, Too Late to Save Vicksburg:  The Battle of Helena, Arkansas, July 4, 1863” (M.A. Thesis, 
University of Arkansas, 2005); Christ, Civil War Arkansas, chap. 4; Mark Christ, “The Battle of 
Helena,” Blue & Gray 32, no. 4 (2016):  6-23, 42-47; and Thomas W. Cutrer, Theater of a 
Separate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River, 1861–1865 (Chapel Hill:  University 
of North Carolina Press, 2017), chap. 12. 
10 Environmental Civil War history is a rapidly growing field.  The best succinct survey 
of the field is Brian Allen Drake, “New Fields of Battle:  Nature, Environmental History, and the 
Civil War,” in The Blue, the Gray, and the Green:  Toward an Environmental History of the 
Civil War, ed. Brian Allen Drake (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 2015), 1-15.  For a 
longer historiographical review, see Lisa Brady, “From Battlefield to Fertile Ground:  The 
Development of Civil War Environmental History,” Civil War History 58, no. 3 (Sept. 2012):  
305-321.  Important works that have appeared since the publication of Brady’s essay include 
Kathryn Shively Meier, Nature's Civil War:  Common Soldiers and the Environment in 1862 
Virginia (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Brian Allen Drake, ed., 
The Blue, the Gray, and the Green; Matthew M. Stith, Extreme Civil War:  Guerrilla Warfare, 
Environment, and Race on the Trans-Mississippi Frontier (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State 
University Press, 2016); and Adam H. Petty, “Wilderness, Weather, and Waging War in the 
Mine Run Campaign,” Civil War History 63 (March 2017):  7-35.  See also Judkin Browning 
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example of that impact.  Previous historians have acknowledged the importance of the 
campaign’s environmental factors, but they have not analyzed their impact from an 
environmental perspective.11  In other words, they have not treated nature as a decisive actor or 
explicitly investigated the ways in which the natural environment influenced human thoughts and 
actions.12  In the summer of 1863, the Confederates believed if they moved against Helena with 
“celerity and secrecy,” they would easily capture the post.13  However, the natural environment 
of east Arkansas—and the Union army’s strategic use of that environment—prevented the 
Confederates from achieving those ends.  Harsh environmental conditions during the rebel 
approach to Helena in tandem with the federal garrison’s ability to adapt the landscape as a key 
ally during the battle led to Confederate defeat and, by extension, solidified Union control of the 
Mississippi River and Arkansas. 
                                                          
and Timothy Silver’s forthcoming The Civil War:  An Environmental History, Kenneth W. Noe’s 
forthcoming book on weather and the Civil War, and Megan Kate Nelson’s forthcoming Path of 
the Dead Man: How the West was Won—and Lost—during the American Civil War. 
11 Brady, “From Battlefield to Fertile Ground,” 319-320.  Geographer Warren Grabau’s 
Ninety-Eight Days, which highlights the importance of geography and terrain in the Vicksburg 
campaign, comes closest to analyzing the Helena campaign from an environmental perspective.  
See Grabau, Ninety-Eight Days, chap. 40. 
12 Scholars are divided on the question of whether nature has “agency.”  I am persuaded 
by Linda Nash, who contends we should be careful about assigning agency to nature because 
unlike humans, nature does not act with intention.  A honeybee, for instance, can build a hive, 
but it cannot envision how its hive will look before completion.  The bee simply builds.  A 
human architect, on the other hand, can imagine the particulars of her house before constructing 
it.  Nevertheless, Nash stresses that nature is not simply an object to be acted upon.  Similarly, 
human ideas and actions do not occur in a vacuum.  Rather, human agency emerges out of and 
exists in specific environments.  Nash contends that when we look at history’s human and 
environmental components, “what we often uncover is not merely the way that nature influences 
and constrains human actions, but also the way that particular environments shape human 
intentions.”  In the end, she suggests, we should strive to write history that presents humans not 
as the “motor of history but as partners in a conversation with a larger world, both animate and 
inanimate, about the possibilities of existence.”  Linda Nash, “The Agency of Nature or the 
Nature of Agency?” Environmental History 10 (January 2005):  67-69. 
13 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, p. 863. 
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Daniel Sutherland has hypothesized that historians may ultimately discover that “there 
was no single real [Civil] war, but rather several, perhaps many, wars, depending on 
geography.”14  If anything, the variety of Civil War community studies produced suggests that he 
was on to something.  Was there a typical Civil War experience?  What was the real war, and can 
we ever get a sense of it?  Scholars have not yet answered these questions satisfactorily, but 
community studies offer one way of doing so.  If the Civil War was in fact many wars, the 
people of Phillips County certainly experienced one of them.  Typical or not, their story 
represents an important piece of the larger record. 
                                                          
14 Sutherland, “Getting the ‘Real War’ Into the Books,” 202. 
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Chapter 1:  Antebellum Phillips County 
 
 
Nature drew the first people to Helena, Arkansas.  According to legend, those original 
pioneers were Native Americans who, sometime in the early sixteenth century, traveled down the 
Mississippi River in search of a mysterious white stag, which prophecy foretold would appear at 
the precise location they should halt their journey and build a great city.  Floating down the 
mighty “Father of Waters,” the itinerant Indians eventually came to a place marked by scenic, 
tree-topped hills that towered over a grassy floodplain blanketed with wildflowers.  Naturally, 
they decided to disembark, encamping on a lush meadow watered by a spring and protected by a 
“sharp sugar-loaf shaped hill, standing like a sentinel to guard it.”  When they awoke the 
following morning, much to their amazement the elusive white stag appeared.  The eager Indians 
chased the animal to the top of an earthen mound, where it rested momentarily before bounding 
out of sight.  Convinced that the Great Spirit had finally revealed their destination, the natives 
began building permanent homes at the site.  They called their new village “Pacaha,” meaning 
“downstream.”1 
The natural environment also attracted Helena’s earliest documented settlers.  
Archaeological remains, including the burial mounds at the modern-day Helena Crossing Site, 
suggest that the area was a crossroads and gathering place for various tribes of the Hopewell 
culture that predated the natives of Pacaha by some 1,500 years.2  Europeans arrived much later.  
The Spanish and French explorers who surveyed the Mississippi valley in the sixteenth and 
                                                          
1 Fred W. Allsopp, Folklore of Romantic Arkansas, vol. 1 (Grolier Society, 1931), 114-
116. 
2 Billy Steven Clifft, s.v. “Phillips County,” The Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & 
Culture, http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=797 
(accessed February 3, 2017). 
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seventeenth centuries likely glimpsed the land that would become Helena and perhaps even 
stepped on its shores.  Indeed, the Pacaha legend holds that Hernando de Soto, the famous 
Spanish conquistador whose soldiers were probably the first Europeans to set foot in Arkansas in 
the 1540s, visited Pacaha and planted a silver cross on the same mound where the white stag had 
stood.3  No proof of this story exists, however, and if any early European explorers visited the 
Helena site, they made no record of it.  That would fall to the first Anglo-Americans to put down 
roots in the area.  In the late 1790s—when Arkansas was still “native ground,” notwithstanding 
European maps that claimed it for Spain—Kentuckian Sylvanus Phillips and a handful of 
pioneers from the nascent United States ventured west to settle.4  In 1820, Phillips and his 
cohorts platted the village of Helena (named for Phillips’s daughter), which became the seat of 
Phillips County in 1830 and was incorporated as a town in the Arkansas Territory in 1833.  
Interestingly, nature propelled some of the first pioneers to Helena.  When the New Madrid 
                                                          
3 Allsopp, Folklore of Romantic Arkansas, 119.  For a different version of the Pacaha 
story that places the village at the confluence of the Mississippi and St. Francis Rivers, see 
Clarence Taylor, “Offers New Version of How DeSoto Landed on What Now is Site of City of 
Helena,” Arkansas Democrat, June 23, 1935, in “Helena” Vertical File, Mullins Library, Special 
Collections Division, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.  Modern scholars place Pacaha well 
to the north of Helena, in modern-day Mississippi County, Arkansas.  Jeannie M. Whayne, 
Thomas A. DeBlack, George Sabo III, and Morris S. Arnold, Arkansas:  A Narrative History, 2nd 
ed. (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 2013), 39-42 [see also plate 11 following p. 
126]. 
4 Kathleen DuVal persuasively argues that the Arkansas valley was a “native ground” 
where various Indian groups, including the Quapaw, Osage, and Cherokee, effectively called the 
shots from the sixteenth through the early nineteenth centuries.  DuVal, The Native Ground:  
Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006).  On Sylvanus Phillips et al.’s arrival in Arkansas, see Ted R. Worley, “Helena on 
the Mississippi,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 13 (Spring 1954):  1-2.  Worley says Phillips 
came from North Carolina, but at least two sources say he was born in Virginia and then 
relocated to Kentucky before moving west of the Mississippi River.  See Tom W. Campbell, 
“The Naming of Phillips County,” Arkansas Gazette, December 10, 1944, in “Phillips County” 
Vertical File, Mullins Library; and Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Eastern Arkansas 
(Chicago:  Goodspeed Publishing Company, 1890), 744. 
15 
 
earthquakes of 1811-1812 destroyed their homes in northeast Arkansas and southeast Missouri, 
the survivors used government-issued New Madrid certificates to resettle at Helena.  Others 
came from Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, Virginia, and 
South Carolina.5   
By the time Phillips and his companions founded Helena, the Indians who inhabited the 
area had migrated elsewhere (or perhaps had been decimated by disease), but the site’s natural 
features remained.  Located approximately 240 miles north of Vicksburg, Mississippi, and 70 
miles below Memphis, Tennessee, Helena lay in the heart of the Mississippi Alluvial Plain—a 
vast swath of territory in the North American interior comprising the floodplain of the 
Mississippi River and its major tributaries, including the Ohio, St. Francis, White, Arkansas, 
Yazoo, and Red rivers (Figure 1).  Often referred to simply as “the Delta,” the region extends 
from the mouth of the Ohio to the Gulf of Mexico, a distance of 600 miles.  At its widest point, it 
stretches some 150 miles across, from Little Rock, Arkansas, to the land east of Memphis.  For 
thousands of years, the Delta has been shaped by the ebb and flow of its rivers, which have 
eroded and deposited hundreds of feet of fertile topsoil on its landscape.  In the words of one 
scholar, the region is “a land of rivers, built by the rivers, and defined by the rivers.”6  
                                                          
5 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 1-2; Dale P. Kirkman, “Old Helena,” Phillips 
County Historical Quarterly 19 (December 1980/March 1981): 73-75; Howell Purdue and 
Elizabeth Purdue, Pat Cleburne:  Confederate General (Hillsboro, Tex.:  Hill Jr. College Press, 
1973), 27.  Kirkman notes that some of Helena’s early settlers also claimed land using 
certificates of purchase from the U.S. government and military land warrants issued for their 
service in the War of 1812.  Kirkman, “Old Helena,” 75.  Arkansas’s territorial legislature 
created Phillips County in May 1820, and the Helena site was platted approximately seven 
months later.  Steven Teske, s.v. “Helena-West Helena (Phillips County),” The Encyclopedia of 
Arkansas History & Culture, http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-
detail.aspx?entryID=950 (accessed February 3, 2017). 
6 Thomas Foti, “The River’s Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta:  Land of 
Paradox, ed. Jeannie Whayne and Willard B. Gatewood (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas 
Press, 1993), 30. 
16 
 
Modern geographers divide Arkansas’s portion of the Delta into five subregions.  Helena, 
a geographical and topographical border town, was built at the intersection of three of them—the 
St. Francis Basin, Crowley’s Ridge, and the White River Lowlands (Figure 2).  The town sits on 
the western bank of the Mississippi, approximately seven miles south of its confluence with the 
St. Francis, on the southern edge of the St. Francis Basin.  One authority calls this subregion the 
“archetypal” Delta because it is “flat, flat, flat, and almost featureless.”7  Just west of the basin, 
however, the land rises.  Crowley’s Ridge, an upland reaching heights up to 250 feet above the 
surrounding Delta, originates north and west of Helena and extends north for 150 miles to 
southern Missouri.  Scientists believe this loess-capped ridge is the product of geological 
processes that began some fifty million years ago, when much of the southern United States lay 
at the bottom of a shallow bay of the Gulf of Mexico that extended as far north as southern 
Missouri.  As the Gulf gradually receded to its present position, it deposited sand, gravel, and 
clay from its beaches and floor.8   
Meanwhile, the Mississippi and Ohio rivers flowed into the abandoned bay, slowly 
scouring and removing most of its ocean deposits in the process.  The two rivers did not always 
follow their current courses.  In fact, within the last twenty thousand years, scientists believe the 
Mississippi flowed down the west side of Crowley’s Ridge, not the east side as it does today.  As 
both rivers waxed, waned, and meandered across the Delta, they gradually carved an island 
between them—the backbone of Crowley’s Ridge.  Since then, dust storms have added up to 
fifty feet of loess—windblown, glacier-ground rock—to the ridge, thus increasing its stature.  
                                                          
7 Foti, “The River’s Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta, 41-42. 
8 Hubert B. Stroud, s.v. “Crowley’s Ridge,” Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & 
Culture, http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=12 
(accessed February 8, 2017); Foti, “The River’s Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta, 32. 
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Some also think fault lines beneath the ridge augmented its height.  “Whether it had a boost from 
fault lines or is strictly the result of erosional forces,” one author contends, “the tertiary deposits 
of Crowley’s Ridge remained high ground towering above the Mississippi Alluvial Plain.”  A 
cavalryman who patrolled east Arkansas during the Civil War called the ridge “one of those 
freaks of nature,” while a reporter who visited Helena in 1862 described it as “a series of 
picturesque bluffs that will do no discredit to the wildest scenery of the Rocky Mountains.”9  
Though certainly an exaggeration, the reporter’s observation nevertheless underscores the ridge’s 
prominence in an otherwise flat region (Figure 3).  As the only high ground on the Mississippi’s 
western bank between Missouri and the Gulf of Mexico, the ridge caught the eye of all who 
visited the area.10 
West of Crowley’s Ridge and south of Helena lie the White River Lowlands, the third 
Delta region to border Helena and “the wildest” of them all.  Even today, much of the Lowlands 
remains undeveloped because it is so prone to flooding.  The White, Black, Cache, and 
L’Anguille rivers, as well as Bayou DeView, regularly inundate this region, which is also 
susceptible to backwater flooding from the Mississippi.  The Lowlands’ chief waterway, the 
White River, originates in the Ozark Plateau of Northwest Arkansas, where the water runs clear.  
Clearer streams scour deeper channels, and thus, by the time the White reaches the Delta, it runs 
                                                          
9 Foti, “The River’s Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta, 32-33, 43; Jodi Morris, 
“On High Ground:  A Natural History of Crowley’s Ridge,” Craighead County Historical 
Quarterly 44 (October 2006):  28; Donald J. Stanton, Goodwin F. Berquist, and Paul C. Bowers, 
eds., The Civil War Reminiscences of General M. Jeff Thompson (Dayton, Ohio:  Morningside, 
1988), 187; Galway, “The Mississippi Expedition,” New York Times, December 4, 1862. 
10 William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winschel, Vicksburg is the Key:  The Struggle for the 
Mississippi River (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 28; Edwin C. Bearss, Decision 
in Mississippi:  Mississippi’s Important Role in the War Between the States (Jackson:  
Mississippi Commission on the War Between the States, 1962), 146; “The Old Route,” New 
York Herald, October 2, 1863. 
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lower than most of the region’s other rivers, including the Mississippi.  Consequently, 
Mississippi floods have been known to extend as far as forty miles up the White, saturating its 
lowlands and transforming them into a sizeable swamp.  Helena’s earliest homesteaders avoided 
settling the White River Lowlands, much of which was not drained and developed until the 
twentieth century.11 
In spite of its vulnerability to flooding, the Helena site abounded with natural advantages.  
The town’s Anglo-American founders were drawn to these features, including the high ground 
on nearby Crowley’s Ridge, the springs that flowed from the ridge’s base, the canebrakes on the 
floodplains for grazing livestock, the fertile alluvial soil for farming, and, most importantly, the 
proximity to the Mississippi River, which gave settlers ready access to water and an extensive 
trade network.  Helena’s founders intended the town to become a prominent port.  One of them 
reportedly built a rudimentary shed on the riverbank to serve as a warehouse for shipping as 
early as 1800 or 1802, well before the town’s official incorporation.  Thirty-five years later, one 
of the first ordinances passed by Helena’s aldermen designated separate docking areas for 
steamboats, stockboats, keelboats, and flatboats along the town’s riverfront.  Interestingly, the 
ordinance used nature to demarcate its three zones, designating them according to elm, 
cottonwood, and willow trees that grew along the bank.  Moreover, some of the town’s original 
streets and alleys—Cherry, Walnut, Pecan, Beech, Poplar, Elm, Mulberry, Hickory, and 
Persimmon—were named for native trees.12   
                                                          
11 Foti, “The River’s Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta, 43-44; Biographical and 
Historical Memoirs of Eastern Arkansas, 745. 
12 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 1-2; Kirkman, “Old Helena,” 86; Campbell, “The 
Naming of Phillips County”; “Dedication of Old Helena,” Phillips County Historical Quarterly 1 
(Summer 1962):  7. 
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To keep those streets dry and passable, Helena’s early settlers took precautions against 
the Mississippi’s periodic overflows.  In language reminiscent of a modern eminent domain 
statute, the town’s 1820 dedication asserted its citizens’ “full and absolute right to raise, erect, 
and build a levee” in the part of the town near the riverbank.  Early townspeople eventually acted 
on this right, mining loess from nearby Crowley’s Ridge to build a small earthen levee on the 
river’s edge.  This primitive embankment—probably little more than an extension of the natural 
levee of silt deposited by Mississippi floods—was hardly adequate, however, and the town 
experienced almost annual inundations throughout its first century.  As the river rose steadily in 
the spring of 1859, the rector of Helena’s Episcopal parish expressed a sentiment felt by many in 
Phillips County when he wrote that “both town and country are now suffering severely from the 
effects of last year’s overflow, and at this present writing we are greatly threatened with another.  
It is only our levee that keeps the Mississippi out of town and from some of the richest 
plantations in the country now, and, as the river is still rising, whether this artificial barrier will 
continue to protect us, is, with many, a question of absorbing interest.”13   
An 1836 ordinance outlawing the “riding, driving, or leading of horsebrutes or cattle 
upon the levee” accentuates the importance residents attached to their embankment’s structural 
integrity, for they knew that whenever it was breached or overtopped, the Mississippi’s 
floodwaters could seep into their wells and cisterns, contaminating them with cholera, a common 
                                                          
13 “Dedication of Old Helena,” 16; Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 3; Otis Hackett, 
“Excerpts from the Diaries and Letters of Reverend Otis Hackett from the Files of St. John’s 
Episcopal Church, Helena, Arkansas,” Phillips County Historical Quarterly 1 (Summer 1962):  
29-30.  On the Mississippi’s formation of a natural levee along its bank, see Foti, “The River’s 
Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta, 37.  It appears that Helenians intended to build a new 
levee on the eve of the Civil War.  In April 1861, a Memphis newspaper reported that the Helena 
city council had “determined to have a levee thrown up to protect the city from the rising 
waters.”  “Levee at Helena,” Memphis Daily Appeal, April 23, 1861. 
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killer in early Helena.  Concerned residents read regular river reports in local newspapers, and 
during the summer months, those who could afford it sought refuge from Helena’s insalubrious 
environment on the high ground of Crowley’s Ridge, which became a symbol of social prestige.  
The ridge’s foothills also served as a convenient place to bury the dead.  The town’s main 
cemetery was located on one of those hills, appropriately named Graveyard Hill.14   
Helena’s citizens quickly learned, however, that as the river takes, it also gives.15  Those 
annual overflows so hazardous to the townspeople’s health also created some of the richest 
farmland in the world.  Sylvanus Phillips and Helena’s original proprietors were traders, 
cattlemen, and land speculators, not farmers, but farmers eventually flocked to Phillips County, 
eager to take advantage of the region’s fertile alluvial soil.  Farming became the most important 
occupation in antebellum Phillips County, and plantation agriculture—the large-scale production 
of crops for sale mainly to outside markets—dominated the county’s economy in the years 
leading up to the war.  An 1859 editorial in a Helena newspaper boasted of an “Extraordinary 
Yield” in a six-acre field south of town that “has, this season, produced over twenty thousand 
pounds of seed cotton.”  “In truth,” the author claimed, “there are hundreds of thousands of acres 
of this description of land in the counties of Phillips” and others in east Arkansas, “and all that is 
needed to insure heavy crops is proper cultivation, and good seasons.”  Whether this particular 
report was true or not, cotton cultivation in the county was extensive.  In 1860, Phillips County 
                                                          
14 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 2-3; “River News,” Helena Southern Shield, 
February 4, 1860; Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Eastern Arkansas, 747. 
15 In the words of ecologist Thomas Foti, “As the river gives, it takes.  Always the river 
gives and takes.”  Foti, “The River’s Gifts and Curses,” in The Arkansas Delta, 31. 
21 
 
farmers grew 26,993 bales, the third largest crop in Arkansas.  They also ranked second and third 
in orchard products and corn production, respectively.16   
In that same year, Helena was home to 1,024 whites and 527 blacks, making it slightly 
less than half the size of Little Rock, Arkansas’s state capital.  The Mississippi port was by far 
the largest town in Phillips County, which had 14,876 residents in 1860.  Of those, 8,941 (sixty 
percent) were enslaved, the most of any county in the state.  Moreover, those slaves tended to be 
concentrated on large farms.  In 1860, over twenty-five percent of Phillips County slaveholders 
owned twenty or more slaves, the typical benchmark of “planter” status in antebellum America.  
Based upon the average number of acres per slaves in the county in 1860, one scholar believes 
that a 600-acre farm would have been considered a large plantation.  In 1860, 21.4 percent of the 
county’s farms were at least that size, and they constituted 63.1 percent of all the county’s 
landholdings during that year.17  Phillips County was not a plantation society, per se.  In other 
words, its planters did not have the same stranglehold on their community’s wealth and power 
that their counterparts in older, more established areas east of the Mississippi River did.  
Nevertheless, as one scholar put it, the county’s “aspiring gentry aped the ways of more-
                                                          
16 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 1-2, 10; Carl H. Moneyhon, “The Impact of the 
Civil War in Arkansas:  The Mississippi River Plantation Counties,” Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 51 (Summer 1992):  106-107; “Extraordinary Yield,” Helena Southern Shield, in Ron 
Kelley, Diary of a State 1860:  Prelude to the Civil War in Arkansas (Helena:  
Arkansastoothpick Publishing, 2014), 3; Orville W. Taylor, Negro Slavery in Arkansas (Durham, 
N.C.:  Duke University Press, 1958), 98. 
17 U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Statistics of the Population of the United States, 
Compiled, from the Original Returns of the Ninth Census, (June 1, 1870) (Washington:  
Government Printing Office, 1872), 87; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the United 
States in 1860 (Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1864), 13-15; Moneyhon, “The 
Impact of the Civil War in Arkansas,” 107-108; Thomas A. DeBlack, With Fire and Sword:  
Arkansas, 1861-1874 (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 2003), 2.   
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established planters in eastern slaveholding states and shared many of their values.”18  Moreover, 
compared to Arkansas as a whole—where only twelve percent of slaveholders had achieved 
“planter” status in 1860—Phillips County was a planter-dominated slave society.19  Most of the 
county’s wealth was concentrated in land and slaves, and some of that wealth was owned by 
absentee planters.  The most prominent of these was Gideon J. Pillow, a Mexican War veteran, 
Tennessee planter, and eventual Confederate general who maintained five large plantations in the 
vicinity of Helena.20 
Profitable planting, however, did not preclude Helena’s citizens from doing other jobs.  
In fact, some of the town’s wealthiest landowners also worked as merchants, businessmen, 
doctors, and attorneys.  Like many frontier communities, Helena teemed with lawyers eager to 
cash in on the plethora of cases involving land speculation and titles.  Before the Civil War, 
many of Helena’s leading citizens were attorneys, a number of whom ultimately occupied 
                                                          
18 Bobby Roberts, “‘Desolation Itself’:  The Impact of the Civil War,” in The Arkansas 
Delta, 71.  Roberts was referring to the entire Arkansas Delta, but his description applies to 
Phillips County in particular.  Carl Moneyhon contends that in 1860, Phillips County was still a 
developing plantation society that looked more like 1850 Mississippi than it did the rest of the 
Old South in 1860.  Put another way, in 1860 the proportion of wealth controlled by Phillips 
County’s “upper economic strata” was greater than that in the “free states of the northwest, but 
not as great as in the rest of the cotton South.”  Carl H. Moneyhon, “Economic Democracy in 
Antebellum Arkansas, Phillips County, 1850-1860,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 40 (Summer 
1981):  154-172 [quotation on p. 172].   
19 DeBlack, With Fire and Sword, 2.  Ira Berlin, a leading scholar of American slavery, 
defines “slave societies” as those where slavery, as the dominant form of labor, shaped all other 
social relationships in that society.  “Societies with slaves,” on the other hand, were societies 
where slavery existed but was not the dominant form of labor.  Berlin, Many Thousands Gone:  
The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge, Mass.:  Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 1-14.  
20 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 14; Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., and Roy P. 
Stonesifer, Jr., The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow (Chapel Hill:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993), 141-143.  Leonidas L. Johnson, Esq., of Louisiana was another absentee 
planter with landholdings in Phillips County.  Johnson, a former resident of Phillips County, 
reportedly visited his plantation at Old Town, approximately twenty miles south of Helena, in 
early 1860.  Helena Southern Shield, February 4, 1860.  
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prominent positions in local, state, and national government.  They included James C. Tappan, a 
state representative who later rose to the rank of brigadier general in the Confederate army; 
Thomas B. Hanly, an Arkansas Supreme Court justice, state representative, delegate to 
Arkansas’s 1861 secession convention, and Confederate congressman; William K. Sebastian, 
U.S. Senator from 1848-1861; and Sebastian’s law partner Charles W. Adams, a secession 
convention delegate and Confederate brigadier (and activist Helen Keller’s grandfather).21   
Perhaps most prominent, at least in due course, was Thomas C. Hindman, a Mexican War 
lieutenant, fire-eating U.S. congressman from 1859-1861, and commander of the Confederacy’s 
Trans-Mississippi District in 1862, and Patrick R. Cleburne, ultimately regarded as one of the top 
divisional commanders in the rebel army.  Cleburne, an ambitious Irish immigrant, moved to 
Helena in 1850 to work as a pharmacist in a drugstore owned by two local doctors, Hector Grant 
and Charles Nash.  The hardworking Cleburne quickly earned enough money to purchase Dr. 
Grant’s share in the store, only to sell it in 1854 to focus his efforts on studying for the bar—in 
Judge Thomas Hanly’s law library, no less.  That same year, Thomas Hindman, a hotheaded 
partisan and attorney from Ripley, Mississippi, relocated to Helena.  Hindman and Cleburne 
ultimately became close friends, political allies, and law partners.  Both men, like most of 
Helena’s aspiring young professionals, understood that the law was a gateway to social 
prominence in the community.22    
                                                          
21 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 8-10; “Seven Confederate Generals of Phillips 
County Arkansas,” in “Phillips County” Vertical File, Mullins Library; Biographical and 
Historical Memoirs of Eastern Arkansas, 741-742. 
22 On the life of Thomas Hindman, see Bobby Roberts, “Thomas C. Hindman, Jr.:  
Secessionist and Confederate General” (M.A. thesis, University of Arkansas, 1972); and Diane 
Neal and Thomas W. Kremm, Lion of the South:  General Thomas C. Hindman (Macon, Ga.:  
Mercer University Press, 1993).  On Patrick Cleburne’s pre-Civil War years in Helena, see Craig 
L. Symonds, Stonewall of the West:  Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War (Lawrence:  University 
Press of Kansas, 1997), 26-44; and Purdue and Purdue, Pat Cleburne, 23-62.  L. H. Mangum, 
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Most of Phillips County’s residents, however, were not socially prominent.  In 1860, only 
35.3 percent of the county’s free adult males owned any improved farmland, and only 16.9 
percent owned slaves.  Moreover, of the approximately four-hundred farmers who tended 
improved acreage in the county in that year, only 73.1 percent owned land.  In other words, over 
a quarter of Phillips County’s free farmers were tenants, renters, or farm laborers.  Frequently 
lumped together as “poor whites,” these people constituted one of the largest classes in Phillips 
County on the eve of the war.  In spite of their numbers, they remained economically and 
politically subordinate to the county’s wealthy landowners and businessmen.23 
Many of those businessmen, including Patrick Cleburne, had offices in Helena’s vibrant 
downtown district centered on Front and Ohio Streets.24  On the eve of the Civil War, that 
district included a busy waterfront, a small, two-story frame courthouse, a two-story brick jail, a 
pair of merchant tailors, a hotel, a milliner, a watchmaker and jeweler, a tin shop, a Swamp Land 
Office, at least five mercantile stores, and a cabinet and carpenter shop.  Helena’s carpenters, like 
its farmers, depended on the bounty of the surrounding Delta land.  They used lumber cut from 
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farms and fields, cypress from the lowlands, and oak, hickory, American beech, sugar maple, 
yellow poplar, and other hardwoods that grew atop Crowley’s Ridge.25  Some of the logs—
hewed at the steam-powered sawmill near the river—were used by locals.  Others were loaded 
onto steamboats at the nearby wharf and shipped upriver to Memphis, Cairo, St. Louis, 
Louisville, and Cincinnati, or downriver to New Orleans—the North American interior’s 
gateway to the larger Atlantic world.26   
Contrary to popular myth, frontier communities like Helena were not isolated.  Several 
roads linked Helena to the Arkansas interior; the main ones, including the Little Rock Road, 
were strategically built atop the hills west of town.  An early newspaper editor noted that Helena 
was one of the only places on the Mississippi River that could be reached from the Arkansas 
interior via high and dry roads.27  By the late 1850s, passengers could travel by coach from 
Helena to Little Rock for eleven dollars.  Stagecoaches—which also carried the mail—departed 
Helena every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday at midnight and arrived in the state capital thirty-
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four hours later.  Postmasters supervised the dispatch and delivery of mail at Helena within a 
year of the town’s founding, while local newspapers printed “prices current” columns so 
residents could stay informed of market conditions and maximize their selling and purchasing 
power.28   
By October 1860, Helena’s newspaper editors could acquire that information via a 
telegraph line that linked their town to Memphis, and thus, to the nation at large.  In fact, the first 
dispatch ever sent over a wire in Arkansas reportedly was transmitted out of Helena, across a 
“submarine cable” to Panola, Mississippi, and up to Memphis.  A local newspaperman 
understood the implications of his town’s new line.  When it was completed, he announced, 
“Helena is in telegraphic communication with the whole telegraphic world.  Let that fact be 
known.”  By early 1861, a second telegraph line connected Helena to Madison, Arkansas, a 
terminal point on the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad (M&LR), Arkansas’s only antebellum 
railway.  On the eve of the Civil War, a telegraph line spanned the entire 133 miles from 
Memphis to Little Rock, but the tracks of the M&LR did not.  By late January 1862, the 
railroad’s eastern and western thirds had been completed, but its middle section—which 
traversed the swampy White River Lowlands—had not.  The environmental obstacles of the 
lowlands, in conjunction with money shortages and the chaos of the Civil War, delayed the 
completion of the M&LR until 1871.  Even then, wartime travelers used a combination or rail, 
stagecoach, and steamboat to make the journey from Memphis to Little Rock in twenty-seven to 
thirty-six hours—a full twenty-four hours shorter than traveling by steamboat alone.29   
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More than any other factor, rivers kept Phillips County connected to the outside world.  
Steamboats regularly carried residents up and down the Mississippi, St. Francis, and L’Anguille 
rivers, and they brought goods from Memphis and New Orleans, whose businesses advertised in 
Helena newspapers.  One local restaurant served fresh oysters that were delivered daily from 
New Orleans packed in ice.  The county’s farmers and businessmen regularly exported cotton, 
lumber, and other products via the Delta’s numerous waterways, while merchants imported a 
variety of finished items for sale to local citizens.  H. P. Coolidge, one of Helena’s earliest 
merchants, set up shop in town less than a decade after its incorporation.  On the eve of the Civil 
War, he and his son owned a mattress factory and a prosperous dry goods store that sold items 
from around the Mississippi valley.  A former slave in Phillips County recalled that Coolidge’s 
store was the “biggest” in town and sold “everything most,” including “boots, shoes, tobacco, 
medicine en so on.”  Coolidge used his connections in New Orleans, Philadelphia, and New 
York to open a private bank, and, like most of Helena’s top businessmen, he also dabbled in land 
sales.30   
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Before the Civil War, Phillips County was home to a number of other businesses, 
including baking, butchering, shoemaking, blacksmithing, tanning, harness manufacturing, and 
grist-milling.  Nash and Cleburne’s Drug Store, located in Helena’s downtown district, continued 
to operate under the same name for two years after its owners sold it, while the Helena Home 
Insurance Company was incorporated in late 1860.31  In the town’s early years, the State Bank 
and local branch of the Real Estate Bank of Arkansas were particularly important businesses in a 
planter-dominated community whose prosperity rested on the land.32  Charles Adams, a member 
of the famed family from Massachusetts, worked as a cashier at the Real Estate Bank before 
joining the bar.  Reflecting on Helena’s commercial success on the eve of the war, one citizen 
bragged, “[T]he amount of dry goods, clothing, drugs, stationery, etc., will compare favorably 
with that of any other city of or above the same size.”  Moreover, he asserted, “The cotton 
shipped from this port during the year is of a quantity by no means small—not including those 
quantities sent away by cotton brokers and speculators.”  These “facts,” he concluded, were “not 
to be denied” and were “evidence of advancing prosperity.”33 
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Inevitably, much of that prosperity was built on the backs of Phillips County’s enslaved 
people.  Although most of these people’s voices sadly have been lost to history, the surviving 
evidence shows that they did not docilely accept their servile status.  Some of them fled their 
homes to protest poor treatment or “steal away” their bodies to freedom, while others violently 
resisted their owners’ and overseers’ demands.  In August 1859, for example, an enslaved person 
who lived near Helena reportedly crushed his overseer’s skull with an axe.  Less than a week 
later, he was captured and hanged (without a trial) near the scene of the crime, his body left 
dangling to warn other slaves against committing such acts.  Such extreme forms of resistance, 
however, were both difficult and hazardous—they required individuals to abandon their families 
and surmount near-impossible odds, and they sometimes resulted in death.  Accordingly, most 
enslaved Arkansans preferred subtler methods of resistance, so-called “weapons of the weak,” to 
challenge their owners and carve out spaces for themselves within the brutal institution of 
slavery.  For example, some stole extra food for themselves and their families, feigned sickness, 
broke tools, or sang songs to slow down their work, which could buy them a brief respite.  
Likewise, some communicated via the grapevine telegraph, practiced covert religions, and built 
strong networks of family and friends, which buoyed them in trying times.34  Oftentimes, their 
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networks extended beyond their immediate household.  A former slave in the Helena area, for 
example, recalled traveling to a plantation south of town to visit his family members two or three 
times per week.  Apparently, the slaves on this plantation were allowed to host barbecues 
attended by enslaved people from two other area plantations.35   
Phillips County’s enslaved people, like their free counterparts, frequently utilized the 
Delta landscape to their advantage.  The dense forests, wetlands, and streams of eastern Arkansas 
served as excellent hiding places, and, occasionally, avenues to freedom.  Dock Wilborn, a 
former slave in Phillips County, remembered that his father sometimes responded to his master’s 
whippings by “escap[ing] to the dense forests that surrounded the plantation where he would 
remain for days” or until he was recaptured.  Similarly, Peter Brown, another ex-slave, recalled 
that when his master tried to force his pregnant mother to work, his father “stole her out” and 
escorted her to a canebrake to sleep over night.  Like Wilborn’s father, it does not appear that 
Brown’s parents intended to flee their home permanently; rather, they temporarily ran away to 
protest their owner’s treatment.  Remarkably, a panther attacked the couple while they lay in the 
canebrake, and the man fended it off with a Bowie knife.  The woman also gave birth to her baby 
that night, and upon returning home the next day, the owner promised that if the man “would 
stay out of the woods they wouldn’t make her work no more.”  Instead, she could devote her 
time to child rearing.  It was a small victory—precipitated by the couple’s daring resistance and 
use of the land—but it was a victory nevertheless.36 
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Thanks in part to slave labor, Phillips County’s free population (which included four 
African Americans) was able to enjoy a variety of cultural and recreational activities before the 
Civil War.37  For example, residents hiked on Crowley’s Ridge, hunted and rode horses in the 
countryside, and fished and sailed on the Mississippi—a potentially dangerous activity given the 
steady steamboat traffic along the river.  Additionally, they perused art and science exhibits at 
the Helena Athenaeum and listened to public lectures at the county courthouse.  They also read 
books housed in the town’s three private libraries, which reportedly contained a combined 5,000 
volumes.  Patrick Cleburne was as involved in Helena’s civic life as anyone.  In the 1850s, the 
determined Irishman was a member of the community literary club, debating society, and chess 
club.38   
Some of the county’s most privileged children attended one of its six private schools, 
which, like most schools of the era, were segregated according to race and sex.  The schools 
convened for terms of twenty-one weeks at a cost of fifteen to forty-five dollars per term.  A 
typical curriculum for males included courses in English, reading, writing, arithmetic, history, 
geography, chemistry, mensuration (geometric measuring), engineering, navigation, and 
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bookkeeping on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, and Latin, French, Greek, belles lettres 
(literature), algebra, geometry, and rhetoric on Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays.  Female 
students also studied English, Latin, and French, if not mathematics and science, and, in 
accordance with the era’s prevailing gender norms, they learned embroidery, bead work, and 
music, both vocal and instrumental (piano or guitar).39  In 1858, select young ladies began 
boarding at the St. Catherine Convent and Academy, where four Catholic nuns from Ireland 
administered their education.  There was no college in Helena before the Civil War, though in 
1859 it was rumored that a local man had donated the funds to build one in his will.  One 
reporter gleefully predicted that “with ordinary management and proper investment,” the new 
college’s endowment would “equal that of Harvard University.”40 
Phillips County’s most distinguished adult males belonged to Helena’s Masonic lodge, 
“the handsomest building in the city” according to one resident.  The Freemasons, an 
international fraternal order whose past members included Thomas Jefferson and George 
Washington, had been in Arkansas since its earliest territorial days.  Contrary to popular belief, 
Freemasonry was a fraternity, not a religion, though its members were required to exhibit 
morality and virtue and believe in the existence of a supreme being.  “Nearly all the respectable 
male members of the town, and many from the country” were members of Helena’s lodge, one 
                                                          
39 Worley, “Helena on the Mississippi,” 5-6.  Worley notes that six schools were reported 
in Phillips County in 1850, and all were privately funded.  Ten years later, however, “all the 
schools in Phillips County received a part of their support from public funds though all were still 
dependent primarily on private income.”  On the curricula and cost for male and female 
academies in Helena, see the advertisements for the “Helena Male School on Rightor St., under 
the Superintendence of Nelson & Montgomery” and the “Select School for Young Ladies,” both 
in the Helena Southern Shield, February 8, 1862. 
40 Phillips County Historical Society, Historic Helena-West Helena Arkansas (Helena:  
Phillips County Chamber of Commerce, 1973), 12; “Arkansas Items,” Memphis Daily 
Avalanche, April 6, 1859. 
33 
 
member recalled.  They included Judge Hanly, James Tappan, H. P. Coolidge, Charles Adams, 
Hector Grant, Charles Nash, and Patrick Cleburne, who was elected lodge master in 1853.  That 
same year, Little Rock attorney Albert Pike, Arkansas’s most distinguished Freemason, 
conferred upon Grant, Nash, and Cleburne “the sublime degree of Royal Arch Mason.”  As lodge 
leaders, the three men helped spearhead an annual Masonic convention in Helena that 
commemorated the nativity of St. John the Baptist.  The event even attracted Freemasons from 
nearby Friars Point and Austin, Mississippi.41 
Those Mississippi Masons, like their counterparts in Helena, did not view the river as a 
significant boundary.  Rather, they saw it as an avenue that joined, rather than divided, the 
communities of the Mississippi valley.  Unlike modern Americans, who travel chiefly by 
automobile, most Americans of the mid-nineteenth century—especially those on the Trans-
Mississippi frontier—were “boat people.”  As historian William Shea writes, they “lived in a 
world of waterways and watercraft. They viewed navigable bodies of water as highways, not 
obstacles; as connectors, not dividers.”  Antebellum Helenians embodied this mentality.  Roads 
in the region were unreliable, and before the Civil War, there was no bridge linking Helena to the 
Mississippi shoreline.  However, steamboats regularly carted passengers from one side of the 
river to the other.  One local ferry service advertised that the trip took only ten minutes, though 
on the eve of the Civil War, complaints against the ferry’s management were reportedly “very 
general.”  Even then, a number of Helena’s attorneys used the ferry to conduct business in 
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Mississippi counties, while planters on both sides of the river regularly crossed to and fro.  For 
example, Charles Nash’s drugstore and medical practice were located in Helena, but he owned a 
plantation in Mississippi that he eventually made his home.  At the same time, Mississippi 
planter James L. Alcorn, a former Whig and Mason from Friars Point (and future governor of 
Mississippi), regularly traversed the Mississippi to conduct business and buy supplies in 
Helena.42   
Unfortunately, disease was not bounded by the waters of the Mississippi, either.  In the 
fall of 1855, a steamboat from New Orleans arrived in Helena carrying several passengers 
infected with yellow fever.  A deadly epidemic subsequently erupted in the town, and most of the 
citizens who could afford to do so fled to the surrounding countryside.  Three doctors remained 
to care for the sick, but when they asked for volunteers to stay and assist them, only three 
stepped forward:  a local preacher, Thomas Hindman, and Patrick Cleburne.  While the 
physicians cared for their suffering patients, the three “young philanthropists” delivered bread, 
soup, and tea to the sick and buried the dead.  After two taxing months, the epidemic finally 
subsided.  Looking back on the event forty years later, one of the doctors recalled that the “part 
that Cleburne and Hindman took as nurses made them confidential friends, though they differed 
                                                          
42 William L. Shea, “The War We Have Lost,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 70 
(Summer 2011):  108; “Steam Ferry Boat at Helena,” Helena Southern Shield, October 25, 1856; 
“A Trip to Arkansas,” Memphis Daily Appeal, April 11, 1860.  James C. Tappan & John Hornor, 
attorneys at law, advertised that they would go to court in the first Arkansas judicial district and 
in Tunica and Coahoma counties in Mississippi.  Helena Southern Shield, February 4, 1860.  
Similarly, attorneys Patrick Cleburne and Mark Alexander, whose law office was located in 
Helena, announced that they would “attend all the courts in the first circuit of this State, and the 
various courts in the western counties of Mississippi.”  Symonds, Stonewall of the West, 40.  Dr. 
Charles Nash retired his medical practice and relocated to his plantation in Tunica County, 
Mississippi, before the Civil War.  Nash, Biographical Sketches, 85.  James L. Alcorn’s 
connections to Helena are well documented.  See, for example, James Lusk Alcorn to My Dear 
Wife [Amelia Alcorn], 16 March 1863, in P. L. Rainwater, ed., “Letters of James Lusk Alcorn,” 
Journal of Southern History 3 (May 1937):  204. 
35 
 
at that time in politics.”  He also remembered that his three assistants represented three of 
Helena’s churches.  The preacher was a Methodist, Hindman a Presbyterian, and Cleburne an 
Episcopalian.43 
Cleburne was a vestryman at St. John’s Episcopal Church, one of twenty-nine churches 
in Phillips County on the eve of the war.  St. John’s had been organized as a parish in 1853, but 
its members did not erect a church building until the winter of 1860-1861.  Thus, for seven years, 
its religious services—which included the baptisms of both free and enslaved congregants—were 
held in either the Helena courthouse, a storehouse, or in various members’ homes.  The parish’s 
reluctance to build a sanctuary frustrated its rector, who resigned his post in the spring of 1859 
because the church’s members were “scattered, most of them living in the country.”  More than 
that, he complained, “the planters look askance upon the town, feel no pride in its growth, and 
take no interest in building it up.  It is little, therefore, and in some instances nothing that they 
will give toward the building of a church in Helena.”  Perhaps the rector’s departure motivated 
those allegedly apathetic planters, for the parish decided to break ground on a church building 
the very next year.  In the fall of 1860, James Tappan purchased a plot “east of the cypress 
swamp” in downtown Helena and donated it to his parish as a site for its new church.  Nature 
mandated the church be constructed of cypress, not brick, which members feared would sink into 
the town’s waterlogged land.  The building was finished the following spring, and inaugural 
services held on Easter Eve, 1861.  St. John’s parishioners could not have known it at the time, 
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but only two weeks later, Confederate gunners at Charleston, South Carolina, fired on Fort 
Sumter, thus inaugurating the Civil War.44      
Like Cleburne and Tappan, a number of Phillips County’s most prominent citizens were 
Episcopalians, yet most of its residents attended other churches.  As in most antebellum southern 
communities, Protestant Christianity dominated.  On the eve of the Civil War, Phillips County 
was home to ten Methodist churches, eight Baptist, seven Presbyterian, two Christian, and one 
Roman Catholic Church, in addition to the aforementioned St. John’s.  The county also 
experienced the aftershocks of the Second Great Awakening—a swell of evangelical Christian 
revivalism that swept the United States from the late eighteenth century through the 1830s.  
Generally speaking, revivalist preachers—who often ascended the pulpit (or the stump) at rural 
camp meetings—told listeners that their souls could be saved through righteous action, and that 
they should work to perfect themselves and the world in preparation for Christ’s imminent 
return.  In the summer of 1853, an especially energetic revival erupted in Helena and ensnared 
many of its citizens, including the Episcopalian Cleburne.  Meetings were held in the woods 
outside town, and Cleburne, in particular, was attracted to the simplicity and purity of the 
religious services, which involved “worship[ping] God beneath his own ethereal roof.”  The 
Irishman was so moved by the experience that he temporarily converted to evangelical 
Presbyterianism, though he eventually returned to worship at St. John’s.45 
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In some parts of the United States, the Second Great Awakening’s emphasis on 
“perfectionism” inspired fervent reform movements in which Americans strove to rid their nation 
of activities and institutions they deemed sinful.  These reformers, many of whom hailed from 
the evangelical ranks, championed a variety of causes, including the abolition of slavery, school 
and prison reform, and abstinence from alcoholic drink, or temperance.  Temperance reformers 
had plenty of potential targets.  In 1830, the average per capita consumption of absolute alcohol 
for Americans of drinking age (15+) was roughly seven gallons per year; in twenty-first century 
terms, that was roughly the equivalent of eighty-eight fifths of eighty-proof alcohol per year.46  
Statistics on drinking in antebellum Helena are unavailable, but, like other frontier river towns, 
Helena acquired a reputation as a lawless den of drunken gamblers.  When Traveler G. W. 
Featherstonhaugh visited Arkansas in the late 1830s, a native of the state warned him that Helena 
was a place “where all sorts of ‘negur runners,’ counterfeiters,’ ‘horse-stealers,’ ‘murderers, and 
sich like,’ took shelter ‘agin the law.’”  Some fifteen years later, the town was home to at least 
one saloon—across the street from Nash and Cleburne’s drugstore—where “Irish levee men” 
reportedly “were in the habit of coming across the Mississippi River and getting on sprees.”47   
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Beginning in the 1840s, a number of temperance societies formed to combat Helena’s 
unsavory reputation.  Patrick Cleburne, who joined a local chapter of the international Sons of 
Temperance, told his stepmother that when he arrived in Helena in 1850, the town had only one 
church and four “drinking & gambling houses.”  Nearly four years later, however, there were a 
total of three churches, and the drinking houses were “not making any thing.”  Cleburne credited 
the Sons of Temperance with “work[ing] wonders for the morality of Helena,” and apparently, a 
majority of its citizens agreed.  In 1854, Phillips County voters went to the polls and directed 
their representatives in Little Rock “to obtain the passage of a special act, prohibiting the sale of 
vinous and spirituous liquors in less quantity than one quart.”  For his part, Cleburne was proud 
to have helped clean up what was once considered “the haunt of the most reckless desperate 
characters in the Mississippi Valley”—a place where “pistol & Bowie Knife decided every 
quarrel.”  One wonders how Cleburne’s stepmother might have responded to her son’s optimistic 
description of his adopted town’s progress had she known that only two and a half years later, he 
would nearly be killed in a downtown gunfight.48 
Cleburne’s 1856 gunfight—in which the Irishman served as an accomplice to his rash 
companion Thomas Hindman—was the result of a political dispute gone awry, and when viewed 
within the context of antebellum America, his predicament was not unique.  Politics in Helena, 
like politics across the United States in this period, was a passionate pastime that inspired intense 
partisanship and occasional violence.  Helena was founded at the beginning of what scholars call 
the “party period,” an era spanning the 1830s through the 1890s characterized by high voter 
turnout in elections, intense party loyalty, extensive patronage, the proliferation of partisan 
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newspapers, detailed party organization, close competition in elections, and widespread 
participation in political rallies, torchlight parades, and barbecues.49  The causes of this political 
upsurge are complex, but the growing number of eligible American voters certainly contributed 
to the fury.  In 1789, Vermont was the only state that had no property or tax requirements for 
voting.  Over the next thirty years, however, westward expansion, a growing egalitarianism 
spurred by the American and Market Revolutions, party competition, and other factors prompted 
most states either to abolish or reduce their property-holding or tax-paying suffrage 
requirements.  Consequently, by 1840, over ninety percent of adult white males enjoyed the right 
to vote, and for the next fifty years, most exercised that right, as average turnout in presidential 
elections soared to some eighty percent of eligible voters.50   
The most famous observer of the American people in this period, French aristocrat Alexis 
de Tocqueville, did not visit Phillips County when he toured the United States in the 1830s, but 
he did detect the political frenzy of the party period, noting that it was “difficult to say what 
place the cares of politics occupy in the life of a man in the United States.  To meddle in the 
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government of society and to speak about it is the greatest business and, so to speak, the only 
pleasure that an American knows.”  Tocqueville’s observation was astute.  The practice of 
politics in antebellum American was not restricted to the ballot box; rather, it involved regular 
participation in a complex political culture that espoused democracy, liberty, and equality 
(though the definitions assigned to each could vary widely).  Women, denied formal voting 
rights, nevertheless found ways to act politically by organizing and attending rallies, circulating 
petitions, mentoring children, writing articles, and participating in the era’s reform movements.  
A group of Phillips County women, for example, hosted a barbecue for Thomas Hindman before 
the congressman left for Washington in late 1859.  After the event, one of the organizers wrote a 
detailed letter to her brother articulating her views on Hindman’s political talents, the 
Democratic Party, race, slavery, sectionalism, northern wage labor, and the state of the union.  
Unable to vote or run for office, the woman staked her position on the foremost political topics 
of the day via other means.  She was not extraordinary.  Simply put, few free Americans of the 
period would have described themselves as apolitical.  Even in a little frontier town like Helena, 
politics was the thing to do.51 
When Cleburne and Hindman dueled with their political rivals in the spring of 1856, the 
most prominent parties in Phillips County were the Democrats and the Know-Nothings.  The 
Democratic Party, officially called the “American Democracy,” had emerged in the 1820s as the 
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party of white male egalitarianism, limited government (especially at the national level), and 
opposition to “special interests” like the Second Bank of the United States, which President 
Andrew Jackson, the party’s founder, had effectively painted as the enemy of the common man.  
Some twenty years later, the Know-Nothing, or American, Party arose when a host of semisecret 
nativist organizations—whose members allegedly responded to questions about their clandestine 
rituals by claiming they “knew nothing”—coalesced to oppose infiltration of the United States 
by immigrants, especially Irish and German Catholics.  Among other things, the Know-Nothings 
wanted to lengthen immigrants’ waiting period for naturalized citizenship and bar Catholics and 
immigrants from public office.  Although the Know-Nothing movement originated in the late 
1840s, Arkansas’s American Party was not born until 1854.  Many of its members, though 
ostensibly committed to nativism, were former Whigs looking for a new political home after 
their party had begun to unravel two years earlier.52   
 Cleburne was one of those former Whigs in search of a new party, and, as relative 
newcomer from Ireland, he understandably detested the Know-Nothings.  Thus, in 1855 he 
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joined forces with his friend and colleague Hindman, a staunch Democrat, in an impassioned 
effort to discredit them.  Political excoriation was an activity at which Thomas Hindman 
excelled.  A friend in Helena described him as an “ambitious politician, rather overbearing in 
expression . . . uncompromising in every thing,” while a congressional colleague called him an 
“an irreconcilable man.  No one could eat more fire in a given time in connection with Southern 
questions in [the 36th] Congress” the congressman wrote.  “While [Hindman] was on the floor of 
the House it seemed as if he was perpetually anxious to have a duel.”  In May 1855, the irascible 
Hindman organized the Phillips County Democratic Association to promote the party’s activities 
in the county, and two months later, his lieutenant Cleburne lambasted the Know-Nothings at a 
local Democratic rally hosted by some of the county’s women.  Though he had not garnered a 
reputation as a rousing orator, Cleburne decried the Know-Nothings’ nativism and anti-
Catholicism and effectively linked them to abolitionism—always good politics in planter-
dominated Phillips County.53   
Shortly thereafter, Cleburne was elected secretary of the county’s Democratic 
Association, and in November, he and Hindman sponsored a Democratic festival at “Camp 
Jefferson” on the outskirts of Helena, complete with food and drink, banners, artillery, a brass 
band from Memphis, and, of course, fervid speeches condemning the Know-Nothings.  Speakers 
included William Sebastian, Gideon Pillow, and a former Mississippi congressman who 
admonished Arkansas Know-Nothings to remember that their “most vital interests were now 
imperiled by a fanatical majority at the North.”  Thousands reportedly attended the two-day 
meeting, which unanimously adopted a resolution specifying Congressional actions that would 
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precipitate a “dissolution of the Union.”  Though no one knew it at the time, the resolution 
portended events to come.54   
The following spring, Hindman and Cleburne, now firm Democratic allies, purchased a 
local newspaper and tellingly rechristened it the States Rights Democrat.  On the eve of the Civil 
War, it was one of three newspapers printed in Helena, though by 1860 it was under different 
ownership.  Helena’s antebellum newspapers, like most in nineteenth-century America, were 
overtly partisan publications, but that did not stop one citizen from boasting in 1860 that the “the 
news and topics of the day” were “published in Helena very liberally indeed.”  He believed the 
town’s three weeklies were evidence that freedom of the press, “that great constitutional right 
and privilege of democratic government and country, which reflects the opinions, the thoughts, 
the deeds and actions of men,” was championed in Helena.  A visitor to the town in April 1860 
agreed.  “Three well conducted newspapers in a small town, well supported, too,” was “not 
common,” he wrote.  In his view, the papers were “gratifying evidence of the intelligence and 
liberality” of Helena’s populace.55 
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 By the spring of 1856, Hindman and Cleburne were esteemed citizens, leading 
Democrats, and newspaper owners.  And thus, the stage was set for the most famous duel in 
Helena’s history.  Two months after the first issue of the States Rights Democrat rolled off the 
press, the hot-tempered Hindman chastised a state legislator from Phillips County, Dorsey Rice, 
for deserting his fellow Democrats for the Know-Nothings, publicly labeling him “the mulatto 
would-be Senator.”  This was out of bounds.  Dorsey may have been a political turncoat, but in 
nineteenth-century America—especially on the southern frontier—using racial language to 
publicly disparage an opponent was, by most counts, off limits.  One contemporary said 
Hindman had “stripped every vestage of political clothing from Rice and left nothing but his 
naked deformity.”  Predictably, Rice wanted vengeance, and word reached Hindman that he was 
plotting it.  No stranger to political confrontations, the cautious Hindman assumed that he might 
need backup, so after arming himself, he visited Cleburne and asked his friend to dine with him 
at a local hotel.  Cleburne obliged, grabbing two derringer pistols on his way out the door.56    
At just past one o’clock in the afternoon on May 24, 1856, the two men met Rice, flanked 
by two of his relatives, on Front Street in downtown Helena.  Rice demanded that Hindman 
apologize, and predictably, the short-tempered Democrat refused, instead replying with a sling of 
insults.  Shots were fired, and when the smoke cleared, three men lay wounded on the ground.  
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One of Rice’s accomplices, who Cleburne’s former drugstore co-owner said was “as brave a man 
as ever breathed the atmosphere of free people,” died within a few days.  A ball struck Hindman 
in the chest, but a surgeon removed it, and the hard-nosed Democrat convalesced rather quickly.  
The same could not be said for Cleburne.  Shot just below the waist, a ball lodged dangerously 
close to his spine.  Immediately after the melee, friends carried him to a nearby bed, where he 
languished near death for ten days while Dr. Nash, his old friend and business partner, sat beside 
him.  Eventually, a surgeon was able to remove the ball and Cleburne recovered, though the 
effects of his injury plagued him for the rest of his life.57 
 In the aftermath of the gunfight, Hindman and Cleburne grew even closer.  According to 
Nash, the “political friendship which existed between [the two men] now became a warm 
personal and lasting friendship.”  The two eventually recuperated, were exonerated for their role 
in the shootout, and swiftly returned to the campaign trail.  Their efforts paid immediate 
dividends, as Democrats captured the presidency, the Arkansas governorship, both of the state’s 
Congressional seats, twelve of the thirteen state Senate seats, and three-fourths of the various 
county races in the elections of 1856, though the Know-Nothing contender for governor won 
Phillips and four other counties.  In the wake of these victories, Cleburne scaled back his 
political activism and instead focused his attention on his legal practice and land speculation.  
His partner, however, was just warming up.  In 1858, Hindman was elected to the U.S. Congress, 
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where, over the next two years, his fire-eating extremism grew even hotter.  He would eventually 
help lead Arkansas out of the Union.58   
 And yet, the secession of Arkansas and ten other slaveholding states—and the civil war 
their separation triggered—was still months away.  In early 1860, Phillips County’s free 
residents, like many in the United States at large, had plenty of reasons to be optimistic about 
their future.  From 1850 to 1860, the cash value of Phillips County’s farms had increased by 691 
percent, making it the richest county in Arkansas on the eve of the war.  Although most of that 
wealth was owned by large farmers who lived outside Helena, the town itself saw a 48.3 percent 
increase in revenue from 1859 to 1860.  This growth, in conjunction with the community’s 
existing amenities, natural advantages, and proud past, made one local lawyer eternally 
optimistic about his town’s prospects.  “It would seem to almost every one,” he wrote in 1860, 
“that a bright future must certainly be in anticipation; that [Helena] will surely occupy a place 
among the more prominent cities of the globe.”  The former rector of St. John’s Church agreed.  
A vocal critic of purported planter indifference toward Helena’s success, he nevertheless 
remained confident in the town’s future:  “But notwithstanding all drawbacks, Helena grows; and 
I am still of opinion that it is destined to be an important town.”  Neither the priest nor the lawyer 
could foresee what destructive events lay ahead.59 
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Chapter 2:  The Secession Crisis 
 
 
 On January 28, 1861, the telegraph office at Helena, Arkansas, was abuzz.  A dispatch—
sent from Little Rock to Memphis along the newly completed telegraph line and then relayed 
down to Helena—had just arrived reporting that a transport loaded with U.S. troops was 
steaming down the Arkansas River toward Little Rock.  The soldiers on board, recently stationed 
at Fort Gibson in the Indian Territory, were supposedly en route to the Arkansas capital to 
reinforce the city’s federal arsenal.  The news spread rapidly in Phillips County, and a number of 
residents panicked.  For months, they had heard rumors that the federal government, lately 
controlled by a cabal of northern radicals, was determined to abolish slavery and coerce the 
South into submission.  Fears of such reports had only intensified since November, when 
Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected president despite winning no electoral votes in the 
South.  Since Lincoln’s election, six slaveholding states had seceded from the Union, and 
although Arkansans had been contemplating secession, they had not yet decided on the matter.1   
In the minds of many in Phillips County, however, the latest dispatch from Little Rock 
was proof that the dominoes were falling.  A public meeting was called in Helena, and residents 
passed resolutions declaring it the duty of Arkansas Governor Henry M. Rector to seize the Little 
Rock arsenal and expel the troops who garrisoned it.  The following morning, Helenians wired 
their governor both a report of their resolutions and an offer to send five hundred militia to assist 
in their proposed operation.  The recently-inaugurated Rector was an erratic politician and a 
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strong proponent of states’ rights, but even he knew that to accept such a proposal would be 
reckless.  In effect, it would mean ordering a preemptive strike on a U.S. arsenal, an act that 
could precipitate war.  Therefore, his adjutant-general replied to Helena’s citizens that the 
governor had no authority to “take possession of a Federal post, whether threatened to be 
reinforced or not.”  But his message included an interesting caveat:  “Should the people assemble 
in their defense, the governor will interpose his official position in their behalf.”  If Helena’s 
leaders recognized the ambiguity of this response, they did not report it.  Instead, they ordered 
four militia companies to move to Little Rock at once.2  
One of those companies, the Yell Rifles, had been organized in Helena some six months 
earlier.  Named for Archibald Yell, a former Arkansas governor killed in the Mexican-American 
War, the company consisted of 115 volunteers, most of whom hailed from Phillips County’s 
upper crust.  Patrick Cleburne, who eventually was elected company captain, described his unit 
as a “splendid company of Riflemen,” the majority of them “young planters of the county.”  One 
of those planters was Lucius E. Polk, a close friend of Cleburne, nephew of Episcopal Bishop 
Leonidas Polk, and a future Confederate general.  Throughout the fall of 1860, Cleburne led Polk 
and his comrades in regular afternoon drilling.  Contemporaries said the Irishman, a veteran of 
the British army, possessed both the skills and demeanor required to whip his men into shape.  
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Years later, a former soldier recalled that he “never before nor since saw as fine a body of men, 
or as well drilled, as was the Yell rifles.”  Their abilities notwithstanding, the Rifles were no 
aberration.  Throughout the tense summer and fall of 1860, similar militia and “Minute Men” 
units formed across the South, including Phillips County’s own Phillips Guards.  Both the 
Guards and the Rifles were part of a short but distinguished military tradition in Phillips County.  
Only fourteen years earlier, the county had sent a company with the First Arkansas Volunteer 
Cavalry to fight in Mexico.3 
Helena’s increasingly martial atmosphere in the summer and fall of 1860 was a boon to 
resident secessionists.  Scholars have portrayed Phillips County as one of the state’s earliest and 
staunchest separatist strongholds, and there is plenty of evidence to support this contention.  For 
example, two of antebellum Arkansas’s leading fire-eaters, Senator William K. Sebastian and 
Congressman Thomas C. Hindman, hailed from Helena, while Phillips County sent two pro-
separation delegates to the state’s 1861 secession convention.  Moreover, the county famously 
contributed seven generals to the Confederate cause, including Hindman, the top rebel officer in 
Arkansas in 1862, and Cleburne, who rose to the rank of major general in the Army of 
Tennessee.  However, in the fall of 1860, Arkansas’s secession—and the Civil War—lay several 
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months in the future, and Sebastian and Hindman, though certainly not alone in their sentiments, 
seem to have represented a minority of Phillips County citizens.4 
For most of 1860, unionism remained strong in both Phillips County and Arkansas at 
large.  During the previous decade, most white Arkansans, including those in the Delta, felt pride 
in the Union of states they had joined only twenty-four years earlier.  In their minds, the United 
States was still mankind’s best hope for democratic government—a beacon for the rest of the 
world to see—especially in the wake of the failed European revolutions of the 1840s.  In a 
January 1860 address before the U.S. House of Representatives, Arkansas Congressman Albert 
Rust proudly told his colleagues, “The people whom I represent, and whose sentiments . . . I 
believe I faithfully reflect, are eminently a national conservative, Union-loving people. Their 
love is not a romantic, sentimental, unreasoning passion.”5   
Harriet Everett of LaGrange (approximately twenty miles northwest of Helena) was one 
of those Arkansans to whom Rust referred.6  Though denied formal suffrage rights, Everett 
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embodied many of the characteristics of a typical fire-eating southerner.  She was a devoted 
Democrat (and Hindman admirer) and avowed white supremacist who accused northern 
politicians and New England ministers of inciting slave rebellions, stoking sectionalism, and 
“spreading . . . deadly hatred to the south.”  Like many white southerners, she also declared the 
South’s slaves happier, healthier, and more prosperous than the North’s factory workers, whom 
she called “slaves to capital.”  Her radicalism notwithstanding, Everett still hoped the Union 
could be preserved.  “Why dont the north, the Democrats I mean, arise as a band of Brothers, and 
save this union[?]” she asked her brother in January 1860.  “Of what use will be their union 
meetings when they continue to send men to Washington, that openly advocate Treason, and 
Rebellion, and would rejoice to see the South overwhelmed with desolation, and her soil deluged 
with the blood of her Sons, and daughters, her dwellings in flames[,] her fields laid waste[?]”  
Everett obviously felt little fondness for northerners, and ultimately, the extreme sectionalism 
(and penchant for finger-pointing) displayed by her and others like her would propel the nation 
to disunion and war.  However, she is proof that in early 1860, it was still possible to be both a 
firebrand and a unionist, even in Phillips County.7   
Arkansans like Everett knew that membership in the Union was about more than lofty 
ideals.  It also came with tangible benefits, including the protection of the U.S. army (especially 
significant in a frontier state), federal aid, and, perhaps most importantly for residents of the 
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Delta, a swamplands reclamation project launched in 1850.  Arkansas planters, in particular, 
were thriving in the Union.  “The planters in Alabama, North Carolina, and many other of the old 
States, when they rise from their beds in the morning, give their first thoughts . . . to the rich 
lands of Arkansas,” boasted a Little Rock newspaper in 1857.  “If cotton will only hold present 
prices for five years, Arkansas planters will be as rich as cream a foot thick.”  Three years later, 
Phillips County farmers expected their best corn crop in over a decade.  It is no coincidence that 
the Whigs—a party devoted to active federal involvement in the economy, including the funding 
of internal improvements like roads, canals, and railroads—enjoyed substantial support in 
Phillips County, especially among its planters, prior to the party’s collapse in the 1850s.  Though 
the Democrats dominated Arkansas as a whole before the Civil War, and they ultimately rose to 
the fore in Phillips County, one resident recalled that “for many years the strength of the two 
parties was about equal” in the county.8 
By 1860, however, the Whigs were effectively dead, and four other parties nominated 
candidates for that year’s presidential election.  The Democrats, unable to agree on a federal 
policy regarding slavery’s expansion, split into northern and southern wings.  Northern 
Democrats nominated Senator Stephen A. Douglas, author of the controversial 1854 Kansas-
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Nebraska Act and a proponent of popular sovereignty, or the idea that the residents of a territory 
should decide the fate of slavery for themselves.  Southern Democrats, including most of 
Arkansas’s party delegates, walked out of the party’s nominating conventions and chose Vice 
President John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky as their candidate.  Tellingly, they also advocated a 
federal law that would guarantee slavery in the western territories.  Most Arkansas Democrats, 
including those in the Delta, preferred Breckenridge over Douglas.  In March 1860—three 
months before the national party split—Phillips County Democrats adopted resolutions 
denouncing “squatter sovereignty, and other heresies which a faction at the North . . . [had] 
attempted to engraft” on the party platform.  In keeping with the position of most of his 
constituents, Congressman Hindman was one of the delegates who exited the June 1860 
convention that nominated Douglas.9   
Meanwhile, the Republican Party, born only six years earlier, met in Chicago and 
nominated former Illinois congressman Abraham Lincoln.  During the campaign, Lincoln 
repeatedly declared that he had “no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution 
of slavery” in states where it existed.  Moreover, he believed he had “no lawful right to do so” 
and “no inclination to do so.”  Most white southerners did not buy it.  Lincoln’s party had 
devoted itself to halting the expansion of slavery into the territories, and in the eyes of many in 
the South, this was at best a tacit condemnation of the southern way of life and at worst a step 
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toward general emancipation.  In most southern states, including Arkansas, citizens could not 
vote for Lincoln because there were no party tickets that bore his name.10   
The Constitutional Union Party, a new coalition of former Whigs, Know-Nothings, and 
moderate Democrats, also entered the contest.  In April 1860, a group of former Arkansas Whigs 
who styled themselves the “Opposition Party” met in Helena and elected delegates to the 
upcoming Constitutional Union convention in Baltimore.  One of those delegates was Q. K. 
Underwood, editor of the Southern Shield, Helena’s Whig newspaper.  The following month, he 
and his colleagues nominated John Bell, a planter and former Whig from Tennessee, to run for 
president.  Bell and his associates denounced extremists in both the North and the South, avoided 
the issue of slavery’s expansion, and endorsed “The Constitution of the Country, The Union of 
the States, and The Enforcement of the Laws,” including those that protected slavery.  Going 
forward, a number of prominent Helenians stumped for Bell, including attorney Charles W. 
Adams, an alternate delegate to the Baltimore convention, and Roland James Cook, secretary of 
the Helena convention and a future Confederate sergeant.11 
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The 1860 presidential election was the most consequential one in American history, yet 
most Arkansans remained rather detached from the contest for most of the campaign.  Instead, 
they continued to focus on local events, including their own August gubernatorial race, in which 
“Independent Democrat” Henry Rector, backed by Congressman Hindman, upset the candidate 
endorsed by the state’s longstanding Democratic dynasty.  “Politics!  yes great political 
excitement in Arkansas!  I have heard of nothing, thought of nothing, but politics for the last two 
months,” exclaimed a Helena lawyer following Rector’s victory.  “[T]he old Lion Democracy 
has come out of Our State elections triumphant – with the gallant Hindman at their head. . . .  
There is but little exitement [sic] felt here respecting the Presidential election [as] Arkansas is 
certain to go for Breckinridge.”12 
Voters in Arkansas’s first congressional district also reelected Hindman in 1860, but 
before his victory had been certified, the Southern Shield anticipated its hometown candidate’s 
defeat.  Early returns suggested that Jesse Cypert, “the Union candidate” from Searcy, had 
captured Phillips County, and the author believed Cypert’s election had national implications. 
“This is a glorious victory for the cause of the Union and the Constitution,” he wrote.  If the 
district that had “hitherto given overwhelming Democratic majorities” voted for Cypert, the 
author predicted it would “insure the State for Bell” in November.  Moreover, it would “serve to 
arouse a feeling, a confidence—inspire the Union men of all the States, from Maine to Louisiana, 
with a will and determination to do their duty, their whole duty to their country, by making one 
long, vigorous, hearty effort to succeed in the great national contest.”  The author must have 
been crushed to learn that Hindman trounced Cypert by more than a two to one margin, winning 
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twenty-three of the district’s twenty-seven counties.  Still, his editorial shows that in the fall of 
1860, unionism remained alive and well in Phillips County.13 
Their state elections completed, Arkansans gradually turned their attention to the 
presidential contest.  Judge John W. Brown of Camden called Election Day “the most important 
day to these United States, and perhaps to Mankind since the Fourth of July 1776,” but the 
evidence suggests that many in the state disagreed.  Although eighty percent of Arkansas voters 
cast ballots—the highest percentage in a presidential election in state history—they cast over 
seven thousand fewer votes for president than they did for governor two months earlier.14   
Still, the results of Arkansas’s election were conclusive.  Breckinridge won the state with 
28,783 votes (53 percent), while Bell and Douglas garnered 20,094 (37 percent) and 5,227 (9 
percent), respectively.  One might infer that Breckinridge won Arkansas because he was the 
candidate most closely associated with the preservation of slavery and southern rights, but most 
scholars disagree with this conclusion.  Bell, as it turned out, found his greatest success in 
eastern Arkansas, a traditional Whig stronghold of cotton-growing slaveholders.  The 
Constitutional Union candidate won a plurality of votes in five Delta counties, and a majority in 
one.  In Phillips County, Breckinridge bested Bell by a razor thin margin of thirteen votes, but 
the Tennessean appears to have won a majority in Helena.  Thanks to commercially-minded 
former Whigs, Bell also carried some of the state’s other entrepôts, including Little Rock and 
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Van Buren.  Breckinridge, for his part, dominated the cotton-producing areas of southern and 
southwestern Arkansas.  He also captured established Democratic counties in northern and 
western Arkansas, where slavery was less significant than in other parts of the state.  Given that 
many of these counties would be unionist strongholds in the years ahead, it appears that party 
loyalty, not Breckinridge’s platform, explains the Southern Democrat’s success.15   
Breckinridge’s victory in Arkansas and ten other slaveholding states was not enough to 
propel the Kentuckian to victory.  Over eighty percent of American voters cast ballots in the 
election, and though Lincoln garnered less than forty percent of their votes, his victories in the 
free states gave him a resounding sixty percent of the Electoral College.  Five days after the 
election, Judge Brown wrote, “The news of Lincoln’s election is confirmed. . . .  I am so much 
concerned about the fate of the Government and the prospect of individual ruin that I do not 
sleep more than half my usual and necessary time.”16   
Brown’s fears proved prescient.  Although Lincoln’s inauguration was nearly four 
months away, his election convinced a number of white southerners that they had lost their voice 
in the federal government.  As during the campaign, many believed that the president-elect and 
his “Black Republicans” threatened the South’s economy and lifestyle, both of which rested on 
the institution of slavery.  Lincoln had made it abundantly clear that he was not an abolitionist.  
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Moreover, his Republican Party, though certainly the preferred party of the small cadre of 
northern abolitionists, was not an abolitionist party.  However, most white southerners perceived 
them in just that way.17   
Upon hearing the news of Lincoln’s election, Harriet Everett lamented, “Now 
abolitionists have triumphed, and have ruined both north, and south.”  Her response was typical.  
Numerous white southerners presumed the Lincoln government would eradicate slavery, curb the 
South’s power, amalgamate the races, elevate black people, and, worst of all, unleash black 
violence and lechery on a degraded white population.  An Irish immigrant in western Alabama 
responded to Lincoln’s victory by exclaiming, “[S]ubmit to be governed by a sectional party 
whose grand aim is . . . to sink the southern white men to an equality with the negro!  Submit to 
have our wives and daughters choose between death and satisfying the hellish lust of the negro!  
Submit to have our children murdered, our dwellings burnt and our country desolated!!  Far 
better ten thousand deaths than submission to Black Republicanism.”18  A week after the 
election, a Phillips County woman expressed similar sentiments: 
Oh!  Brother what are we coming too [sic]? When we lay down at night in fear before 
morning we may be roused by there [sic] blood hounds. . . .  I feel now if I was ever to 
see a real abolitionist again that I should dread them as I would the worst of murderers! 
The vilest class of people in these United States when I say real I mean those that are 
willing to see the negroe set loose upon defenseless mothers & children. . . .  Do you 
think Lincoln will do any out ragious [sic] act when he takes the chair? . . . If there should 
be war what should we all do?  There has been great excitement here in this little 
place[.]19 
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In the weeks following Lincoln’s election, secessionist voices in Arkansas grew louder.  
Several Arkansas counties, including three in the Delta, demanded a state convention to discuss 
separation.  Phillips was not one of them, but resident fire-eaters like Thomas Hindman 
continued to agitate for the South’s withdrawal.  On November 23 and 24, Hindman and Edward 
Gantt, Arkansas’s other U.S. congressman-elect, “openly declared for secession” in speeches 
before the legislature.  According to one reporter, their speeches “were of the most ultra and 
inflammatory character.”  Three weeks later, a Little Rock newspaper owned by Hindman, the 
Old-Line Democrat, declared, “Lincoln has been deliberately flung in our teeth; there is nothing 
left for Arkansas to do but to follow the lead of the lower South, in secession or not.”  “Our 
destiny is irrevocably linked with that of the other cotton-growing States,” the author continued, 
and “we should not falter for one moment to seek that destiny or pause to deliberate the 
consequences that may follow.”20     
Most Arkansans, however, did not share Hindman’s views.  Though concerned about the 
election’s results, most remained loyal to the Union, urged caution, and adopted a wait-and-see 
approach toward the new administration.  Most state legislators, for example, rebuffed Hindman 
and Gantt’s pro-secession appeals.  According to one author, the congressmen-elect’s November 
23-24 speeches “produced a powerful reaction, and the Union sentiment in the legislature was 
greatly strengthened.”  A week earlier, a conservative Little Rock editorialist had announced, 
“Lincoln is elected in the manner prescribed by law, and by the majority required by the 
Constitution.”  “Let him be inaugurated,” the author implored his readers, “and let no steps be 
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taken against his administration until he has committed an overt act which can not be remedied 
by legal and Constitutional means.”  Another Little Rock newspaper, which served as a 
mouthpiece for the state’s Democratic dynasty, similarly announced it was “opposed to 
premature agitation or hasty legislation.”  Albert Rust’s stance was even more conservative.  In a 
speech before the state legislature, the outgoing congressman denied the right of a state to secede 
and proclaimed, “[I]f the opinion and wishes of nine-tenths of the people of Arkansas are 
reflected by her Representatives at Little Rock, and in Washington, her course in the present 
political crisis will be temperate and conservative.”21 
In Phillips County, unionism waned after Lincoln’s victory, but it was by no means 
extinguished.  A week later, a dedicated Democrat in LaGrange reported that some of her 
neighbors “wished they could see the Democrats tarred & burned to the stake.”  Because, by that 
time, most white residents of eastern Arkansas deemed the Democrats the party of secession, it is 
reasonable to assume those angry neighbors were unionists, perhaps perturbed by the escalating 
talk of separation.  At the very least, they must have been upset that their state had gone for 
Breckinridge in the election.22   
Two weeks later, Phillips County residents assembled at a mass meeting to discuss the 
implications of Lincoln’s election.  At the meeting’s conclusion, they adopted a resolution urging 
the Arkansas legislature to call a convention of the southern states to discuss the condition of the 
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Union.  “Entertaining the hope that our rights in the Union may yet be maintained,” the people 
proclaimed, “and believing that . . . the time is now upon us when . . . united action among all the 
southern states can and ought to be brought about . . . the legislature of Arkansas . . . ought to 
take prompt action toward bringing about the proposed southern convention.”  The people of 
Phillips County knew that South Carolinians were contemplating secession, and they wanted 
their representatives to “take some official action to induce South Carolina, and the more hasty 
of our southeastern sister states” to participate in the convention.  There, they hoped 
representatives from the South would “demand for each and every southern state, all her 
constitutional rights in the Union.”  If this failed, the convention could consider forming an 
“independent Southern Confederacy,” but this should be only a contingency plan.  Many white 
Phillips County residents, though deeply concerned about their future in the United States, 
remained hopeful they could continue to be a part of it.23 
A doctor in LaGrange shared his neighbors’ guarded optimism.  On November 28, he 
observed, “Our country is healthy and but for the political excitement I should say we were 
prosperous & happy.”  Though the current political situation was “dire enough to make one 
pause & reflect,” he insisted, “[T]here is everything to lose & nothing to gain in the disruption of 
this beautiful fabric of our fathers.”  Military companies were forming all over the South, but he 
reasoned they were for defense, not aggression.  Moreover, he hoped white southerners were 
“unnecessarily alarmed & that good fellow ship may be restored speedily.”  Like other white 
residents of Phillips County, he was also encouraged by the county’s recent economic progress, 
including that built by slave labor:  “We have a telegraph running from Helena to Madison 
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passing by our door so we can get news if we are willing to pay for it[.]  Our country is 
improving faster than any country I ever knew.  There are plantations on every side of us of from 
fifty to a hundred negroes & land is selling from 25 to 50 dollars an acre.”24  
Like a typical politician, Governor Rector struck a more ambiguous tone regarding how 
Arkansans should respond to Lincoln’s election.  In his November 15 inaugural address, the 
governor advised that “a most unprovoked and diabolical warfare” was “being waged by the 
people of the non-slaveholding states, against the peace, dignity and independence of all those 
recognizing that institution.”  He declined to “counsel precipitate or hasty action” concerning 
Arkansas’s secession, but if any other southern states were to secede, Rector thought Arkansas 
“ought not to withhold her sympathies and active support, if coercive measures be adopted by the 
general government.”  And, in such a case, the governor believed it would be his duty to 
“convene the General Assembly, that the matter might be referred to the people for their primary 
action and advice.25 
Less than a month later, however, Rector hardened his tone.  “I am convinced that the 
Union of these states in this moment is practicably severed and gone forever,” he told the 
Arkansas Assembly on December 11.  The “union of the states may no longer be regarded as an 
existing fact, making it imperatively necessary that Arkansas should girdle her loins for the 
conflict, and put her house in order.”  To justify his outlook, the governor listed a number of 
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ominous events transpiring around the country.  One of those events was South Carolina’s 
imminent secession convention.26  
Nine days after Rector’s address, South Carolina seceded from the United States.  Over 
the next six weeks, the other states of the Deep South—Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, and Texas—followed.  South Carolina’s withdrawal, in particular, was a turning point 
for many white Arkansans, including those in Phillips County.  For decades, secession had been 
only a threat employed by hotheaded partisans (in both the North and the South) who opposed 
federal actions that clashed with their interests.  Now it was a reality.  In the weeks ahead, 
numerous large farmers in eastern and southern Arkansans—many of them former Whigs who 
had backed Bell for president—found common cause with secessionist Democrats.  Many saw 
themselves as inextricably linked to the other slaveholding states.  When some of those states 
seceded, they wished to follow.  At the same time, the small farmers in the upland counties of 
northern and western Arkansas gradually united to oppose secession, which many viewed as a 
planter-led conspiracy.  Few of these uplanders were abolitionists.  To the contrary, many were 
slaveholders, and most of those who were not aspired to own slaves.  However, they owned 
fewer slaves than their counterparts in the Delta, and they were unwilling to leave their beloved 
Union to protect slavery.  At the very least, they wanted to consult with the other slaveholding 
states of the Upper South (especially neighboring Tennessee) before acting.  Going forward, this 
gulf between Arkansas’s upland farmers and lowland planters widened, and the state’s politics, 
long dominated by personal alliances and party labels, largely realigned along geographic lines.  
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Accordingly, support for secession in Arkansas became, in most cases, directly related to the 
percentage of a county’s enslaved population.27 
 In the winter of 1860-1861, at least eleven Arkansas counties, including several in the 
uplands, sent anti-secession resolutions to the state legislature, but they failed to quell the 
separatists’ cries.  In fact, South Carolina’s withdrawal on December 20 inspired two of the 
state’s fiercest rivals, Congressman Hindman and Senator Robert W. Johnson, to resolve their 
differences in the name of secession.  On December 21, the two urged the Arkansas Assembly to 
pass “an act calling together a convention, to enable the people of Arkansas to join in the 
common councils of the South, for her protection and future safety.”  The following day, the 
Assembly obliged.  Its act, which the state Senate endorsed on January 15, called for a statewide 
election to be held on February 18.  In that election, Arkansas voters would decide whether to 
hold a secession convention.  At the same time, they would choose delegates to represent them at 
that hypothetical convention.  This arrangement gave the secessionists a clear advantage.  As one 
historian put it, Arkansas unionists had the undesirable “double task” of opposing a secession 
convention while simultaneously stumping for their own election to it.28 
Some Arkansans opposed secession because they knew it would lead to the withdrawal of 
federal troops from the state, thus leaving it vulnerable to attack.  “The main dangers,” a 
conservative Little Rock editorialist warned in January 1861, “will be on the Western and the 
Eastern sides of the state.”  By his calculation, U.S. troops would be removed from Arkansas’s 
                                                          
27 Fellman et al., This Terrible War, 76; DeBlack, With Fire and Sword, 20; DeBlack “‘A 
Remarkably Strong Union Sentiment,’” in The Die is Cast, 84; Woods, Rebellion and 
Realignment, 120-125; Gigantino, Slavery and Secession in Arkansas, xix-xx.  
28 Scroggs, “Arkansas in the Secession Crisis,” 195-196; Telegraph from US Senator 
Robert Ward Johnson and Congressman Thomas C. Hindman, 22 December 1860, in Gigantino, 
Slavery and Secession in Arkansas, 74-76; DeBlack, With Fire and Sword, 20-21; Woods, 
Rebellion and Realignment, 122. 
65 
 
western border, thereby exposing it to violent assaults by Indians incited by abolitionists and 
robbers.  At the same time, eastern Arkansas would be ravaged by Mississippi River-based 
“pirates” who would destroy telegraph stations and other valuable property and “escape before 
any steps could be taken” against them.  “Almost the whole country on the river,” the author 
warned, “is not only exposed, but, at present, without any means of defense.”  A number of 
Phillips County residents no doubt shared his concerns.29 
If Patrick Cleburne feared the destructive repercussions of Arkansas’s secession, he did 
not record it.  However, the “gloomy state of Affairs” facing the nation in the winter of 1860-
1861 hung heavily on his mind.  “I never spent a more gloomy christmas,” he wrote to his 
brother in early 1861.  “I have been invited to twenty parties this christmas and have not attended 
one.”  Despite his pessimism, Cleburne still hoped the Union could be preserved, but only if the 
federal government granted to the South what he called “the full measure of her constitutional 
rights.”  Cleburne, like many of his compatriots, wanted assurances that white southerners would 
be able to manage their own affairs, including those associated with slavery.  “I never owned a 
Negro and care nothing for them,” he wrote in May 1861.  “[B]ut these people [whites in 
Arkansas] have been my friends and have stood up to me on all occasions.”  If Cleburne opposed 
slavery, he never said so explicitly.  Like virtually all white southerners of the era, he probably 
accepted it as a part of life.30   
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What Cleburne did not accept, however, was the prospect of a Republican-controlled 
government denying white Arkansans the right “to live under laws of their own making.”  For 
most of the United States’ eighty-five year history, southerners had dominated the federal 
government.  Thanks to a divisive but fair presidential election in 1860, that period of dominance 
was over, and Cleburne and a number of other white southerners feared they would be reduced to 
second-class citizens.  The Irishman, like most of his companions, also seems to have believed 
that slaveholders held a constitutional right to take their slaves into the western territories, and, 
accordingly, that Republican opposition to this right was despotic.  In 1864 he extended this 
argument further, declaring that the North’s opposition to slavery was “merely the pretense to 
establish sectional superiority and a more centralized form of government, and to deprive us of 
our rights and liberties.”31 
That winter’s predicament left Cleburne despondent.  Support for secession was growing 
in both Phillips County and Arkansas at large, and by January 1861, the Irishman could gaze out 
his office window in downtown Helena to “see a foreign nation on the other side of the river.”  “I 
hardly know what to say to you about politicks,” Cleburne wrote to his brother.  “[T]his State has 
called a convention for [February] 18th . . . or rather ordered an election for that day for delegates 
to a convention.  I cannot say what course they will adopt but the fever of revolution is very 
contagious and if blood is spilled and passion excited the reckless riflemen who inhabit our 
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woods will inevitably take a hand.”  Even if Arkansas decided not to secede, Cleburne predicted 
it would be “impossible to prevent armed volunteers from rushing to the scene of action.”32 
The Irishman’s observation was perceptive, for this is exactly how militiamen from 
several Arkansas counties responded to reports that federal troops were reinforcing the Little 
Rock arsenal in late January 1861.  When the citizens of Helena sensed Governor Rector’s desire 
to seize the arsenal, the Yell Rifles, the Phillips Guards, and two other militia companies 
proceeded to the capital without delay.  With Cleburne leading them on horseback, some five 
hundred volunteers marched to Helena’s wharf and boarded a steamboat.  From there, they 
traveled down the Mississippi River and up the Arkansas, arriving in the state capital on 
February 5.  To their surprise, only one local citizen greeted them at the riverbank.  After loading 
their weapons, the militiamen marched to the governor’s mansion to obtain orders.  Rector was 
surprised to see them.  Apparently unaware of the ambiguous message sent by his adjutant, the 
governor told the volunteers that he opposed any movement against the arsenal unless the 
situation deteriorated.  The zealous militiamen were surprised and disappointed.  In their minds, 
the army’s decision to reinforce the arsenal was proof that the situation had already worsened.  
As it turned out, that decision had never been made.  The telegraph report was false.33   
Phillips County residents were not the only ones fooled by a fictitious report.  Rector also 
had heard the rumor.  On January 28, he asked Capt. James Totten, commander of the sixty-five 
troops who garrisoned the arsenal, to guarantee that he would neither remove nor destroy the 
munitions inside the installation, and that no reinforcements were en route.  “Any assurances that 
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you may be able to give touching the observance of these . . . two conditions will greatly tend to 
quiet the public mind, and prevent a collision between the sovereign people of Arkansas and the 
Government troops now stationed at this point,” the governor informed Totten.  The captain was 
aghast.  As a native of Little Rock (and the son of a local doctor), Totten wished to avoid any 
confrontation that might lead to bloodshed and destruction in the city.  He reminded Rector that 
he and his troops had been sent to Little Rock the previous November at the request of several 
Arkansas citizens and congressmen.  Additionally, although he could give no guarantees about 
the army’s plans for the arsenal, he did not know of any orders regarding reinforcements or 
munitions.  Totten politely reminded Rector that he took instructions from the U.S. government, 
not the state of Arkansas, but he promised to forward the governor’s concerns to the secretary of 
war and the president.34 
Totten communicated his dilemma to his superiors in Washington and asked them for 
instructions, but unfortunately, none came.  Meanwhile, the rumor that U.S. troops were bound 
for Little Rock continued to sweep the state.  Word eventually came from Pine Bluff, a cotton 
hub on the Arkansas River, that a boat carrying three to four-hundred federal soldiers was 
destined for the capital.  Rector responded to the news by ordering cannons to be placed on the 
wharf “to intercept the landing of the troops.”  He also sent out messengers to investigate the 
report’s veracity.  When the governor learned that the rumor was false, he ordered the cannons 
removed and the gunners disbanded.35 
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Nevertheless, by February 5, an estimated eight hundred to one thousand militiamen from 
at least nine Arkansas counties, including five from the Delta, had descended upon the capital.  
Rumors spread that as many as four thousand more volunteers were on the way.  “The 
excitement became intense,” Rector recalled, and two local companies were called out to 
stabilize the situation.  The volunteers mistakenly believed that the governor and the citizens of 
Little Rock supported their cause.  In response to the looming crisis, the Little Rock city council 
passed resolutions declaring it “the duty of the governor to assume the responsibility of this 
movement or to interpose his authority and influence to prevent it.”  If the governor believed that 
taking the arsenal was “the only way to prevent the effusion of blood,” the council recommended 
he request its surrender.36 
With the council’s backing, Rector demanded that Totten surrender the arsenal on 
February 6.  A “considerable number” of citizens had come to Little Rock to seize the facility, 
the governor told the captain, and reports indicated that a “large force of citizens” was on its way 
“for the same purpose.”  Though he had not authorized the gathering of these volunteers, Rector 
felt duty-bound to “prevent a collision” between his constituents and the U.S. troops.37   
Totten mulled the governor’s request for twenty-four hours.  For over a week, he had 
awaited his superiors’ orders, but none had arrived.  This was a serious situation, one that could 
provoke civil war, something Totten desperately wanted to avoid.  Any fight in the city likely 
would lead to the destruction of private property and the death of innocent civilians.  Moreover, 
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Totten was severely outnumbered.  So, on February 8, “in the presence of a greatly superior 
armed force,” he ordered his troops to evacuate the arsenal.  As they marched toward the bank of 
the Arkansas River, throngs of people jeered.  The Capitol Guards, a Little Rock militia company 
whose ranks included many of the city’s finest men, swung in line to protect them.  When they 
reached the riverbank, Totten and his men set up camp; four days later, they boarded a steamboat 
for St. Louis.  Prior to their departure, a group of Little Rock ladies visited the camp and 
presented Totten with a ceremonial sword for his “gallant and meritorious” behavior.  The sword 
was inscribed with the following legend:  “When woman suffers chivalry forbears, The soldier 
dreads all dangers but his own.”  In his report on the arsenal crisis, Totten noted that the majority 
of Little Rock citizens had opposed their governor’s actions.  The women’s gesture certainly 
bore that out.38  
 When Cleburne heard what the ladies had done, he reportedly expressed shock.  
Nevertheless, he was pleased that the arsenal was now safely in Arkansans’ hands.  With the 
governor’s permission, he secured a supply of minié balls from the facility’s stockpile and led his 
Yell Rifles back to Helena.  The Phillips Guards, however, remained in Little Rock to garrison 
the arsenal for a few more days.  When they returned home, the “Young Ladies of Helena” 
formally presented them with a sky blue-colored silk flag with a golden fringed border and the 
words “Onward and Upward” inscribed above the Arkansas coat of arms.  Apparently, the ladies 
expressed some consternation about presenting such a flag while Arkansas remained in the 
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Union.  Nevertheless, in the words of one historian, they had “literally stitched their way into the 
political sphere.”39 
Unlike the women of Helena, a number of Arkansans disapproved of the arsenal’s 
seizure.  A planter in the Delta spoke for many of the state’s unionists when he declared, “We 
deem the whole affair to be one gotten up for political effect, in order to hurry the State into a 
rash and excited secession attitude, because there exist some fears that the moving of Arkansas 
out of the Union might not be done precipitately enough.”  At the height of the arsenal crisis, 
several of the state’s leading politicians, including Albert Rust, William Sebastian, Albert Pike, 
Robert Johnson, and even Thomas Hindman, implored the governor to withhold any attack “for 
God’s sake.”  To be sure, Johnson and Hindman were more concerned about the possible 
disgrace of a failed assault than they were its implications for disunion.  Accordingly, when 
Johnson received word that Rector had captured the installation, he wired his brother in Little 
Rock, “Thank God!  Hold it.”40   
While the arsenal crisis ensued in Little Rock, Johnson was in Washington penning his 
Address to the People of Arkansas, which he hoped would convince his constituents to vote for a 
secession convention.  He forcefully argued that Arkansas should withdraw from the Union, join 
its “sister” Deep South states who already had seceded, and, if necessary, defend itself in war.  
“Worse calamities may befall a people than war,” the senator argued.  “[O]f these are submission 
and Negro equality, and the subversion of our social system which makes of the humblest and 
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poorest white man, a proud man, and the peer and the equal of the wealthiest and greatest in the 
land.”41 
Six days after Totten’s troops departed Little Rock, Arkansas voters decided to hold a 
secession convention by overwhelming numbers (27,412 to 15,826).  Yet most of the delegates 
they elected opposed immediate separation.  As one scholar observed, “while many Arkansans 
were willing to consider the possibility of secession, most were in no hurry to secede.”  
Moreover, the election confirmed the recent geographic division in the state’s politics.  Most of 
the counties in southern and eastern Arkansas—including Phillips County—elected pro-
secession delegates, while most in the northern and western sections chose unionists.  
Meanwhile, as Arkansans cast their ballots on February 18, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated 
president of the Confederate States of America in Montgomery, Alabama.42 
 Affairs in Arkansas again coincided with important national events on March 4.  On that 
day, Abraham Lincoln took the oath of office as the sixteenth president of the United States, and 
Arkansas’s secession convention opened in Little Rock.  Hindman was not a delegate to the 
convention, but when Congress adjourned in early March, he rushed home to urge separation.  In 
the ensuing two weeks, a number of other pro-secession visitors addressed the convention, 
including Rector, Johnson, a spokesman for Jefferson Davis, and representatives from South 
Carolina and Georgia—both now part of the Confederacy.  Their efforts proved futile.  Of the 
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seventy-seven delegates who attended the convention, anti-secessionists consistently held a five-
person majority, and they swiftly rejected most of the separatists’ proposals.43   
This did not stop the two delegates from Phillips County, Charles Adams and Judge 
Thomas Hanly, from doing everything in their power to expedite Arkansas’s secession.  The 
county was capably represented by the duo, a unionist delegate later recalled.  Adams, a former 
Whig and Bell supporter, was “an able man, and noted for the frequency of his orations” at the 
convention.  He relished debating unionists and was a “scholarly man, of fine appearance, [who] 
wore his hair long and was sometimes called [Albert] Pike, the Second.”  Likewise, Hanly was 
“one of the ablest advocates of secession,” another unionist remembered.  “He was a powerful 
debater, and was very effective as such by reason of a constant flow of wit and sarcasm.”  Hanly 
also had the honor of being the first delegate to move that Arkansas voters decide their state’s 
fate.  During the roll call vote on this motion, Adams proudly told his fellow delegates, “I have 
the honor of representing on this floor a county that has always been true to the South.  They 
imposed no instructions upon me, except to aid in taking the State of Arkansas out of the Union 
as soon as possible, and I feel it an honor to record my vote aye.”  Though the motion was 
defeated, the convention ultimately passed it in modified form.44   
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In the convention’s final days, some of the delegates who opposed secession feared that 
Rector might sidestep the convention and take the issue to the state legislature, or worse, that 
southern and eastern Arkansas might secede from the rest of the state in protest.  Therefore, they 
begrudgingly agreed to a referendum, to be held on August 5, in which Arkansans would vote 
either “for secession” or “for cooperation.”  Two weeks after the referendum, the convention 
would reconvene to ratify the people’s decision.  In the meantime, David Walker, a steadfast 
unionist from northwest Arkansas who chaired the convention, also had the power to reassemble 
the delegates.45 
 When the convention adjourned on March 21, Arkansas remained in the United States.  
The unionists were victorious, but with an important qualification.  By the spring of 1861, most 
Arkansas unionists, including those who attended the convention, were conditional unionists.  
Sometimes called “cooperationists,” they shared the secessionists’ conviction that slavery had to 
be protected, but they believed this could best be accomplished in the Union.  Thus, they sought 
every possible means of compromise to prevent Arkansas’s separation.  If, however, the federal 
government proved unwilling to protect slavery or guarantee the rights of the slave states, they 
were willing to secede.  Most cooperationists also opposed any effort by the federal government 
to force the states that had already seceded to rejoin the United States.  A unionist at Arkansas’s 
secession convention, for example, said that he and his colleagues agreed that “any attempt on 
the part of the Federal Government to coerce the other Southern States would be, or should be, 
resisted by the state of Arkansas, however anxious the people were to remain in the Union.”  
After the convention, he and the other thirty-eight delegates who had opposed secession 
explained their position in a “Unionist Manifesto,” published in a Little Rock newspaper on 
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April 6.  Among other things, they declared, “[W]hile Arkansas is not committed to the doctrine 
of secession, she condemns coercion by the Federal Government, and recommends the removal 
of causes that might lead to a collision.”46 
  One of the “causes” those unionists wished to remove was Fort Sumter, a federal fortress 
that guarded the harbor at Charleston, South Carolina.  When Lincoln became president on 
March 4, the United States controlled only four forts in the seceded states.  The Confederates 
eventually seized all except Sumter, which they had besieged since January.  On March 5, 
Lincoln learned that the eighty U.S. soldiers inside the fort would run out of supplies within six 
weeks.  This left the president with a difficult decision.  If he attempted to resupply the garrison, 
U.S. ships might have to shoot their way past the rebel gunners that ringed Charleston harbor, 
thus triggering a war.  If, on the other hand, he ordered the troops to evacuate the fort peacefully, 
many Americans would interpret it as a de facto recognition of the Confederacy, something 
Lincoln wanted to avoid.  Further complicating matters, a number of conservatives and Upper 
South unionists were urging the president to relinquish Sumter as a gesture of amity to bolster 
southern unionism.  Lincoln pondered the idea, and many unionists, including those in Arkansas, 
believed he would do it.  “The Federal troops have been, or very soon will be, withdrawn from 
Fort Sumter,” the “Unionist Manifesto” promised Arkansans, “and thereby the danger of a 
collision avoided.”47 
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Collision, as it turns out, is exactly what happened, though that was not what Lincoln 
intended.  On April 6, the president notified the governor of South Carolina that he would 
resupply Fort Sumter with provisions only. “[I]f such attempt be not resisted,” he continued, “no 
effort to throw in men, arms, or amunition [sic], will be made, without further notice, or in case 
of an attack upon the Fort.”  It was a shrewd plan, one that placed the burden of decision for 
peace or war on Jefferson Davis.  Davis chose the latter.  He demanded that federal troops 
evacuate Fort Sumter, and at 4:30 a.m. on April 12, rebel forces fired on the fort.  After a thirty-
four hour bombardment, the U.S. garrison surrendered.48 
 Three months earlier, Patrick Cleburne had written to his brother, “My own opinion is 
that the first blood shed on Southern soil in a collision between the Federal troops and the state 
authorities of any southern state will be the signal for a civil war.”  Once more, the Irishman 
proved prophetic.  No one was killed in the bombardment of Sumter, but the following day, an 
accidental explosion during the garrison’s farewell salute killed one U.S. soldier and mortally 
wounded another.  The low casualties did not temper Lincoln’s response.  On April 15, he 
requested that states still in the Union supply a total of 75,000 volunteers, including 780 from 
Arkansas, to put down the Confederate rebellion.  The volunteers would serve for ninety days “to 
favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence” of the 
Union and the “perpetuity of popular government.”  More specifically, these volunteers would 
“repossess the forts, places, and property” that had been seized by the Confederacy.  At the heart 
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of Lincoln’s proclamation was his belief that the South—especially the Upper South states of 
Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—was filled with unconditional unionists who 
would rally around the American flag, or, at worst, sit out the coming conflict.  He was wrong.  
In reality, most southern unionists resembled those in Arkansas.  In other words, they were 
conditional unionists, or cooperationists, who championed southern rights, opposed federal 
coercion, and were willing to secede if things did not go their way.  Like Cleburne, they hoped 
for the best and prepared for the worst, and in the eyes of many, the worst had arrived.49 
 After Lincoln’s call for troops, cooperation in Arkansas collapsed.  Judge John Brown, a 
unionist, believed Lincoln had played right into the secessionists’ hands.  “This is enough.  The 
secession leaders have accomplished their fatal plan at last,” the judge wrote on April 20.  “The 
new administration has been weak enough, or wicked enough to afford them the pretext to 
precipitate not only the ‘Cotton’ states but to involve the whole South in a war.  Nothing like 
coercion could or would be borne by the south.”  On the same day, a Little Rock newspaper 
announced that because the president had commenced “The Work of Coercion,” the time had 
come for Arkansas to resist him.  The author, a cooperationist, believed secession was 
unconstitutional, yet he implored Arkansans to exercise their “right to rebel against an oppressive 
government” that had declared war on the seceded states.  In the same newspaper, one hundred 
and thirty-seven self-proclaimed unionists signed a statement to declare, “The recent action of 
the weak and perfidious Administration of Mr. Lincoln has made the Southern People, a united 
people.  Its abrupt adoption of a war policy in the midst of protestations of pacific and 
conciliatory purposes has convinced it of a duplicity and treachery towards the conservative 
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portion of the Southern people, only equaled in degree by the incapacity and stupidity which 
dictated it.”  More specifically, the authors lamented the federal government’s attempt to use 
military power to “compel” the seceded states “to submit to its jurisdiction,” and they called on 
David Walker to recall Arkansas’s secession convention “at the earliest practicably moment” so 
that Arkansans could “take such action as duty” required.50  
 Inevitably, secessionists also wished to reconvene the convention as soon as possible.  
Thanks to Lincoln’s call for volunteers, most people viewed the state’s withdrawal as a fait 
accompli.  On April 17, Judge Hanly reminded Walker that as chairman, he had the power to 
recall the convention if any “exigency” arose before the state’s August referendum.  In Hanly’s 
view, Lincoln’s request for troops certainly qualified as such.  To justify his position, the judge 
informed Walker that in the eastern Arkansas counties of Phillips, Monroe, St. Francis, Poinsett, 
Craighead, Greene, Crittenden, and Mississippi, the sentiment for secession was nearly 
unanimous.  “Since the recent events,” he added, “I doubt much whether one can be found to 
oppose secession in these counties.”51 
 Hanly knew his home county well.  That same month, a Little Rock newspaper observed 
that all three of Helena’s papers were now “of the secession school.”52  Meanwhile, pro-southern 
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mobs in the countryside targeted residents from the North whom they believed to be 
abolitionists.  On April 17, William Stevenson, a New Yorker who had moved to Phillips County 
the previous month, was awakened in the middle of the night by three men on horseback.  The 
posse, which included a “good friend” and two acquaintances, ordered the New Yorker to 
accompany them to Jeffersonville, a small town on the St. Francis River approximately fifteen 
miles northwest of Helena.  There, Stevenson was tried by the Phillips County Vigilance 
Committee for being “an Abolitionist whose business . . . was to incite an insurrection among the 
slaves.”  Stevenson was no abolitionist.  Like most northerners, he believed that “where [slavery] 
existed it should be left to the control of those who were connected with it.”  Still, as a 
northerner, he aroused the locals’ suspicions.  During his midnight “trial” at Jeffersonville, the 
vigilance committee, essentially a lynch mob of fifty to sixty drunken zealots, hissed, groaned, 
and shouted, “Hang him!  Burn him!”  Stevenson coolly refuted all of their charges, at which 
point they produced a letter—which the New Yorker had penned and mailed the previous day—
that described Phillips County as a “hard place” in which to live.  At this, the mob, now bearing a 
noose, surrounded him.  Stevenson and his friends reached for their firearms, prepared to shoot 
their way out of the room if necessary.  Upon seeing this, however, the committee voted to acquit 
him in order to avoid a gunfight.53 
 After his narrow escape, Stevenson decided to flee Phillips County.  Two nights earlier, 
members of the same vigilance committee had murdered a New York native who had lived in 
Arkansas for sixteen years and “against whom no charge could justly be brought.”  A few days 
before that, they had whipped to death a man whose “only crime was that he was a Northern 
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man.”  Stevenson interpreted these tragic events as an omen.  “No Northern man’s life was safe 
for an hour in that section of Arkansas,” he later wrote.  So, under the cover of darkness, he rode 
to Helena, where he boarded a steamboat bound for Memphis.  Upon entering the ship’s cabin, 
he heard “excited crowds” discussing rumors of his escape the previous night.  As it turned out, 
Stevenson’s boat had come down from Jeffersonville earlier that morning.  The New Yorker 
wisely kept a low profile during his trip up the Mississippi, but when he disembarked at 
Memphis on April 19, a military policeman halted him.  The officer marched him directly to 
Memphis’s Committee of Public Safety, whose members thoroughly interrogated him.  To 
Stevenson’s amazement, one of his cross-examiners had been present at the Jeffersonville trial 
thirty hours earlier.  Apparently, the man had followed him to Helena, caught an earlier boat to 
Memphis, and alerted the authorities to the New Yorker’s impending arrival.  Even with this 
witness, the committee could not convict Stevenson of any wrongdoing.  However, it intimidated 
him into “volunteering” for service in the “Jeff. Davis Invincibles,” a Memphis militia.  
Ironically, Stevenson spent the next thirteen months serving in the Confederate army.54  
As Stevenson began his military service, the Phillips County militia, including the Yell 
Rifles and Phillips Guards, was drilling more frequently, and new companies were forming in 
anticipation of secession and war.  Hindman, who returned to Helena after the secession 
convention adjourned, must have reveled in his town’s increasingly bellicose environment.  In 
April, he asked the Confederate war department if Arkansas soldiers could enlist in their cause 
even though the state had not yet seceded.  The Confederate secretary of war politely declined 
                                                          




Hindman’s offer, but he left open the possibility that an Arkansas brigade might be organized 
following the outbreak of war.55 
 Governor Rector also pondered the role of Arkansas troops in the impending conflict.  On 
April 22, he formally declined Lincoln’s request for 780 volunteers.  “In answer to your 
requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States,” the governor declared, “I 
have to say that none will be furnished.  The demand is only adding insult to injury.”  Perhaps 
oblivious to the irony of his position, Rector also asserted, “The people of this commonwealth 
are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives, and property 
against Northern mendacity and usurpation.”56 
 When the Confederate secretary of war got wind of Rector’s “patriotic” refusal of the 
U.S., he asked the governor to furnish a regiment of Arkansas troops for the Confederacy 
instead.  In the time since the secretary had declined Hindman’s offer of troops, Virginia had 
seceded, and soldiers were needed for immediate service there.  Rector no doubt wished he could 
oblige the request, but he regretfully informed the secretary that he had “no power” to do so, 
given that Arkansas remained in the Union.  However, the governor forwarded the entreaty to 
four of the state’s militia officers, who immediately took up the task.  He also assured the 
secretary that Arkansas’s separation was imminent.  Due to unremitting pressure from 
secessionists, David Walker reluctantly had ordered the state’s secession convention to 
reassemble on May 6.57 
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  Some Arkansans, including many in Phillips County, were unwilling to wait.  They 
assumed that war was coming, and they wanted to ensure that their local militias were equipped 
for the pending fight.  Therefore, in the spring of 1861, a number of communities in Arkansas 
and across the South began purchasing guns and ammunition, including some from arms dealers 
in the North.  Alarmed by this development, some northerners moved to stop it.  In April, for 
example, local police and Home Guard units in Cincinnati, Ohio, began halting munitions ships 
destined for Arkansas, including some that were passing though the city from Virginia.  When 
Arkansans learned about this, they sought vengeance.  In Napoleon, a port at the confluence of 
the Arkansas and Mississippi rivers, firebrands mounted two cannons on the Mississippi 
riverbank and forced steamboats to land for inspection.  In April 1861, they seized the Ohio 
Belle, a steamboat bound for Cincinnati, and confiscated its cargo.  A few days later, the captain 
of another ship refused to surrender his freight, and local militiamen fired on the vessel, killing 
one passenger and injuring another.58     
Phillips County residents also retaliated against the people of Cincinnati.  In April 1861, 
Helena’s city council ordered the town’s mayor “to have all unmounted cannon mounted and to 
purchase two barrels of cannon powder for the defense of the city.”  The council also authorized 
residents to seize all Cincinnati-owned ships that passed on the Mississippi.  Apparently, 
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numerous townspeople complied.  In late April, a Memphis newspaper reported that Helenians 
had erected a battery near the river, and guards were “on duty night and day to prevent the boats 
of unfriendly States from carrying out any objectionable designs.”  Likewise, a correspondent 
who ascended the Mississippi that spring did not see a single U.S. flag between New Orleans and 
Cairo, while that of the Confederate States greeted him “at every turn and on all occasions.”  As 
his boat neared Helena, the reporter saw “a huge crowd assembled and a cannon pointing to the 
river.”  When he asked the people what they were doing, they declared their intention “to 
intercept Cincinnati boats, as an offset to the detention of firearms at Cincinnati by the 
authorities there.”59 
On April 24, the citizens of Helena accomplished their objective.  On that day, the 
Cincinnati-owned Mars, which had left New Orleans three days earlier, steamed into view.  
Upon sighting the ship, local militia fired a cannon ball across her bow, forcing the captain to 
bring his vessel to shore.  At Hindman’s behest, militiamen then boarded the Mars and 
confiscated large quantities of molasses, sugar, resin, turpentine, oil, beer, and wine “as a reprisal 
for the arms seized by the Cincinnati authorities that were destined for the state of Arkansas.”  
The militia allowed the boat’s crew to remain on board, but several companies “stood regular 
watches alternately night and day.”  For three days, the crew negotiated for their ship’s release, 
but to no avail.  The belligerent Helenians reportedly announced that the people of Cincinnati 
could have the boat when they took her, “and not until then.”  Eventually, the frustrated 
crewmembers abandoned their vessel and caught a ride upriver on a boat bound for Louisville.  
Their cargo, however, remained at Helena.  When he learned about the Mars’s seizure, Governor 
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Rector ordered James Yell, major general of the state militia, to “take charge” of it and the Ohio 
Belle until the people of Cincinnati made “restitution” for the property they had captured.60 
With the Mars secured at Helena’s wharf, another vessel, the Queen of the West, steamed 
into sight.  Again, local militiamen, including Patrick Cleburne, fired a volley in its direction and 
forced the ship to bay.  The soldiers quickly discovered that in addition to the stores of coffee, 
sugar, and molasses on board, the Queen of the West was also “full of people.”  Nevertheless, 
angry Helenians demanded that the captain disclose the name of his boat’s owner.  When he told 
them it belonged to Rogers & Sherlock, a Cincinnati company, Cleburne must have shuddered.  
As fate would have it, the Irishman’s sister was married to Thomas Sherlock’s younger brother.61 
 This improbable situation put Cleburne in a quandary.  Three months earlier, he had told 
his brother that in the impending crisis, he would be “with Arkansas in weal or in woe.”  The 
Queen of the West incident put that pledge to the test.  Sherlock was, for all intents and purposes, 
family, and moreover, Cleburne knew him to be “a good Southern man.”  Therefore, he begged 
his fellow townspeople to release the ship as a personal favor to him.  By his own admission, the 
Irishman “cried on the public street like a woman” while making his plea.  Helena’s citizens 
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must have been moved by this open display of emotion, for they eventually agreed to release the 
boat, but not before they seized “every pound of freight consigned to Cincinnati.”  A report from 
Memphis claimed that “the citizens of Helena, with their accustomed politeness,” treated the 
Queen’s passengers “with all possible respect.”  If true, it was a testament to their respect for 
Cleburne.62 
 Three days later, another boat moored at Helena’s wharf, but this one was not from 
Cincinnati.  Rather, it was a transport whose captain had come to carry some of Helena’s soldiers 
to war.  Arkansas still had not seceded, but some of Helena’s most distinguished militiamen were 
eager to enter the fray.  On April 27, Cleburne assembled the Yell Rifles in front of the Helena 
courthouse.  From there, they marched one block to the Methodist church, which was so crowded 
with well-wishers that they spilled outside the sanctuary.  Inside the church, a minister conducted 
a short service, at the conclusion of which he blessed the troops and presented them with a Bible.  
Touched by the gesture, Cleburne reportedly thanked the congregation in a hushed tone.  He then 
led his men to the town’s waterfront, where hundreds of friends and supporters gathered to see 
them off.  Hindman, who recently had resigned his seat in Congress to raise troops for the 
Confederacy, addressed the crowd at the landing.  The festivities concluded, the Rifles boarded a 
steamboat and plied upriver.  Their destination was Camp Rector, a gathering place for aspiring 
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Arkansas Confederates on the west bank of the Mississippi River near modern-day West 
Memphis.63 
The Yell Rifles and other Arkansas volunteers gathered at Camp Rector at the behest of 
the governor.  Since declining Lincoln’s call for Arkansas troops on April 22, he had been 
“acting as though the state had already seceded.”  For example, Rector ordered the Arkansas 
militia to seize the federal post at Fort Smith, which they accomplished on April 23.  He also 
authorized four of the state’s militia officers to raise a regiment for Confederate service in 
Virginia.  Finally, he ordered James Yell and Dandridge McRae, a militia captain from Searcy, 
to “concentrate troops” at Camp Rector to thwart a rumored federal advance down the 
Mississippi.  By May 4, some five hundred militiamen from five Arkansas counties had 
congregated at the camp to organize and drill.  Along with the Yell Rifles, they included the 
Harris Guards of Monroe County, the Rector Guards of Prairie County, the Jefferson Guards and 
Pine Bluff Artillery of Jefferson County, and the Border Rangers of White County.  White 
County also supplied the Hindman Guards, who, though not personally connected to the fire-
eating congressman, hoped that their “friend, Hon. T. C. Hindman, [would] fully appreciate the 
honor bestowed upon him.”  Most of the companies were mustered as the First Arkansas 
Volunteer Infantry (later renamed the Fifteenth Arkansas), and they elected Cleburne as their 
colonel.64 
                                                          
63 Purdue and Purdue, Pat Cleburne, 73-74; Symonds, Stonewall of the West, 48; Alan 
Thompson, ed., “‘Frank and out spoken in my disposition’:  The Wartime Letters of Confederate 
General Dandridge McRae,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 72 (Winter 2013):  334. 
64 OR, vol. 1, pp. 650, 688; Carl Moneyhon, “1861:  ‘The Die is Cast,’” in Rugged and 
Sublime:  The Civil War in Arkansas, ed. Mark K. Christ (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas 
Press, 1994), 7; “Volunteers for the Southern Cause!” Arkansas State Gazette, April 27, 1861; 
“To Volunteers,” Arkansas State Gazette, May 4, 1861; Message of Governor Henry Rector to 
the Arkansas secession convention, May 6, 1861, in Journal of Both Sessions of the Convention 
of the State of Arkansas, 152-153; Dandridge McRae to Angie McRae, 25 April 1861, in 
87 
 
All of the militias that convened at Camp Rector hailed from eastern Arkansas, a fact that 
likely came as no surprise to contemporaries.  In fact, as delegates to the secession convention 
made their way to Little Rock, passions in the Delta intensified.  On May 4, a mob of angry 
secessionists at Taylor’s Creek—some fifty miles north of Helena in St. Francis County—
murdered a man whom they believed was “secretly opposed to the interests of the South.”  
Apparently, the man had been trying to raise a militia company “with the avowed purpose of 
sustaining law and order and putting down vigilance committees,” but local hotheads believed he 
was colluding with the Federals.  To prove his southern credentials, the man had promised to join 
a local company “gotten up for resistance to Federal usurpation,” but when he failed to report for 
duty, a mob attacked his home and killed him.65 
Two days after the “Bloody Affray in St. Francis,” Arkansas’s secession convention 
resumed.  Chairman Walker called the meeting to order at 10:00 a.m.  Minutes later, Charles 
Adams of Phillips County moved that a committee prepare an ordinance of secession, and by 
3:00 p.m., it was ready.  One delegate recalled that, unlike the “many turbulent scenes” that had 
occurred over the course of the convention, “very little excitement” ensued during the secession 
vote, which the delegates knew was a foregone conclusion.  When the votes were tallied, sixty-
five approved, and only five objected.  Clearly, Arkansas’s unionist-cooperationist majority had 
collapsed in the wake of Lincoln’s call for troops.  With secession now inevitable, Walker 
pleaded for unanimity among the delegates:  “[L]et us all go together; let the wires carry the 
news, to all the world that Arkansas stands as a unit against coercion.”  At that, four men 
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switched their “nay” votes to “yea.”  Only Isaac Murphy of upland Madison County held true.  
He arose and told his colleagues, “I have cast my vote after mature reflection, and have duly 
considered the consequences, and I can not conscientiously change it.  I therefore vote ‘no.’”  A 
Little Rock woman, who observed the proceedings from the gallery, responded to Murphy’s bold 
act by tossing a bouquet of flowers in his direction.  Hindman also watched from the gallery on 
May 6.  Later that evening, he wired Jefferson Davis that Arkansas’s convention had “passed 
[an] ordinance of secession at 4 p. m. by a unanimous vote.”  After nearly a decade of fire-eating, 
Helena’s most prominent secessionist was so excited about his state’s decision that he chose to 
ignore Murphy’s dissent.66 
Upon hearing the news of Arkansas’s separation, Hindman’s old friend Cleburne 
responded defiantly.  “I am with the South in life or in death, in victory of defeat,” he wrote from 
Camp Rector on May 7.  “I believe the North is about to wage a brutal and unholy war on a 
people who have done them no wrong[,] in violation of the constitution and the fundamental 
principles of the government.”  Going still further, he opined, “[T]hey no longer acknowledge 
that all Government derives its validity from the consent of the Governed[.]  they are about to 
invade our peaceful homes[,] destroy our property[,] and inaugurate a servile insurrection[,] 
murder our men and dishonor our women.”  Cleburne’s pro-southern zealotry aside, his forecast 
for the costs of war was astute.  In September, the Irishman would cross the Mississippi to 
defend other parts of the Confederacy.  Meanwhile, his adopted home of Helena, like so many 
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Chapter 3:  And The War Came 
 
 
On the morning of May 15, 1861, Camp Rector hummed with activity.  For more than a 
week, militiamen from Arkansas had been congregating to defend the Confederacy, and 
additional volunteers were arriving daily.  On this day, a delegation of women from Jefferson 
County joined the hubbub, and they were eager to see their family and friends who had departed 
Pine Bluff two weeks earlier with the Jefferson Guards and the Pine Bluff Artillery.  Since then, 
Arkansas had seceded from the Union, and the people of the state were busy preparing for war.  
To demonstrate their support for their male protectors, the “patriotic ladies” of Pine Bluff had 
sewn flags for the troops, and they selected Etta Bocage and Lillian Rozelle to present them. 
 As the camp prepared for the women’s presentations, excitement filled the air.  “Large 
crowds” of ladies and gentlemen gathered for the occasion, including many from Memphis who 
crossed the Mississippi in a ferryboat.  Bocage, the daughter of a Pine Bluff judge, launched the 
event at 11:00 a.m.  She unveiled a “fine blue silk” banner bearing the Latin motto, “Fiat justicia 
ruat coelum [sic],” meaning, “Let justice be done though the heavens fall.”  As she presented her 
flag to the Jefferson Guards, an attendee observed that “the patriotic emotions of the heart . . . 
fell from her lips.”  The captain graciously accepted her gift on behalf of his company, and the 
crowd erupted in “hearty cheers.” 
 The following day, Rozelle bequeathed a second banner to the Jefferson Guards, but this 
one was for the company’s regiment.  More than six-hundred soldiers of the First Arkansas 
Volunteer Infantry, including those from Pine Bluff, assembled before the speaker’s platform “in 
all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war,” as Rozelle rose to address them.  “Our hands 
have made [this flag]; your hearts must defend it,” she charged.  “You go, brave ones, to struggle 
in the dearest cause an American heart has at stake—the rights of this hallowed land of the 
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South!”  She continued, “It was liberty, not Union, for which our forefathers fought,” implying 
that southerners were “not the aggressors, but the wronged.”  Thus, she maintained, “an all-wise 
and just God” had blessed the South’s cause.  At the conclusion of her speech, as the audience 
cheered “with an enthusiasm and stentorian voice,” Rozelle handed her flag to the captain of the 
Guards, who passed it to his newly-elected colonel, Patrick Cleburne.  The beloved Irishman 
received the banner with “an able and eloquent speech of some length, in which he promised that 
it should never be dishonored.”1 
 At the beginning of the Civil War, such scenes were common across the North and South.  
In that stirring spring and summer of 1861, communities in both sections gathered for galas, 
parades, and ceremonies to urge their men to enlist and join the war.  One veteran remembered 
“the excitement, the bonfires, the speeches stirring the young hearts to action” in White County.  
“The sentiment of war was so strong and ran so high,” he recalled, “it was death to anyone who 
should utter a word in opposition, especially to manifest sympathy for the north.”  In a rally at 
Searcy, a speaker climbed atop a hogshead to deliver Patrick Henry’s “Give Me Liberty, Or Give 
Me Death” speech, after which residents congregated in the Methodist church to present a 
Confederate flag to a militia captain.  “I boiled over” at the sight, the veteran recalled, “and I 
proceeded to join” the Hindman Guards.  When, a few days later, his company boarded a boat 
for Camp Rector, the veteran observed “the parting scene of mother, father, sisters, brothers and 
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sweethearts.  No man or boy who enlisted had the power to resist a tear,” he remembered, “and 
hard hearted indeed was any one who witnessed the departure who did not also weep.  
Handkerchiefs fluttered from those on board and those ashore, until the boat hove around the 
bend and out of sight.”2 
Women frequently spearheaded these mobilization festivities.  They organized parades 
and church services, founded aid societies, and established clubs to make clothing, flags, and 
other items for the soldiers.  The ladies of Helena, for example, founded a sewing society when 
the war began.  Between April and October 1861, they knitted 579 pairs of pants, 378 shirts, 295 
coats, 120 pairs of drawers, 72 haversacks, 60 sheets, 30 mosquito bars, and 20 pillowcases for 
local troops.  The society also proudly reported that a large number of garments were made by 
Phillips County women who did not belong to the club.  Not to be outdone, the ladies of Little 
Rock sewed 3,000 uniforms, 1,500 haversacks, and 5,000 shirts during the first six weeks of the 
war.  A local newspaper boasted that the “arduous services” that the Little Rock women had “so 
cheerfully and so faithfully rendered their country” did not diminish the “patriotic ardor which 
urged them to these duties.”  The women were so dedicated, the paper declared, that they were 
“willing to labor on and to the end with a high and holy purpose.”  Like the ladies of Pine Bluff, 
some women proclaimed their political views on the flags they stitched.  In Searcy, for example, 
local ladies presented a company with a banner inscribed, “No Backing Out.”3 
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Women also pressured their male counterparts to enlist in the army.  Henry Morton 
Stanley, a soldier in eastern Arkansas who later gained fame for exploring Africa, recalled that 
following Arkansas’s secession, “inflamed as the men and youths were, the warlike fire that 
burned within their breasts was as nothing to the intense heat that glowed within the bosoms of 
the women.  No suggestion of compromise was possible in their presence,” Stanly observed.  “If 
every man did not hasten to the battle, they vowed they would themselves rush out and meet the 
Yankee vandals.”  Moreover, because women were “worshipped by the men,” such language 
made the men “war-mad.”  When Stanley hesitated to enlist, he received a “chemise and 
petticoat, such as a negro lady’s-maid might wear,” from an unknown address, “written in a 
feminine hand.”  The unidentified woman’s gesture compelled Stanley to join the Dixie Grays, 
which later mustered as the Sixth Arkansas Infantry at Little Rock.  The ladies of Little Rock 
sewed all of the Grays’ uniforms and made them a flag, and when the company marched to war, 
crowds lined the streets of the capital to cheer.  Stanley observed that the “emotional girls,” in 
particular, “waved their handkerchiefs and wept.”4 
Stanley recalled that his comrades joined the army for a variety of reasons.  Some were 
motivated by patriotism and a sense of duty, while others enlisted because they had “an appetite 
for glory, the desire of applause, a fondness for military excitement, or because they were 
infected with the general craze, or to avoid tedious toil, or from the wildness of youth.”  Modern 
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scholars agree with his assessment.  Some Civil War soldiers volunteered for ideological 
reasons—nationalism, honor, or opposition to tyranny—while others had more practical motives, 
including money, peer pressure, defense of home and hearth, and the pursuit of adventure and 
glory.5   
Yet others, like Stanley, enlisted to prove their manhood.  At the start of the war, many 
Americans believed that southern men were more aggressive and martial than their northern 
counterparts.  Because most southerners lived in sparsely settled, rural regions, a number of 
Americans assumed that southern males, free from the corrupting effects of urbanization and 
industrialization, learned to defend their homes and honor at an early age.  “We were taught to 
believe that one southern man could whip at least five yankees; they were no marksmen, but that 
we of the south who had from childhood been used to the gun were far superior to them,” a 
soldier from White County recalled.  Most Americans quickly learned, however, that such 
perceptions were exaggerated, if not false.  In the mid-nineteenth century, most northerners also 
lived in rural communities, and they possessed just as much grit as their opponents.  “We learned 
however before the war closed that we were made of about the same ‘stuff,’” the soldier 
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continued, “and many of us saw the time when one-half a yankee would be as much as we 
wanted to contend with.”6 
In the war’s opening months, the men of eastern Arkansas enlisted in droves.  
Approximately 400 of the 2,000 adult white males in Phillips County volunteered to fight, and 
over the ensuing four years, at least seven infantry regiments came from the Arkansas Delta.  In 
addition to the Yell Rifles and the Phillips Guards, the men of Phillips County joined the 
L’Anguille Rebels, the Trenton Guards, the Pat Cleburne Guards, John Clendenning’s Company, 
and the LaGrange Guards, who were captained by Daniel C. Govan, later a Confederate 
brigadier.  Another future rebel general, James C. Tappan, led the Tappan Guards, who were 
sometimes called the Helena Guards.  The Phillips County Cavalry Company protected county 
residents before the Civil War, and in the war’s later years, local horsemen joined companies 
commanded by William Weatherly and John Swan.  Area gunners, for their part, enlisted in the 
Helena Artillery, which eventually was led by Thomas Jefferson Key, publisher of the Helena 
Weekly Note-Book, one of the town’s three newspapers at the outbreak of the war.  By May 7, 
1861, both the Phillips Guards and the Helena Artillery had joined the Yell Rifles at Camp 
Rector.7 
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White men from all ranks and classes enlisted in Phillips County’s companies.  
Aristocrats dominated the Yell Rifles, but their captain, Cleburne—though a member of the Irish 
gentry—was largely a self-made man in the United States.  Daniel Govan, the LaGrange Guards’ 
leader, was a prosperous cotton planter who owned twenty-five slaves, but John Clendenning, 
commander of the company that bore his name, owned no property.  Similarly, John Swan held 
only 170 acres of land, while William Weatherly owned virtually no property.  In contrast to the 
Yell Rifles, the L’Anguille Rebels were mostly men of modest means.  A local newspaper 
described them as “hardy, industrious men, inured to toil and privation of frontier life,—the best 
material out of which to make the effective, reliable soldier, if properly armed, drilled and 
disciplined.”8 
 Like most early enlistees across North and South, those in Phillips County tended to be 
young.  Cleburne was barely thirty-three years old when the war began, while Govan and 
Clendenning were thirty-four.  Swan, for his part, was only twenty-three years of age.  Many of 
the initial volunteers were also bachelors.  For example, eighty-eight members of the Yell Rifles 
enlisted in Confederate service in the summer of 1861.  Of the forty-three men for whom census 
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data exists, their average age was twenty-six years, and only three were married.  Untethered to 
wives and children, they willingly risked their lives to “see the elephant,” prove their mettle, and 
make a name for themselves.9  
As white Arkansans enthusiastically prepared for war, African Americans—who 
constituted some one-third of the state’s population and a majority of Phillips County’s—proved 
they had little interest in supporting the Confederacy, a slaveholders’ republic.  In the war’s first 
year, U.S. forces fought to save the Union, not end slavery, but the evidence suggests that 
enslaved people always believed the fight had something to do with the latter.10  In the spring of 
1861, rumors of slave insurrections spread across Arkansas, and though it is impossible to know 
if the revolts were planned by slaves or simply imagined by fearful whites, the consequences of 
the rumors were palpable.11  In Camden, Judge John Brown noted that the slaves were “very 
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quiet,” but whites were nevertheless “taking measures to strengthen [their] watch in the city.”  In 
eastern Arkansas, enslaved people were anything but silent, as at least two insurrections were 
reported.  In early May, African Americans in the vicinity of Des Arc, a port on the White River, 
allegedly planned to kill every white person they met on their way to Searcy, where a white 
Methodist minister would then lead them to Memphis.  White vigilantes foiled their purported 
plot, and five of the supposed conspirators, including the minister, were hanged.  In the 
immediate aftermath, whites who resided near Des Arc organized vigilance committees to “ferret 
out those engaged” in the “nefarious plot.”  The following month, authorities arrested several 
African Americans in Monroe County, approximately thirty miles west of Helena, “on a charge 
of attempted insurrection.”  Three of the accused were hanged, including a blacksmith who had 
lived at Big Creek, a small community in Phillips County.12 
While white Arkansans violently crushed suspected slave revolts, their representatives in 
Little Rock were busy advancing the state’s rebellion against the United States.  In the words of 
one delegate, the secession convention was “placing the State on a war footing, and organizing 
the government of the same as a party of the Confederacy.”  Despite Governor Rector’s protests, 
the convention remained in session until June 3—nearly a month after it approved a secession 
ordinance—to act as the state’s interim government.  Among other things, the delegates rewrote 
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Arkansas’s constitution to outlaw the emancipation of slaves, legalize banking, and move the 
state elections from August to October.  Elections were scheduled for October 1862, thus 
reducing the embattled Rector’s term from four years to two.  Thomas Hanley of Phillips County 
chaired the judiciary committee that drafted Arkansas’s new constitution.  He and his colleagues 
also joined the Confederacy, approved the Confederate constitution, and selected five delegates 
to represent the state in the provisional Confederate Congress.13   
Thomas Hindman was not one of the delegates chosen for the Congress, nor was he 
present at the Little Rock convention.  However, he reportedly helped write an ordinance—
approved by the convention on May 15—that empowered a three-man military board to “call out 
the militia and volunteer forces of the state,” manage its forts and munitions, and “put on foot 
such military expeditions as in their opinion circumstances and necessity may require . . . for the 
safety and protection of Arkansas, until such time as the authority of the Confederate States of 
America shall be extended over it.”  The final qualification would, in due course, prove to be a 
point of contention between Rector, who chaired the military board, and other state leaders.  
Initially, however, all agreed that the Confederacy should assume primary responsibility for 
defending Arkansas as soon as possible.14   
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As the delegates in Little Rock debated his ordinance, Hindman was busy raising troops 
for the Confederacy.  Spurned by the convention, he would seek glory in war, not government.  
After Arkansas seceded, Hindman journeyed to Montgomery, where he was commissioned a 
colonel in the provisional Confederate army.  Accordingly, on May 17, Confederate Secretary of 
War LeRoy Walker approved Hindman’s longstanding offer to raise a regiment for rebel service, 
but he informed the colonel that Arkansas, not the Confederacy, must supply the regiment’s 
arms.  Undeterred, Hindman pressed forward.  He returned to Helena and on May 23 asked the 
delegates in Little Rock to provide muskets, clothing, and ten days rations for his troops.  
“Helena is the rendezvous—two large companies in camp, others coming,” he told them.  “I 
intreat you to afford the aid requested.  Give us a chance to fight for our country.”15  
The military board failed to supply the requested items, so Hindman turned to the citizens 
of Arkansas.  On May 25, he invited the public, through the Arkansas State Gazette, to send 
shirts, pants, hats, socks, shoes, blankets, and food to his troops at Helena.  He explicitly 
appealed to people who resided “some distance from Helena,” for the residents of his hometown 
already had shown “the utmost liberality towards the soldiers of the South,” and Hindman 
believed it was “unjust to ask more aid from them” until after others had contributed.  That same 
month, a local newspaper also praised Helenians for their unparalleled support of the war effort.  
In contrast, “certain wealthy individuals” in the countryside had been “extremely parsimonious 
and selfish . . . in refusing to aid in a cause of such vital importance as the equipment of troops to 
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defend the country.”  The paper chastised the unnamed people and juxtaposed their selfishness 
with the largesse of two men who lived outside Phillips County—a businessman in Mississippi 
who donated a mill “towards the equipment of Southern troops,” and a captain in Monroe 
County who outfitted sixty soldiers “out of his private purse.”16   
Hindman was also funding his troops’ subsistence out of pocket, and the expense was 
“ruinous” to him.  Accordingly, he wanted either Arkansas or the Confederacy to outfit his men 
as soon as possible.  On May 25, Secretary Walker told Arkansas’s Confederate congressmen 
that the war department would be happy to receive Hindman’s troops (and others) “into the 
Confederate service and assign them to duty on the Indian frontier” in western Arkansas.  Walker 
also notified Hindman of his plan but assumed that the state had armed the troops.  It had not, 
apparently, having reserved its weapons for the militia, and Hindman’s men suffered for it. 
Neverthless, Hindman continued to recruit.  By June 1, he had assembled ten 
companies—six at Helena and four at Pine Bluff—but they still lacked accoutrements as well as 
transportation to the west.  Consequently, he became willing to serve outside Arkansas.  If the 
Confederacy would supply his men with adequate provisions, the colonel “preferred” to go to 
Virginia.  Unfortunately, half of his regiment disagreed.  Rumors circulated that federal forces in 
southern Missouri were threatening Arkansas, and Hindman’s troops, like many in the Civil War, 
wanted to stay near home to protect their families.  On June 3, Hindman warned Walker that he 
would “certainly lose five companies” if ordered outside the state.  He wished to be sent to 
western Arkansas first.  After that, the secretary could send his troops wherever he pleased.17 
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The Confederate war department ignored Hindman’s appeal and ordered his regiment to 
Virginia.  The colonel complied, but not before excoriating the state military board for its failure 
to supply his troops with such basic amenities as shoes and blankets.  The board had invited his 
men to “become a part of the State militia for twelve months.”  Hindman replied that as “soldiers 
of the Confederate states,” not Arkansas, he and his regiment could not “honorably consider, 
much less accept” such a proposition.  Had the board provided arms as requested, he believed his 
troops would have defended the Arkansas frontier “without one dollar from the State treasury.”  
However, the board had refused them, and so they would abandon their home state.  Two days 
later, Hindman and six companies departed Helena for the Eastern Theater.18 
As the troops boarded transports at Helena’s wharf, J. M. Potts, a civilian from Kansas 
who had lived in Helena for nearly a year, took advantage of the “general confusion” at the 
landing and secured passage on one of the boats “without being detected.”  The Kansan fled 
Helena out of fear that he, “like many other Union men, would be pressed into the rebel army,” 
and he departed in secret because northern men had been “closely watched,” which made it 
“almost impossible for them to escape from the State.”  Potts disembarked at Memphis with 
Hindman’s troops, who subsequently left for Virginia.  The Kansan, however, made his way 
north to Cairo, Illinois, where he was briefly detained by Union General Benjamin M. Prentiss.  
Neither the general nor Potts could have known it, but Prentiss would later command the federal 
garrison at Helena and defend it against a major Confederate attack.19 
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The drama surrounding the enlistment, provisioning, and departure of Hindman’s 
regiment from Helena was indicative of the confusion that plagued Arkansas in the war’s 
opening months.  Most of the state’s leaders wanted (and expected) the Confederate war 
department to take charge of Arkansas’s defense because it would rid the state of the fiscal 
burden of supplying its troops.  But the war department, which apparently had no plan for 
protecting the state, waited for Arkansas to tender its troops to the Confederacy.  State officials, 
meanwhile, expected the war department to ask for those troops.  This breakdown in 
communication caused chaos.  In early June, David Hubbard, commissioner of the Confederate 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, told the secretary of war that “with about 25,000 able-bodied brave 
men Arkansas [had] less the appearance of a military organization than any people” he had ever 
known.  The people were “nearly all under arms,” Hubbard wrote, “and daily rumors of 
invasions calling them from home.”  Even then, the commissioner had never seen “people who 
appeared to know so little about commanders, or who seemed so utterly devoid of confidence in 
any one faction or leader of a faction in the State.”  To solve this problem, Hubbard wanted the 
Confederacy to send a military leader from outside the state to assume command of Arkansas’s 
disorganized, but “brave and hardy hunters.”20 
On June 25, Confederate leaders did just that, appointing William J. Hardee, author of the 
era’s top tactical manual, to take charge of most of northern Arkansas.  Once there, Hardee 
would assume command of Hindman’s regiment—whose orders to move to Virginia had been 
rescinded—and 3,000 other troops, including Cleburne’s First Arkansas.  Hardee’s dallying, 
                                                 




combined with continued confusion among state and Confederate leaders, delayed the general’s 
arrival in northern Arkansas for a month.21 
Hindman was already in east Tennessee when he learned that the war department had 
rerouted him to northern Arkansas, so he backtracked to Memphis, where his soldiers mustered 
into service.  While in Tennessee, the colonel continued to recruit, eventually raising a total of 
eighteen companies.  “Hindman’s Legion,” as contemporaries dubbed his unit, remained in 
Memphis until the evening of July 10, when it boarded transports to relocate to Pitman’s Ferry, 
an encampment in northern Arkansas.  As was often the case during the Civil War, nature 
dictated the legion’s itinerary.  Because of an abnormally wet summer and the marshy Delta 
terrain, the troops traveled by boat instead of marching overland.  Their route led them down the 
Mississippi to the mouth of the White River, up the White to the Black River, up the Black to the 
Current River, and up the Current to Pitman’s Ferry.  Along the way, they stopped at a familiar 
place:  Helena.22  
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had refused to supply him with arms).  It is unclear whether the colonel received this message or 
was alerted to the change of plans in another dispatch.  OR, vol. 3, p. 590. 
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At 6:00 a.m. on July 11, Hindman’s Legion docked at Helena’s wharf.  They were 
“complimented by quite an interesting ovation,” one soldier recalled.  Townspeople must have 
known they were coming, as Cleburne’s regiment—also en route to Pitman’s Ferry—had passed 
through the previous week.  However, because Hindman’s troops arrived at such an early hour, 
“a great many from the country failed to get in in time to see” them.  One soldier—who hailed 
from Mississippi County but had attended school in Helena a few years earlier—was “gratified 
by meeting many familiar faces” in the town, all of whom cheered him “with a warm and hearty 
greeting.”  Apparently, his former acquaintances were surprised to see that the young man had 
become captain of his company.23   
From Helena, Hindman’s troops proceeded down the Mississippi to the mouth of the 
White River, where they temporarily parted ways with their commander.  Upon reaching the 
White, most of the boats turned toward Pitman’s Ferry, but Hindman continued down the 
Mississippi to Napoleon.  A month earlier, the Confederate war department had requested that 
Governor Rector relinquish “the provisions captured at Helena and Napoleon” to Hindman, and 
the colonel intended to act on that authority.  Upon reaching the town, he commandeered thirty-
five muskets and then made his way back upriver.  The colonel caught up to his legion at Des 
Arc, where he seized two steamers, the Mars and the Ohio Belle, “in the name of the Southern 
Confederacy” and ordered them to Memphis.  A local reporter was perplexed by Hindman’s 
“novel and strange” act, for he knew that the boats belonged to the state of Arkansas, not the 
Confederacy.  What the reporter likely did not know, however, was that Hindman had a history 
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with the Mars, whose supplies he had helped seize at Helena three months earlier.  Moreover, 
because the boats had been captured at Helena and Napoleon, the colonel probably believed he 
was authorized to sequester them.  Regardless, Hindman had made it abundantly clear that he 
and his troops were “for the war,” not Arkansas, and as the colonel ultimately proved, he was 
eager to do whatever he deemed necessary to defend the Confederacy.24 
By late July 1861, Hindman, Cleburne, and the rest of Hardee’s command were 
encamped on the Current River.  From there, they spent the greater part of August trying (and 
failing) to drive the Federals from Missouri, while Hindman traversed northern Arkansas to 
recruit more men to the Confederate ranks.  In September, Hardee’s troops crossed to the east 
bank of the Mississippi, where most of them remained for the duration of the war.25   
Meanwhile, their companions back in Arkansas were adjusting to life in the new 
Confederacy.  When Arkansans rushed off to war in the spring and summer of 1861, they 
vacated a number of state and local offices, leaving behind what Governor Rector called a “mere 
skeleton of a government.”  In August, the governor decried the impossible task of running such 
a government, as many counties had “neither Sheriffs, Judges, Coroners nor Justices of the 
Peace, to administer the laws or enforce justice.”  Frustrated, Rector beseeched Arkansas 
officeholders who had departed for the war to return to their posts immediately or resign so that 
suitable replacements could be selected.  That same month, he also instructed the Phillips County 
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sheriff to hold two elections:  one to fill the county’s three vacant seats in the state legislature, 
and the other for “the general election in October in pursuance of law.”  In compliance with the 
governor’s proclamation, Arkansas voters went to the polls in the fall of 1861 and endorsed 
Jefferson Davis for a six-year term as Confederate president.  Davis had served as provisional 
president since February, so his election was a mere formality.  In fact, Arkansas leaders ensured 
that neither he nor Vice President Alexander H. Stephens faced any opposition.  At the same 
time, Arkansas voters chose four representatives to the Confederate Congress, including Thomas 
Hanly of Phillips County.  Judge Hanly, whom one scholar calls “probably the most industrious 
member of the Arkansas delegation” in Richmond, served on at least six congressional 
committees and easily won reelection two years later.26   
Two days before the general election, Arkansas legislators convened to select the state’s 
Confederate senators.  They called Robert W. Johnson out of retirement to fill one of those seats, 
while Charles B. Mitchel, a medical doctor from Hempstead County, was elected to the other.  
Mitchel had been chosen to succeed Johnson in the U.S. Senate in December 1860, but, like the 
rest of his colleagues, he had departed Washington following Abraham Lincoln’s inauguration in 
March 1861.27  Upon leaving the capital, Mitchell and nineteen other U.S. senators from the 
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Confederate states had resigned their posts, but Helena attorney William K. Sebastian, 
Arkansas’s other U.S. Senator, had not.  He and Andrew Johnson (the future U.S. president from 
Tennessee) refused to tender their resignations in hopes that the Union might yet be preserved.  
When that did not happen, they and their southern colleagues were formally expelled from the 
Senate in July 1861.  After departing Washington, Sebastian returned to Helena to resume his 
law practice.  For a short time, he also reportedly captained a military company that drilled in the 
town.28 
By the summer of 1861, most of the military companies that had assembled in Phillips 
County had departed to fight elsewhere.  When J. M. Potts fled Helena (with Hindman’s troops) 
in early June, he observed that the only soldiers remaining were a “Home Guard of about 100 
men,” who were armed with two cannons “stolen from the arsenal at Little Rock” and an 
additional thirty-two pounder.  In spite of this paltry military presence, Potts reported that no one 
in Helena called himself a “Union man” for fear of reprisal.  “[C]ouldn’t if he owned a hundred 
niggers,” the Kansan observed.  Inevitably, the political violence that had plagued Phillips 
County before secession spilled into the early months of the war, as two men lately had been 
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hanged in Phillips County “for their political opinions.”  Despite the excitement, Potts noted that 
business in Helena was “extremely dull.”  Salt pork sold for twenty-five cents per pound, and 
“very little” of that was available.29 
The pork shortage that Potts witnessed in June 1861 was no aberration, as Phillips 
County—and Arkansas at large—experienced an economic crunch in the war’s first year.  Local 
communities spent the bulk of their cash arming and equipping the companies they sent to war, 
while the troops’ departures drained local economies of crucial manpower.  Additionally, county 
courts levied special taxes to raise money for the war effort, which further squeezed cash-
strapped civilians.  Consequently, by the summer of 1861, currency shortages existed throughout 
the state.  John Brown recognized the crippling costs of mobilization.  “A great number of 
companies forming,” the judge wrote in early June, and the “greatest trouble is to get the means 
of starting them out.”  Brown expressed alarm that “every dollar” that could be raised seemed to 
be given to the troops or loaned to their friends.  “More money has already been furnished than I 
thought was in the Country,” the judge observed.  “The expenses of the War are becoming 
almost incalculable.”30 
In many Arkansas communities, currency shortages triggered a collapse of the credit 
system, which further paralyzed local economies.  Debtors lacked the cash to pay their bills, 
which hampered the ability of creditors to buy supplies, especially from merchants outside the 
state.  Without these supplies, farmers struggled to plant their crops, and a vicious cycle ensued.  
In May, the secession convention attempted to alleviate Arkansas’s looming debt crisis by 
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passing an ordinance forbidding creditors from seizing property owned by men who fought for 
Arkansas or the Confederacy.  This stay law was a boon to debtors, but it made life even more 
difficult for creditors, who struggled to pay their taxes and fulfill their obligations to creditors 
elsewhere.  In June 1861, Judge John S. Hornor of Helena complained that a local debtor was so 
“absorbed in the Military movements” that he seemed “to have lost sight of his personal 
liabilities and promises, resting perfectly easy, no doubt, in consequence of the disposition on the 
part of our Civil Authorities not to press the collection of any debt.”31 
In the opening months of the war, merchants and tax collectors scrambled to muster the 
money owed them, but most were unsuccessful—in some cases because public officials impeded 
their efforts.  For example, the secession convention temporarily suspended “all sales by sheriffs 
or constables, for the collection of debts.”  Within ten months, however, Phillips County law 
enforcement had resumed this practice.  In February 1862, the Helena Southern Shield publicized 
the names of 104 individuals and businesses in Phillips County whose property the sheriff would 
sell “to pay the taxes, penalty and costs due thereon for the year 1861, and other years therein 
mentioned.”  That A. G. Underwood, a local judge, appeared on the sheriff’s list suggests that by 
early 1862, the costs of war had fallen upon some of Phillips County’s most prominent citizens.32 
Unable to collect their debts, a number of merchants stopped extending credit to their 
customers.  In February 1862, two Phillips County businesses, the Helena Flouring Mill and 
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Cage & Rankin’s Drugstore, announced that, henceforth, they would only accept cash as 
payment for their goods and services.  The former implored its patrons to settle their debts as 
soon as possible—with payments in corn or wood, if necessary.  Merchants across the state made 
similar pronouncements in the war’s first year.  As early as April 1861, a Little Rock business 
declared it would only take cash for its corn meal because credit was “played out” in the capital 
city.  The following month, another Little Rock entrepreneur instructed his customers to refrain 
from asking for credit because he would “not do a credit business with any one.”  He also 
directed his debtors to “come forward and settle” immediately.33 
The Confederacy also taxed the people of Phillips County in the war’s first year.  In 
August 1861, the Confederate Congress imposed a modest tax of one-half of one percent on all 
personal property and charged the states with collecting it.  Six months later, the Phillips County 
sheriff announced that he had received Richmond’s assessment for the county, which taxpayers 
had twenty-one days to dispute.  Apparently, South Carolina was the only state that collected the 
tax.  Texas confiscated northern-owned property to pay its share, while the nine other 
Confederate states, including Arkansas, paid their levies either by borrowing money or by 
printing paper currency.34   
The latter practice, together with wartime shortages of goods and widespread speculation, 
caused runaway inflation.  Before the war, a sack of salt, necessary for curing meats before 
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refrigeration, cost only two dollars in Little Rock.  By November 1861, that price had risen to 
twenty dollars in eastern Arkansas.  Over the same period, a pound of coffee increased from 
fourteen cents to forty cents, and by February 1862, it retailed for a dollar in Helena.  To counter 
inflation, in November 1861, Confederate authorities in Arkansas briefly outlawed the 
speculation, monopolization, and exportation of “subsistence supplies, constituting the 
necessaries of life,” and six months later, they capped the prices of various items, including salt, 
coffee, flour, bacon, and sugar.  Speculation continued, however, and prices continued to rise.  In 
late 1861, the editor of the Arkansas State Gazette complained that from the war’s beginning, 
“unprincipled, soulless speculators” had “traversed almost every settlement” and preyed upon 
ignorant civilians.  Posing as government agents, they made “appeals to the patriotism of the 
people,” bought essential goods they claimed were for the war effort, and then turned around and 
sold them at exorbitant prices.  Meanwhile, some farmers and merchants simply refused to abide 
by price controls, while others sold their products on the black market.  Consequently, by March 
1863, coffee had risen to seven dollars per pound, while salt soared to one hundred dollars per 
sack.35 
Inevitably, inflation fell hardest on the poor, whose loyalty to the Confederacy waned 
with each successive hardship.  In 1862, prices in the Confederacy rose some three hundred 
percent, while wages for skilled and unskilled workers increased only fifty-five percent.  Farm 
families fared little better.  The exodus of adult white males to fight in the war sapped their 
                                                 
35 Moneyhon, The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on Arkansas, 107-108, 
120-121; Washington Telegraph (Washington, Ark.), February 19, 1862; Solon Borland, 
“General Order,” November 29, 1861, and “Col. Borland’s Orders,” both in Arkansas State 
Gazette, December 14, 1861; Moneyhon, “Governor Henry Rector and the Confederacy,” 367-
368; OR, vol. 15, p. 782; Dougan, Confederate Arkansas, 85; “Whom Will Ye Serve?” The 
Shield (Helena, Ark.), September 6, 1862. 
113 
 
farms’ productivity, while salt shortages hampered their ability to tan leather and preserve beef, 
pork, and butter from bacteria.  The dearth of salt also made their horses and mules more 
susceptible to hoof and mouth disease.36   
Nature conspired against Arkansas farmers in other ways, too.  In the war’s opening year, 
hog cholera decimated the South’s swine population.  This outbreak was particularly devastating 
because pork was a staple of southern diets, both free and enslaved.  In fact, one authority 
contends that, “[w]ith the exception of yellow fever, no disease hurt the Confederacy more than 
hog cholera.”  In the fall of 1861, Thomas Jefferson Key claimed to have witnessed “the hogs in 
Arkansas dying at the rate of thirty or forty per day.”  However, he was happy to report that 
farmers in Phillips County had discovered that by adding trace amounts of arsenic to their pigs’ 
feed, they could mitigate the disease.  Key was so encouraged by this remedy that he shared it 
with the editor of a newspaper in middle Tennessee, although, oddly enough, the farmers who 
lived just across the Mississippi from Helena knew nothing of the remedy.  In June 1862, a 
resident of Friars Point, Mississippi, observed that cholera had “destroyed nearly all the hogs” in 
his county, while cutworms had ruined many of their cornfields.  The following summer, hog 
cholera erupted into a full-blown epizootic in Arkansas.  “A disease has pervaded the whole 
country which has killed most of the hogs,” Judge Brown observed in July 1863.  “Meat is very 
scarce and the country is likely to be almost without next winter.”  Brown’s fears proved 
prescient, though the disease spread even more rapidly than he predicted.  Only three months 
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later, he lamented that cholera had “killed out the hogs to such an extent that there cannot be 
meat for bacon.”37  
 Drought also diminished Arkansas’s hog population.  In the summer of 1861, insufficient 
rainfall reduced the state’s corn crop, which was crucial for feeding livestock.  Consequently, a 
number of farmers were forced to slaughter their cattle and pigs before they were fully fattened, 
as well as find other sources of protein.  Some attempted to solve their dilemma by reducing the 
amount of pork they allotted to their slaves, while others took to the woods to hunt wild game.  
Enslaved Arkansans—who always had supplemented their diets with wild deer, rabbits, and 
raccoons—also hunted nearby forests and fields to feed their families.  In doing so, they 
sometimes ran into white farmers, who accused them of killing hogs they had released into the 
woods to forage.  This ongoing struggle to consume enough calories to survive, while “bereft of 
the glory and theatricality” of conventional battles, was nevertheless central to how Americans—
North and South, soldier and civilian, free and enslaved, male and female, young and old—
experienced the Civil War.  It also shaped the conflict’s outcome.  Generally speaking, northern 
soldiers and civilians ate better than their southern counterparts.  A number of factors explain 
this food disparity, including northern mechanization, the Union naval blockade, southern labor 
shortages, the armies’ logistics, and the location of the fighting.  The natural environment, 
however, was also key.  Droughts, floods, extreme temperatures, crop blights, and animal 
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diseases ravaged Confederate foodstuffs, and this gave the Union a crucial advantage in the 
fight.38 
The decision-making of Arkansas farmers also contributed to the state’s food shortages.  
State and Confederate authorities encouraged planters to grow cereal crops to feed soldiers and 
civilians; however, most people found that cultivating cotton better paid the bills.  In late 1861, 
the Southern Shield reported that a farmer who lived twenty-five miles above Helena had netted 
$1,500 by shipping forty hogs to New Orleans.  The paper enthusiastically suggested that “the 
cost and trouble of raising that lot of hogs did not exceed what it would to plant, gather, gin, and 
send to market three bales of cotton!”  Although some farmers undoubtedly agreed with his 
assessment, many also believed that cotton’s market value made it worth the trouble.  Most 
planters were debtors, and cotton was the one crop that consistently brought in cash, even after 
the war obstructed its sale.  As a result, Arkansas farmers kept growing cotton, especially in 
fertile Phillips County.  In February 1862, at least two cotton factors, including one in New 
Orleans, still advertised in Helena’s newspapers, while a local feed store declared it would stow 
“any amount of cotton” in its depot on Front Street, with no extra charge for “shipping, drayage, 
or wharfage.”  The store’s owner also announced he would accept cotton as payment for the 
sugar he was peddling.  Cotton was so valuable in Phillips County that students at a local girl’s 
academy could use it to pay their tuition and board in kind.39   
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 Nevertheless, by early 1862, numerous newspapers and public officials were exhorting 
Arkansas farmers to grow less cotton and more food.  In February, the editor of the Southern 
Shield reprinted (and endorsed) a letter penned by “a very intelligent citizen” that entreated 
farmers to “make no cotton at all, and produce so much grain that poor men who are in the army 
can support their families on $15 per month.”  If southern planters did this, the author believed 
the Confederates would become “complete masters” over both the North and the English, who, 
desperate for cotton to feed their textile mills, would recognize the Confederacy.  If, on the other 
hand, southern farmers failed to recognize their duty to “provide cheap food for the families of 
the absent laboring men,” the author predicted that by spring 1863, the nation would be left with 
a “disbanded army and a ruined cause.”  Arkansas legislators apparently agreed with this 
sentiment, for in March 1862 they passed an ordinance forbidding the state’s farmers from 
growing more than two acres of cotton per hand.  Farmers who violated the law faced a penalty 
of $500 to $5,000, but many ignored it anyway.  In early May, a newspaper editor in Little Rock 
chastised those planters who seemed “determined, notwithstanding the prohibition of the 
Legislature, to plant large crops of cotton.  We cannot believe it.  There must be some mistake,” 
he opined.  “Cotton planted now is planted for the enemy.”  Like his colleague at the Southern 
Shield, the editor also implored Arkansas farmers to “plant grain—so as to support the families 
of absent soldiers, and feed the soldiers themselves as they fight our battles.”  Additionally, he 
argued, “great attention should be given to raising hogs, cattle, sheep, and everything of which 
meat can be made.”40 
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  Planters were not the only people in Phillips County eager to conduct business as usual.  
A local shoe factory—that regularly advertised for employees in a Memphis newspaper in the 
fall of 1861—reportedly secured a contract to make shoes for Confederate soldiers at $3.50 per 
pair.  In early 1862, most of Helena’s businesses still advertised in local newspapers, just as they 
had before the war.  Private schools continued to educate the community’s children for five-
month terms, while H. P. Coolidge and his son still sold a cornucopia of items at their dry goods 
store.  In February 1862, many of those goods continued to be imported from merchants in 
Memphis and New Orleans, as most of the Mississippi River remained open for trade.  It also 
remained open for travel.  As late as May 31, 1862—nearly a month after the Union navy 
captured New Orleans and infiltrated the Mississippi—steamboats regularly carried passengers 
from Memphis to Helena, Napoleon, Vicksburg, and places in between.  Meanwhile, many of 
Helena’s attorneys continued to conduct business on both sides of the Mississippi, though by 
1862, all three partners at the law office of Cleburne, Scaife, and Mangum were off serving in 
the war.41 
 Yet, no matter how hard they tried, the people of Phillips County—like those employed 
at Cleburne’s law firm—could not escape the war.  Even after many of the county’s men 
marched off to fight, local women continued to support the war effort.  In the fall of 1861, for 
example, they donated a box of clothing to the Southern Mothers’ Association, a charitable 
organization that ran a soldiers’ hospital in Memphis.  African Americans had no interest in 
supporting the Confederacy philanthropically, but they were caught up in the conflict, too.  For 
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example, a slave named Toney took advantage of the wartime chaos and ran away from his 
owner in Coahoma County, Mississippi.  In January 1862, the Phillips County sheriff 
apprehended the young man and published a runaway notice in the Helena Southern Shield.42   
That same month, the Southern Shield announced that a “faithful servant” named Major 
had escaped a federal prison in Cairo and miraculously returned to his plantation in Phillips 
County, where, among his “real friends” once more, he was “a happy, contented, honest darkey.”  
According to the report, Major had accompanied his Confederate owner to Belmont, Missouri, 
where, in November 1861, U.S. forces overran the rebels and detained him.  From there, he was 
transported to nearby Cairo, where an Illinois captain promised him twelve dollars per month to 
serve as his personal cook.  When, a month later, he had not yet received payment, Major 
decided to flee.  Under the cover of darkness, he crawled through federal lines, stole an “old 
leaky skiff,” and drifted down the Mississippi to Columbus, Kentucky, where he was improbably 
reunited with his owner.  The Shield printed Major’s story to show that southern slaves were 
loyal to their masters, and thus, that “Lincoln and his myrmidons” had no hope of converting 
them into rebellious “incendiaries and executioners” to sabotage the Confederate cause.43   
While it is impossible to determine the truth of Major’s story, his alleged odyssey 
nevertheless illustrates what one scholar calls the “experience of movement” that defined the 
Civil War for so many of its participants.  Like Major, some slaves accompanied their rebel 
owners to war, while others, like Toney, ran away from them.  From 1861 to 1865, at least 
500,000 slaves fled their farms and plantations to seek refuge behind Union lines, while untold 
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numbers were captured trying to do so.  Others, meanwhile, were forcibly relocated to distant 
frontiers by their owners, who sought to hide their prized property from federal forces.  In the 
fall of 1863, for example, Judge John Hornor moved his slaves from Phillips County to 
northeastern Texas, where they remained until after the war.  “The slaves had become restless” 
in Helena, his son later recalled, and both Union and Confederate soldiers “took from him 
freely.”  “[C]aught between two fires” and “threatened with eventual despoliation,” Hornor and 
his family packed their belongings and took to the road.  Over the course of the war, hundreds of 
thousands joined them—as refugees, runaways, stragglers, deserters, and aid workers.  All the 
while, an estimated three million soldiers and sailors moved from their homes to military camps, 
from camps to battlefields (where they marched, rode, steamed, and sailed against their 
opponents), and from battlefields to hospitals, prison camps, or the next site of combat.  This 
movement of people was, in the words of one scholar, a “pivotal aspect” of how the Civil War 
actually was lived.44   
Confederate soldiers moved in and out of Phillips County during the war’s first year.  In 
September 1861, the so-called “Preachers’ Regiment” of Arkansas troops passed through Helena 
“en route for the seat of war.”  The Southern Shield wryly reported that the regiment’s colonel, a 
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Methodist minister from Pine Bluff, commanded at least eight other preachers, including one 
over seventy years old.  Four months later, the honorable Charles W. Adams began raising yet 
another Confederate regiment at Helena.  Unlike those led by Hindman and Cleburne, this one 
would remain west of the Mississippi River, where it could better protect the Arkansas 
homeland.  Once raised, it would remove to the Indian Territory, where Albert Pike—now a 
Confederate brigadier—was assembling an army.  In January 1862, Adams reported that eastern 
Arkansans thus far had responded “nobly” to Pike’s call for troops, and he hoped the men of 
southwest Arkansas would do so, too.45   
Pike was still recruiting soldiers to his ranks in early March, and in that month, Helenians 
experienced an unanticipated consequence of mobilization.  Adams’ enlistees, by then 
designated the “Adams Guards,” were still encamped at Helena, when, in the early morning 
hours, they accidentally started a fire that quickly engulfed much of the town’s riverfront district.  
“The flames spread with great rapidity,” a local newspaper reported, “and in a short space of 
time two blocks of business houses were wrapped in liquid fire, and their long tongues mounted 
high in the air, spreading devastation before them, and illuminating the entire city.”  Firefighters 
“did all in their power” to stay the blaze, but with only one engine at their disposal, their success 
was limited.  Panicked residents spread wet blankets on the rooftops of downtown buildings, and 
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ultimately, the fire was confined to two city blocks.  Still, when the smoke cleared, Helenians 
had suffered an estimated eighty-five to ninety thousand dollars in damages.46 
The Helena Weekly Note-Book office caught fire, but, unlike many other buildings on the 
block, it survived the conflagration.  Both the Note-Book and the Southern Shield remained in 
print in early 1862, but by that time, paper shortages were limiting the length of issues.  The 
same was true for numerous other Arkansas (and Confederate) newspapers, including the 
flagship Arkansas State Gazette, which temporarily suspended publication in May 1862 when it 
ran out of paper.  When the Gazette reopened the following month, only eight newspapers 
remained in Arkansas (not counting regimental newspapers published by soldiers), as compared 
to the thirty or forty printed in the state before the war.  Helena’s newspapers also ceased 
publication in 1862, but not before their editors made a favorable impression on M. Jeff 
Thompson, the so-called “Swamp Fox of the Confederacy,” whose soldiers occupied Helena that 
spring.  “We were treated with great kindness and respect by the citizens of Helena,” Thompson 
recalled, “and the good conduct of my men was much complimented by everybody especially the 
newspaper editors.”47  
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As Thompson and his men mobilized in Helena, the natural environment again wreaked 
havoc on the county’s war-weary citizenry.  In March, the waters of the Mississippi started to 
rise—as they often did at that time of year—and by the end of the month, they had breached the 
levee below Friars Point.  The river continued to surge in early April, eventually rupturing the 
earthworks on both sides of the Mississippi below Helena.  An estimated $800,000 had been 
spent on one those levees, but the forces of nature proved undeterred by that price tag.  
Interestingly, Helenians benefited from these downriver breaks, which lowered the waters at 
their wharf by several inches.  Thus, on April 5, they remained optimistic about their prospects 
for staying dry.  “Thanks to the Mayor and levee committee, our city is yet free from overflow,” 
a local newspaper reported.  “We think the river will not rise any more at present, as the breaks 
will take off most if not all the water to come out of the St. Francis.”  The author pled ignorance 
about the condition of the Mississippi upriver of Helena, however, because the “war times” had 
prevented him from acquiring any “reliable information from above.”48 
The author’s war-induced ignorance did not produce bliss, for the following month, the 
Mississippi swelled to historic levels and inundated Phillips County.  By late May, floodwaters 
“stood three feet deep on many of the first floors of the stores and dwellings in Helena,” and “the 
water was all over the country for many miles, all the plantations being thoroughly drowned out, 
with the June rise still to come.”  The overflow washed away a Baptist preacher’s rental house in 
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Helena and “so undermined another” that he could no longer lease it “without considerable 
expense.”  Floodwaters also ruined most of the buildings in Old Town, a plantation community 
about twenty miles southwest of Helena.  In August 1862, a Union soldier noted that “before the 
last freshet there was a large warehouse, two fine stores, a tavern and a shoeshop besides several 
dwelling houses” in Old Town.  “’Twas a place of considerable trade,” he added, but thanks to 
the deluge, only a “little old log house” remained.  Later Helenians remembered this “great flood 
of 1862,” during which the Mississippi rose to its highest level since 1815 and swamped some of 
the world’s most productive farmland.  An 1865 newspaper described it as “the highest water 
ever known” in Helena.49   
Further compounding the townspeople’s suffering that spring, the rebel soldiers who 
occupied Helena were acting with impunity.  According to one report, they confiscated all of the 
community’s beef cattle, burned all its cotton, and “rigidly” enforced conscription.  In theory, 
their actions were legal because in March 1862 the Confederate Congress had sanctioned the 
destruction of cotton and other property in danger of falling into Union hands; the following 
month, it authorized the first national military draft in American history.  The Confederate 
conscription act of April 1862 made all white males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five 
liable for three years of military service; it also extended by two years the commitment of men 
already serving who had, in good faith, volunteered for one year.  In hindsight, the act was 
probably necessary for the Confederacy to survive beyond the summer of 1862, but many 
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citizens viewed it as a violation of their civil liberties by a dangerous, distant government.  Two 
shoemakers who fled Helena in the spring of 1862 reported that in consequence of conscription, 
flooding, and Confederate confiscation, the people of eastern Arkansas were suffering greatly 
and soon would starve if U.S. authorities did not send them food.  Accordingly, they believed the 
region’s residents “were looking for the approach of the Union troops with hardly concealed 
joy.”50 
Unbeknownst to the people of Phillips County, U.S. troops were on the way, although 
ultimately, their presence provided little relief to local citizens.  The Union brass found much to 
like in Helena’s riverside location at the tip of Crowley’s Ridge.  As the only high ground on the 
Mississippi’s western bank between the Gulf of Mexico and Missouri, the loess-capped ridge 
represented a strategic military position for anyone trying to control traffic on the river.  The 
Confederates had tried to capitalize on Helena’s natural advantages.  At the outbreak of the war, 
rebel strategists assumed Union gunboats would use the Mississippi to invade the South, and 
although the Confederates could counter with iron- and timber-clad vessels of their own, they 
knew that northern industries would outproduce them.  Therefore, to defend their heartland, the 
rebels relied primarily on fixed fortifications at key points along the Mississippi.  Helena was 
one of those points.  On April 17, 1861, almost three weeks before Arkansas seceded, the 
Confederate war department asked Governor Rector for permission to construct a defensive 
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battery “at or near Helena” to obstruct a possible federal invasion.  Rector gave his consent on 
April 29, even though a week later, he told Arkansas’s secession convention that the topography 
of eastern Arkansas was “inauspicious for defence [sic].”51 
Helenians worried about their vulnerability to attack from the outset of war.  In May 
1861, they held a public meeting to petition Jefferson Davis to build a “strong and safe fort” 
upon “one of the eminences west of the city.”  A week later, Confederate engineers arrived to 
superintend the construction of a battery near the town.  A local newspaper lauded the engineers’ 
appearance and demanded that every planter in the region “send five, ten or twenty negroes” to 
“aid in this essential measure,” but apparently, the fort was never built.  In February 1862, 
Senator Robert W. Johnson recommended to President Davis that fortifications be constructed at 
both Helena and the mouth of the Arkansas and White rivers.  Such defenses, Johnson argued, 
would prevent the isolation of Confederates west of the Mississippi in case Memphis was 
captured.  That same month, a rebel colonel also worried about the fate of the lower Mississippi 
if Memphis fell.  Accordingly, he wanted the Confederates to erect “fortifications of a suitable 
character” at Helena and other strategic sites in the lower Mississippi valley.  Interestingly, his 
plan depended on what the local ecosystem furnished.  He called for enslaved men—freed from 
the onus of cultivating cotton thanks to the Confederacy’s wartime shift to corn and grain—to 
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build casements using the region’s ample timber supply and then cover them with earth and 
Bermuda sod, which would make them “impervious to shot or shell.”  Apparently, his plan was 
ignored.  As late as June 1862, Confederate officers continued to reconnoiter the hills around 
Helena to select a site for defense batteries.52 
Without fortifications, Helena became easy prey for U.S. forces.  Federal attempts to 
occupy the river town were delayed until the spring of 1862, when Union land and naval forces 
began their invasion of the South.  In accordance with Union strategy, this invasion hinged on 
gaining control of the Mississippi River, “the backbone of the Rebellion and the key to the 
situation,” according to President Lincoln.  Between March and June, the Federals captured 
several Confederate bastions on the Mississippi above Helena, including New Madrid, Missouri, 
Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, and Memphis (Figure 1).  In April, Union Admiral David Farragut’s 
West Gulf Blockading Squadron entered the southernmost portion of the Mississippi from the 
Gulf of Mexico, passed Forts Jackson and St. Phillip, and captured the most important city in the 
Confederacy outside of Richmond, New Orleans.  By late May, Farragut’s fleet had seized Baton 
Rouge and Natchez, Mississippi, and on May 18, it reached Vicksburg, where it began a siege of 
the Mississippi port.53 
In March 1862, Union Major General Henry W. Halleck, then commander of the 
Department of the Missouri, did his part to try to secure the Mississippi River by land.  He 
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instructed Brigadier General Frederick Steele, who was operating in southeast Missouri, to 
invade Arkansas, destroy enemy stores, and proceed to Helena.  Once there, Steele was to fortify 
the town and cut off all Confederate steamboat communication with Memphis.  Halleck believed 
Steele’s expedition, “if successful, [would] be one of the most important of the whole 
campaign.”54 
 Steele’s column did not occupy Helena in March 1862.  Instead, it would eventually 
converge upon the port town later that summer, and it would not make the journey alone.  
Shortly after its victory at the battle of Pea Ridge in northwest Arkansas on March 6-7, 1862, 
Major General Samuel R. Curtis’s Army of the Southwest began marching east along the 
Missouri-Arkansas border (Figure 4).  Curtis initiated the movement on April 5, after learning 
that his adversary at Pea Ridge—Confederate Major General Earl Van Dorn, who was encamped 
in Van Buren, Arkansas—had begun moving his defeated army east.  Curtis worried that the 
Confederates, fresh off their failed attempt to invade Missouri from northwestern Arkansas, were 
threatening to try again from the northeastern part of the state.  In actuality, Van Dorn had no 
such plan.  He had orders to move his army across the Mississippi River at Memphis and join 
forces with General Albert Sidney Johnston’s army at Corinth, Mississippi.  Together, Van Dorn 
and Johnston hoped to annihilate General Ulysses S. Grant’s army at Pittsburg Landing, on the 
Tennessee River, and shift the balance of power in the Western Theater in the Confederacy’s 
favor.55 
 When he learned of Van Dorn’s movement, Curtis wasted little time shifting his army to 
protect Missouri’s southern border.  After receiving Halleck’s approval, he led his men across 
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the rugged Ozark Plateau of southern Missouri.  Proceeding eastward from Cassville to West 
Plains, Missouri, the Army of the Southwest endured great hardships as it navigated the Ozark 
Plateau’s rocky peaks and flooded valleys.  During the course of their journey, Halleck learned 
about the intended terminus of Van Dorn’s movement.  Relieved that Missouri was no longer 
threatened, he instructed Curtis to take the offensive and invade northeastern Arkansas.  On May 
2, Curtis occupied Batesville, Arkansas, on the White River, and two days later, he joined forces 
with Steele, whose column had moved out of southeastern Missouri and captured Jacksonport, 
twenty-five miles southeast of Batesville.  After incorporating Steele’s troops with his army, 
Curtis was to march to Memphis, where he would combine forces with a Union flotilla on the 
Mississippi and converge upon the Tennessee port in a combined army-naval operation.  
However, when flooded fields made the region between Jacksonport and Memphis impassable, 
Halleck altered his plans and instructed Curtis to march on Little Rock instead.  Once he 
controlled Arkansas’s capital, Curtis was to take over the state government and declare martial 
law.56 
 Meanwhile, heavy spring rains slowed Van Dorn’s movement across Arkansas to a 
snail’s pace.  By the time his army reached Corinth in mid-April 1862, the battle of Shiloh was 
over, General Johnston was dead, and the Confederates had suffered a devastating defeat.  
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Perhaps more significant than Van Dorn’s tardiness, however, was the void his movement left in 
the Trans-Mississippi Theater.  In addition to moving some 15,000 troops out of Arkansas, Van 
Dorn had transferred nearly all of the Confederate weapons, stores, and ammunition out of the 
department for use east of the Mississippi.  Consequently, Confederate Arkansas stood unable to 
defend itself against Union invasion.  The ranking rebel in Arkansas summed up the state’s 
predicament in a letter to his superior:  “No troops—no arms—no powder—no material of war—
people everywhere eager to rise, complaints bitter.”  Outraged at the abandonment, Governor 
Rector complained to Jefferson Davis and even threatened Arkansan secession from the 
Confederacy.  To quell dissatisfaction and stabilize the situation west of the Mississippi, the 
Confederates called on a soldier familiar to all Arkansans:  Thomas Hindman.57 
 Since leaving Arkansas in the fall of 1861, Hindman, Cleburne, and their Confederate 
compatriots had clashed with Union armies in both Kentucky and Tennessee.  At the battle of 
Shiloh, Hindman—whose superiors unanimously praised his performance in the engagement—
severely injured his leg when his horse was shot from under him.  He received a leave of absence 
to recuperate in Helena, and, in late April 1862, was temporarily reunited with his wife and 
children, including an infant son who had been born during his absence.  While convalescing at 
home, he also learned of his promotion to major general, thus capping a meteoric rise from the 
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rank of colonel in only a year.  Sufficiently recovered by early May, Hindman rejoined the Army 
of the Mississippi at Corinth on May 10, just as Curtis’s army was threatening Little Rock.  The 
general had barely settled into his old command when he received orders to return to his home 
state to command the Confederacy’s Trans-Mississippi District.58 
 Hindman wasted little time in assuming his new command.  From Corinth, he traveled to 
Memphis, where he confiscated weapons, shoes, blankets, and other “camp equipage” for the 
army he planned to build.  He also purchased medicines, and, with his superior’s apparent 
permission, impressed $1 million in Confederate currency.  From Memphis, he proceeded down 
the Mississippi River to the mouth of the Arkansas.  Along the way, he “caused large quantities 
of cotton to be burned, pursuant to the order of the War Department on that subject, to prevent it 
from falling into the hands of the enemy.”  He also made a quick stop at Helena, where, in 
typical fashion, he “seized all the ammunition, shoes, blankets, and most valuable medicines held 
for sale.”  While there, he also arranged for his wife and children to join him in Little Rock, 
which the general reached on May 30.  “I found here almost nothing,” he complained to the 
Confederate war department.  “Nearly everything of value was taken away by General Van 
Dorn.”  Nevertheless, the following day, Hindman announced, with his usual flair, that he had 
come “to drive out the invader or to perish in the attempt.”  With Curtis’s army threatening and 
precious little time to organize an army, Hindman vigorously enforced conscription, declared 
martial law, and called for the formation of militia groups and guerrilla bands to attack the 
invading Federals and lay waste to the landscape on which they subsisted.59 
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 Hindman’s draconian measures ultimately proved unpopular in Arkansas, but victory 
remained paramount in the general’s mind.  During his sixty days in command of the Trans-
Mississippi, he tolerated no compromise, not even in his hometown.  When, in early June, 
Hindman learned that federal gunboats were plying toward Helena, he ordered the provost 
marshal there to “[b]urn, immediately, every bale of cotton in Phillips County,” arrest those who 
had hidden their crop, and send them to Little Rock, where they would be “delt [sic] with as 
traitors.”  At the same time, he instructed the provost to confiscate all powder, lead, percussion 
caps, cartridge paper, and quinine in the town and send them to Little Rock.60  Ten days later, 
when Hindman learned that Union troops might capture Helena, he ordered a colonel in Phillips 
County to attack the Federals “at all times, by day and night,” even if it caused civilian 
casualties.  “Allow no threats of shelling or burning Helena, or doing any other injury, to prevent 
you from striking the enemy, whenever you can,” the general instructed.  “Use all rigor and 
report often.”  Union forces did not capture Helena in mid-June, but less than a week later, 
Hindman learned that some of the town’s citizens were refusing to accept Confederate currency.  
In response, he told the Confederate commander in Phillips County to notify Helenians that if 
they allowed “such conduct to prevail in the future,” their town would be “burned to ashes.”  
Union sailors who patrolled the Mississippi at Helena reported seeing men hiding near the 
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riverbank and “flying from the conscription act,” a predictable response to Hindman’s severe 
policies.61 
 Meantime, Curtis’s advance had stalled.  As his army moved closer to Little Rock, its 
supply line—which originated three hundred miles to the north in Rolla, Missouri—stretched to 
its breaking point.  Furthermore, Confederate resolve was strengthening under Hindman’s 
command, as rebel guerrilla and militia bands constantly harassed the overextended Army of the 
Southwest.  After coming within forty miles of the capital, Curtis was forced to halt.  He 
backtracked to Batesville, where he hoped to be resupplied by a federal flotilla from Memphis 
that was moving up the White River.  Unfortunately for the Federals, the fleet never made it to 
Batesville.  On June 17, it encountered stiff rebel resistance at St. Charles.  During the fight, 
Confederate shots struck the steam drum on the Union ironclad Mound City, killing or severely 
wounding most of its 175-man crew.  Although the rest of the flotilla managed to escape, it was 
eventually halted by low water near Clarendon, well downstream from Batesville.  Nature, it 
seemed, was colluding with Hindman and the Confederates.62 
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 Desperate for provisions, Curtis decided to cut his Rolla supply line and march his army 
along the White River to meet the grounded convoy.  For the next two weeks, his troops foraged 
and pillaged everything in sight, devastating the eastern Arkansas countryside and waging war 
on its economy.  According to the Arkansas State Gazette, “No country ever was, or ever can be, 
worse devastated and laid waste than that which has been occupied, and marched over, by the 
Federal army.  Every thing which could be eaten by hungry horses or men has been devoured, 
and not content with foraging upon the country, almost every thing which could not be eaten was 
destroyed.”  All the while, Curtis’s troops struggled mightily to survive the region’s harsh 
summer temperatures and wet, low-lying terrain.  One Illinois cavalryman described the Delta 
sun as being so hot that the troops knew “how it [was] in haydes.”  Another soldier called eastern 
Arkansas a “wooded wilderness of fever nests and mosquito pests,” while an Illinois officer 
labeled the region between Batesville and Helena “the most backward in civilization and 
cultivation of any we saw in the South.”  The Army of the Southwest was the first Union army to 
operate without a base of supplies during the Civil War.  Such a daring feat would not be 
repeated for almost a year, when Grant’s army undertook similar actions during the Vicksburg 
campaign.63 
 As Curtis’s army trudged across the Arkansas Delta, it attracted a number of unexpected 
followers.  Several hundred “loyal residents of Arkansas” joined the column at Batesville; they 
“demanded that arms be given them” to form a Union regiment, and Curtis complied, eventually 
                                                 
63 Shea and Hess, Pea Ridge, 300-301; DeBlack, With Fire and Sword, 57-58; 
Moneyhon, The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on Arkansas, 128-129; Arkansas 
State Gazette, July 19, 1862; Shea, “A Semi-Savage State,” in Civil War Arkansas, 93-94; 
Samuel Black, A Soldier’s Recollections of the Civil War (Minco, Okla.:  Minco Minstrel, 1911–
1912), 16; James M. Miller et al., History of the Sixteenth Battery of Ohio Volunteer Light 
Artillery, U.S.A. (1906), 18-19. 
134 
 
forming the Arkansas Six Months Infantry Volunteers.64  More significantly, an estimated 2,000 
slaves fled to Union lines during the march.  “We have been marching through vast plantations 
of cotton and corn where the negroes swarm by thousands,” Curtis informed his wife.  “They are 
all delighted to see us, and all want to go with us.  They are entirely indifferent, or delighted, to 
see the masters suffer either as prisoners or as contributors.”  A Little Rock newspaper accused 
Curtis of stealing these men, women, and children from Arkansas planters, but in many cases, 
the enslaved people—drawn by the presence of soldiers in blue—stole their own bodies from 
their so-called masters.65  “On our march the negroes had fairly swarmed around us, coming 
from every mansion, log cabin, and habitable place in the whole region,” an Illinois cavalryman 
remembered.  “So excited a body of humanity never was seen before; here was the realization of 
the hopes of liberty which they had kept alive for years.”  Abraham Lincoln would not issue his 
final Emancipation Proclamation for another six months, but black Arkansans believed the Army 
of the Southwest had come to liberate them.  “The slaves seem to understand the matter very 
clearly and are on the alert to make escape by any opportunity,” an Illinois soldier reported.  
Many of the Midwesterners in Curtis’s column witnessed slavery on a large scale for the first 
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time.  “It was a country of large plantations with armies of strange looking negroes who 
streamed into our camps and attached themselves to our columns,” recalled one officer.  “They 
were the most wretched lot of human beings that we boys had ever seen.  We were short of 
supplies ourselves, but we had to share what we had with these strange camp followers.”  In 
some cases, the slaves returned the favor, clearing rebel barricades and sharing valuable 
intelligence and food with the famished soldiers.  On the outskirts of Helena, slaves reportedly 
lined the road and handed boiled ears of corn to passing troops.66 
 Curtis did not encourage enslaved Arkansans to join his march, but he did not discourage 
them from doing so, either.  As a former Republican Congressman from Iowa with antislavery 
sentiments, he certainly sympathized with their plight.  However, he had thousands of tired and 
hungry soldiers to provide for, and they remained his primary responsibility.  Still, Curtis had 
encountered numerous man-made obstacles during his march across Arkansas, and upon further 
investigation, he learned that many of those obstructions had been built by the very people who 
sought his assistance.  According to the First Confiscation Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 
August 1861, all slaves “employed in or upon any fort, navy yard, dock, armory, ship, 
entrenchment, or in any military or naval service” to the Confederacy were “subject of prize and 
capture wherever found.”  Although the act did not explicitly free slaves employed by 
Confederates, it nullified their owners’ claims to their labor, so Curtis believed it authorized him 
to act.67  An accomplished attorney, Curtis also reasoned that slaves were, by definition, 
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captives.  Thus, when he seized them in warfare, they “became captured captives and therefore 
subject to [his] disposal instead of a former captor or assignee.”  Using this logic, he issued 
freedom certificates to all slaves who proved they had been “engaged in the rebel service.”  His 
so-called “free papers” declared these slaves to be “contraband of war” and, as such, he “forever 
emancipated” them.68  Word of Curtis’s actions spread quickly along the slaves’ grapevine 
telegraph, and in the months ahead, thousands more flocked to Union lines to secure their 
freedom and have it validated.69 
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 Curtis’s distribution of free papers infuriated Hindman and the Confederates, who tried 
frantically to halt the Union advance and end the destruction of their homeland.  On June 24, 
Hindman called for all Arkansans residing near the White River to resist the Yankees in a 
guerrilla war: 
Attack him day and night, kill his scouts and pickets, kill his pilots and his troops on 
transports, cut off his wagon trains, lay in ambush and surprise his detachments, shoot his 
mounted officers, destroy every pound of meat and flour, every ear of corn and stack of 
fodder, oats and wheat that can fall into his hands; fell trees, as thickly as in rafts, in all 
the road before him, burn every bridge and block up the fords.  Hang upon his front, 
flanks and rear, and make the ring of your rifles and shot-guns the accompaniment of 
every foot of his retreat.70 
   
Many civilians ignored Hindman’s request for what must have sounded to them like economic 
suicide, for the general later lamented, “My instructions for devastating the country were not 
executed.”  However, Hindman’s troops complied.  He ordered them to “resist the enemy to the 
last extremity blockading roads, burning bridges, destroying all supplies, growing crops 
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included, and polluting the water by killing cattle, ripping the carcasses, and throwing them in.”71  
The Union soldiers subjected to these scorched-earth tactics suffered immensely.  One recalled 
that during the march, he and his comrades “suffered mor [sic] for water than anything else.  On 
every plantation there [were] generely [sic] two or three wells which might have afforded us 
tolerably cool water,” he continued, “but our enemies would break the buckets and fill up the 
wells with logs and dirt on our approach leaving only the muddy swamps and Bayous along the 
road[.] this water was perfectly hot and almost putrid for the secesh would drive hogs and cattle 
into these places and then shoot them and leave them to season the water for us to drink.”  To 
survive the ordeal, the soldier sipped water that, prior to joining the army, he “would have been 
ashamed to offer to a hog.”72   
Still, Curtis’s column pressed forward.  On July 7, a collection of Texas and Arkansas 
regiments failed to prevent the Yankees from crossing the Cache River, and by July 9, the Army 
of the Southwest had reached Clarendon.  To their dismay, the Union soldiers found that the 
supply flotilla had already left Clarendon and moved downstream.  Without provisions, Curtis 
knew that an attack on Little Rock would be impossible.  Reasoning that the safety of his army 
was more important than the occupation of Little Rock, he decided that the Arkansas capital 
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could be taken another day.  On July 9, his army began a three-day, forty-five-mile march to 
Helena, where it would establish a new supply line on the Mississippi River.  After three months 
and five hundred miles of marching, the Army of Southwest reached and occupied an 
undefended Helena on July 12, 1862.73 
Six months earlier, Q. K. Underwood, the longtime editor of the Helena Southern Shield, 
commemorated his newspaper’s twenty-second anniversary by bemoaning the “diabolical war” 
that consumed his country.  Like many white southerners, he blamed Lincoln and the northern 
abolitionists for attempting to subjugate “to their unhallowed will a large number of their former 
fellow citizens, joint inheritors with them of the great legacy left them by the father’s [sic] of the 
Republic, because they had the temerity to differ from them in their construction of the 
Constitution.”  A former Whig, Underwood also longed for the leadership of William Henry 
Harrison, John Tyler, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun, “that renowned host of 
intellectual giants” who, if alive, would have recoiled at what had befallen the United States.  He 
beseeched his readers to look to those “illustrious sages” for guidance and to defend their 
liberties against the North’s “yoke of hateful oppression.”  “Rather than submit to such a fate,” 
he harangued, “it were better that every field were whitened with the bones of our people, every 
ear of corn and blade of grass consumed, leaving our beautiful country one vast desolation, ‘A 
seething cauldron and a burning Hell.’”  Tragically, Underwood would get much of what he 
wished for in the months ahead, as his and the devotion of fellow Helenians to the Confederate 
cause would be put to the ultimate test.74 
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Chapter 4:  Occupation 
 
 
On July 11, 1862, at 2:00 a.m., a bugler blasted reveille.  The signal startled the 2,500 
Union cavalrymen encamped at Clarendon, Arkansas, who slipped out of their bedrolls and 
packed their gear.  After a paltry breakfast of “three crackers to each man,” the weary soldiers 
mounted their horses and hit the Little Rock Road.  For weeks, they had been riding “through the 
enemy’s country,” where “on all sides there was hostility to the Union soldiers” courtesy of 
Confederate regulars, rebel guerrillas, antagonistic civilians, and the eastern Arkansas 
environment.  The Federals and their horses had been living off the land, and nature had been 
unkind to them.  Food and potable water were scarce, and the “country literally steamed with 
heat.”  Moreover, many of the horses suffered from “Grease Heel,” a disease that attacks the 
horse’s feet “between the hoof and fetlock, separating and cracking open the skin.”  One soldier 
observed that the animal’s feet heal quickly when they are properly cleaned and given dry 
ground to stand on, but there was little of that in the Delta.1   
At last, however, the cavalrymen neared the end of their journey.  Only sixty-five miles 
to their southeast lay Helena, a bustling port on the Mississippi River where they hoped to 
establish a new waterborne supply line.  Led by former congressman (and future Wisconsin 
governor) Cadwallader C. Washburn, the horsemen were the van of General Samuel R. Curtis’s 
Army of the Southwest, which had been marching for more than three months.  They were 
parched, hungry, and fatigued, but they rode all day and all night, stopping only once to feed and 
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water their horses.  Consequently, some of the men “dropped from their horses” along the way, 
while “others laid quietly down by the roadside—quite a number to rise no more.”2 
Twenty-eight hours after leaving Clarendon, the cavalry emerged from the “wilderness” 
and trotted into the streets of Helena, where they glimpsed the Mississippi River “with a delight 
almost equal to that of Hernando de Soto when he first gazed upon its turbid current.”  No 
Confederate troops were present in the town, but many of the locals were surprised to see the 
Yankees.  “Nobody was aware of our coming,” reported a newspaperman who accompanied the 
Union column.  Still, some Helenians must have had a hunch.  More than a month earlier, 
Thomas Hindman had ordered the town’s “publick stores and impressed property” moved in 
anticipation of the Federals’ arrival, and on June 24, he ordered the citizens of eastern Arkansas 
to wage a guerrilla war against Curtis’s army.  Additionally, a number of Union boats had 
churned past Helena’s waterfront in recent weeks, including those that had attempted to resupply 
Curtis on the White River.  Nothing, however, could have prepared Helenians for the full-blown 
invasion that commenced on July 12.3   
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As the Yankee cavalry charged into town, they spotted a boat steaming away from the 
riverbank.  Its passengers, who included a “few negroes and citizens,” may have been attempting 
a last-minute escape.  To stop this, the soldiers hauled a brass howitzer onto the levee and fired 
several four-pound shots over the ship’s bow.  When the ferryman on the Mississippi shore saw 
the excitement, he refused to let the steamboat dock, so its unnerved captain waved a white flag 
and returned to Helena’s wharf, where Union troops detained the passengers and examined their 
belongings.  Meanwhile, in accordance with his orders, Washburn established a supply line.  He 
“hailed the first Boat and sent to Memphis for supplies,” and he dispatched a second ship to find 
the “lost fleet” on the White River.  After attending to the welfare of his exhausted troops—some 
of whom literally fell from their saddles upon reaching camp—Washburn took up his 
headquarters at “the splendid residence of Genl. Hindman,” a profoundly symbolic act given all 
that the rebel general had done to thwart his advance.  Hindman’s home, one of the finest in 
Helena, was a two-story brick structure “built on ground so high as to be always above the 
highest overflow of the river.”  It was surrounded by a white picket fence that enclosed a lawn 
sheltered by “some shady beach trees with sweeping limbs and thick shade.”  The proud Yankees 
hoisted a U.S. flag above the roof of the house, thus capping their conquest of Confederate 
Arkansas’s most prominent Mississippi port.  “The Stars and stripes float to the wind on the 
Mississippi at Helena,” boasted the army’s quartermaster.4 
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Over the next three days, the remainder of the Army of the Southwest, including its 
commander Curtis, trickled into town.  The infantry’s march to Helena was just as grueling as 
the cavalry’s had been.  “We had no blankets for the night, no food for the day, no decent water 
to drink,” an Illinois soldier recalled.  “During the entire day the only water we could get was 
from one swamp we passed.  In that, the thick green scum, from an eighth to a quarter of an inch 
thick had to be pushed away before we could get to the filthy, poisonous water beneath.  We 
were tired and worn out, foot-sore, sick and hungry.  That was soldiering in earnest.”  Inevitably, 
some of the troops did not make it to Helena, and many who did arrived in wagons and 
ambulances.  “Back for miles the sides of the road were strewn with our sick and exhausted 
soldiers,” the Illinoisan continued.  “Full three fourths, if not more, of the entire command were 
thus lying upon the road side. . . .  It took two or three days after we arrived to bring in our worn-
out and sick soldiers.  The first thing being, of course, to send back food to distribute to them 
along the road.”5 
That food came from federal steamboats on the Mississippi River, the army’s new 
lifeline.  It was a godsend to the famished troops, who rushed to the riverbank to receive their 
rations.  “Never was a vessel more thankfully received than this one bringing relief to us in our 
destitute and starving condition,” one soldier recalled.  Shortly after the Federals arrived in 
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5 Samuel R. Curtis account of military history prepared for Col. E. D. Townsend, 
February 28, 1865, pp. 58-59, Box 4, Folder 1, Curtis Papers, SHSI; Albert O. Marshall, Army 
Life.  From a Soldier’s Journal.  Incidents, Sketches and Record of a Union Soldier’s Army Life, 
in Camp and Field, 1861-64, ed. Robert G. Schultz (Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 
2009), 94-95; “From Curtis’ Column,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 22, 1862. 
144 
 
Helena, an Indiana cavalryman reported that “20,000 persons assembled on the bank to behold 
the sight” of a steamboat.  “The brass band was there a few National airs then the shouts of the 
soldiers wrent the air, as the white handkerchiefs waved in return.”  Another Yankee 
remembered a more chaotic scene, as hungry soldiers stampeded the riverbank to fill their 
bellies:  “On the levee there had been several boxes of hard bread opened, and about five or six 
bushels were broken up very fine and trodden into the dirt and mud.  Our poor boys saw them, 
and broke ranks in the wildest confusion, and such devouring of dirty food would have melted a 
heart of stone.  Our general witnessed the sight and wept like a child.”6   
The hard bread that the troops gorged was a standard army ration called hardtack, a three-
inch square cracker made of flour, water, and salt that was, as the name suggests, rather rigid.  In 
fact, soldiers sometimes soaked it in water or coffee to avoid breaking their teeth.  Hardtack 
arrived at Helena’s wharf in boxes labeled “B. C.,” meaning “Brigade Commissary,” but one 
soldier assumed it meant “‘baked before Christ,’ which seemed applicable as [the crackers] were 
infested with worms.”  The army’s rations were “not good,” he recalled, but after weeks of 
foraging in the wilderness, they were certainly “better than starvation.”7 
Starvation was exactly what faced the estimated 2,000 runaway slaves who accompanied 
Curtis’s column to Helena.  Most fled to Union lines voluntarily, but some had been dispatched 
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by their owners, who, on account of the war, found themselves unable to feed their slaves.  The 
Federals gave the African Americans what rations they could; they also employed them as cooks, 
teamsters, construction workers, laundresses, grave-diggers, guides, wood-choppers, hospital 
aids, and personal servants, though, in the months ahead, much of their work went 
uncompensated.  Still, slaves continued to flock to federal lines, and Curtis kept freeing all who 
could prove they had been employed by the Confederates (the burden of proof required by the 
general was allegedly rather low).  On July 15, for example, Curtis “forever emancipated” 
“David Bostwick and Family, colored persons formerly slaves,” who, “by direction of their 
owner,” had been “engaged in the rebel service.”  The general declared them to be “contraband 
of war” and granted them permission to pass through Union pickets and go north.  Two weeks 
later, Curtis noted that on account of his policy, slaves were “throwing down their axes” and 
rushing into Helena to acquire free papers.  “It is creating a general stampede in this region of 
cotton and contempt for Yankees,” the general reported.  “The slaves are mutinous, but do not 
abuse their masters.  Society is terribly mutilated, and masters and slaves are afraid of famine.”  
Meanwhile, in Little Rock, Thomas Hindman heard rumors of slave insurrections in Monroe and 
Phillips counties.  Exasperated, he ordered a subordinate in Pine Bluff to “Send a squadron under 
a discreet and reliable officer, to follow up track of the enemy, get as near Helena as possible. . . 
and preserve order among [the] slave population.”8   
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Unbeknownst to Hindman, the time for white Arkansans to control African Americans in 
the Delta was over.  Only three days after Curtis reached Helena, the U.S. government’s Second 
Confiscation Act proclaimed all slaves owned by rebel masters “forever free of their servitude” 
and declared that they be “not again held as slaves.”  Whereas the First Confiscation Act of 
August 1861 touched only those slaves employed in the Confederate service, the Second 
Confiscation Act of July 1862 effectually freed all who entered Union lines and claimed that 
their owners were disloyal.  In the months ahead, the number of enslaved Arkansans (and 
Mississippians) who declared this at Helena swelled into the thousands.9 
The white residents of Phillips County could not control their Union invaders, either.  As 
Curtis’s soldiers poured into Helena, they seized private residences, businesses, lumber, and 
anything else they needed to establish their barracks.  Washburn politely relinquished the 
Hindman house to his commanding officer, and the rest of troops took much of what they wanted 
from the locals.  “The arrival of Curtis’ army was a complete surprise to the people of Helena,” 
one newspaper reported, “and when the immense body filed into the town, and occupied every 
road and lane leading to and from it, great was the terror of the inhabitants.”  William Barksdale, 
a Baptist preacher in Helena, decried the Federals’ demolition of his rental houses, which he 
believed the soldiers “devoured . . . for the purpose of making their fires at camp.”  Two months 
earlier, Mississippi floodwaters had damaged his houses, and the troops came in and finished the 
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job by stripping them of their weather-boarding, which they then hauled off and burned.  On July 
15, another fire erupted in Helena, and a portion of the town was destroyed.  “Every where [the 
Yankees] are devouring and laying waste the labor of man’s hands,” Barksdale complained.  
“Our wives are not free from their insults—but they walk in armed with pistols and sabres, and 
thus compell [sic] with arms, our wives to cook for them!”  An Indiana infantryman agreed that 
Helena had seen better days.  On July 26, he reported, “Helenas about as miserable a looking 
place as I ever saw.  What has been the best part of town is completely destroyed, whether by the 
rebels or through a[n] accident I dont know.  The remaining houses are all deserted by their 
owners and are now occupied by Soldiers for different purposes.”10   
Three months later, Union troops continued to requisition local buildings.  “We are now 
in our winter quarters and it is a sight to look at, we have quite a town and most conceivable kind 
of house that one could imagine,” reported a soldier in late October 1862.  “[B]ut in building up 
our houses we had to pull down the ancient city of Helena so that not a stone, brick or fence now 
be found within the former limits, even good houses have been sacrificed for the comfort of the 
1st Brigade.”11 
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Federal soldiers also appropriated whatever they needed from the region surrounding 
Helena, laying waste to large swaths of the countryside while doing so.  They confiscated crops 
and livestock from nearby farms, and they cut down trees and razed fences and cotton gins to 
obtain lumber for their quarters.  “[I]t looks hard the way the farmers are served here,” 
empathized an Illinois cavalryman.  “[T]he soldiers take the fence and turn the crop out and 
when they go for forage they find a cornfield drive in get what they want leave the fence down 
and go back[.]  there is but few whites and the darkeys will suffer this winter[.]”  The troops also 
looted valuables.  In August 1862, a soldier stationed fifteen miles below Helena reported that 
local whites had abandoned their plantations and “left a lot of fine furniture” in their houses.  
“We tear everything upside down,” he confessed.  “We don’t care for nothing. . . .  [E]verything 
we want we take and ask nobody.”  In consequence of such scavenging, William Barksdale 
observed that the country surrounding Helena was, “for miles around, swept by foraging parties.  
Farmers have both negroes and all kinds of stock stolen from them.  Some of my dear brethren, 
are striped [sic] of nearly everything by these ruthless invaders. . . .  It seems that Curtis’ army is 
bent upon starving out this county.”12   
Barksdale believed that Union officers disapproved of the plundering, and he noted that 
“every family in town [was] compelled to keep a special guard” of troops to prevent pillaging.  
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Indeed, federal soldiers were stationed with a number of local families “to protect them and their 
property from molestation,” but they often neglected to do their duty.  One man recalled that he 
and his comrades were ordered to guard a plantation about five miles from Helena, but they “did 
not protect it much.”  As a case in point, they “did not prevent the soldiers from helping 
themselves to rebel chickens and garden stuff,” and they always “looked out for number one, you 
bet.”  On August 15, the U.S. war department reminded troops about the rules for confiscating 
civilian property, including “the penalty of death for pillage or plundering,” but many ignored 
the warning.13 
The story of the Pillow plantations illustrates what happened to many farms in Phillips 
County following the Army of the Southwest’s arrival, albeit on a large scale.  Before the Civil 
War, Gideon J. Pillow, a Mexican War veteran and Tennessee planter, was one of the leading 
landowners in Arkansas.  Pillow resided on his plantation near Columbia, Tennessee, but he also 
owned “a small empire” in eastern Arkansas, including five plantations in Phillips County.  In 
1860, those plantations, which constituted over six thousand acres, were home to more than two 
hundred slaves who grew cotton and corn in abundance.  An absentee landowner, Pillow was 
still the sixth largest slaveholder in Arkansas on the eve of the war.14 
In May 1861, Pillow was given command of the Provisional Army of Tennessee, and, 
when the Confederacy assumed control of that army two months later, he was commissioned a 
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rebel brigadier.  In February 1862, his troops surrendered Fort Donelson, the most formidable 
Confederate bastion on the Cumberland River (near the Tennessee-Kentucky border), to Union 
forces under Ulysses S. Grant—but not before Pillow and his superior, General John B. Floyd, 
controversially fled the fort.15  In the wake of the Donelson disaster, Pillow was relieved of his 
command, and in April 1862, the disgraced general made his way to Helena.  Concerned about 
his inability to manage his Arkansas plantations, and fearing they might eventually fall into 
federal hands, Pillow sold them—along with the slaves who tended them—to H. P. Coolidge, 
Helena’s most prominent merchant, for $575,000.  It was a mock sale, for the two friends then 
effected a second, secret agreement that showed “in point of fact no sale of this property was 
intended, but the real object of the pretended sale was to create in Coolidge an agency for the 
management of Pillow’s estate and to supply the wants of Pillow’s large slave population.”  
Coolidge was purportedly a Unionist, so Pillow probably believed the agreement would increase 
his chances of preserving his property if Helena was captured.16 
 Helena fell to Curtis’s army only three months later, and Pillow’s plantations became 
spoils of the war.  On July 20, Pillow told his brother Jerome—also a Tennessee planter with 
significant holdings in Phillips County—that as soon as General Curtis “gets out of the way,” he 
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intended to move his slaves in eastern Arkansas elsewhere.  Unfortunately for Pillow, Curtis did 
not get out of the way.  In fact, his advance cavalry under C. C. Washburn “sent out large 
foraging parties that fell upon the Pillow farms” shortly after arriving in Helena on July 12.  In 
Curtis’s mind, this was justified because all members of the Pillow family “except the slaves 
were in the rebel lines.”  When Curtis reached Helena two days later, he “found the Pillow 
negroes, three or four hundred, and thousands more claiming freedom and protection.  Thus 
neglected,” the general reported, “the Pillow plantations were visited in a spirt of wantoness [sic] 
by soldiers, camp followers, and the negroes, which could not be restrained.”17   
Curtis did not restrain his troops in the ensuing weeks, either.  An Illinois cavalryman 
remembered that his comrades made “frequent excursions” to one of the Pillow plantations, 
where the troops carried off “what they desired,” while an Indiana soldier assured his family that 
he had “plenty to eat” because Pillow and Hindman had “plenty of hogs and roasting ears near 
and we help ourselves whenever we wish.”  The following day, another Hoosier reported that 
one of Pillow’s plantations had “heretofore furnished the boys with roasting ears and poultry,” 
but, on account of the troops’ continuous foraging, the farm was now “played out.”  The 
Arkansas True Democrat, a pro-Confederate newspaper in Little Rock, agreed.  On July 30, it 
reported that the Pillow farms were “utterly ruined; not a fence rail, rafter, or vestige of a home 
left.”18 
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The pillaging of the Pillow plantations caused great suffering among their African 
American inhabitants.  Union soldiers stole much of their sustenance, and, on occasion, 
persecuted the black residents.   On the night of July 21, for example, eight drunken Illinois 
cavalrymen “abused and maltreated” the female slaves on a Pillow farm.  The rapists declared 
that they hated abolitionists and feared that Abraham Lincoln would “adopt the policy of ‘nigger 
equality.’”  In subsequent months, sexual liaisons (voluntary or otherwise) between federal 
troops and African American women were common in Phillips County.  In late July, a Union 
quartermaster in Helena reported that white teamsters and soldiers were “indulging in intimacy” 
with black women, which, in his view, could “only be accounted for by the doctrine of total 
depravity” that existed among the freedpeople.  Two months later, a newspaper correspondent 
lamented that black females at Helena were “in too many instances made to serve as 
prostitutes.”19 
Curtis observed that of all the farms in eastern Arkansas that his soldiers visited, the 
Pillows’ were “especially devastated, [and] the negroes were most destitute.”   To alleviate the 
African Americans’ anguish, the general freed all who could prove they had labored for the 
Confederates (a relatively easy task given that most belonged to a rebel general).  He also 
allowed them to sell whatever cotton remained on the premises.  The Confederates had burned 
much of the region’s cotton to prevent it from falling into Union hands, but the slaves—
sometimes at the behest of their owners—had utilized the Delta terrain to conceal a number of 
bales, hiding them in the swamps, woods, and canebreaks.  Curtis reasoned that because the 
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slaves had performed most of the labor required to grow, harvest, and preserve the crop, they 
were entitled to the fruits of their labor.  Plus, he argued, the Pillow plantations were “stripped by 
our Soldiers and the Negroes must have perished, If I had not [resorted] to some such means to 
save them from starvation.”   
And so, African Americans brought their bales to Helena and sold them to make ends 
meet.  Curtis allowed them to “make their own bargains” with buyers, but unscrupulous 
speculators and soldiers frequently took advantage of them, so the general stepped in to 
supervise their exchanges.  He typically did so on an ad hoc basis, safeguarding the 
freedpeople’s earnings and then doling them out piecemeal whenever they needed money.  He 
also maintained sloppy records of transactions and steered the freedpeople toward merchants he 
personally trusted (some of whom were his acquaintances), practices his enemies later cited as 
evidence of his corruption.  Still, the general’s policy was a boon to the African Americans of 
Phillips County.  Some four hundred freedpeople from the Pillow plantations, for example, used 
the money they earned from cotton sales to travel north “in rather comfortable circumstances.”  
Moreover, Curtis furnished them free passage to Cairo, Illinois, on a government steamboat, 
another act for which he was later criticized.20 
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When Pillow learned about the devastation of his Phillips County properties, he protested 
to President Jefferson Davis and asked, “Can no retaliatory measures be adopted?”  He also 
wrote to Samuel P. Walker, his friend in Union-occupied Memphis, to complain about the 
“wholesale robbery” of his plantations.  Rumor had it that four hundred of his slaves had been 
“taken off” by federal soldiers, who also “destroyed everything else” on his farms.  Many of 
those slaves reportedly had made their way to Memphis, where they were “wandering about” and 
“suffering for food.”  Pillow asked Walker to investigate these rumors and forward his concerns 
to either U. S. Grant or William T. Sherman, the Union commander in Memphis, to “ascertain if 
these proceedings [had] been ordered by them.”  He also reminded his friend that he had 
“protected the property of Union men” in Missouri and Kentucky, including that of General 
Thomas L. Crittenden, and now he hoped federal officers would return the favor.  Moreover, the 
Second Confiscation Act accorded rebels sixty day days to affirm their loyalty to the United 
States and keep their property.  That act had barely been on the books for two weeks, so in 
Pillow’s estimation, his slaves “were in no legal sense liable to seizure.”21 
Walker forwarded Pillow’s letter to Sherman, who promptly replied even though he 
believed it was “not proper in war” to do so.  It just so happened that Curtis had visited Memphis 
recently, and Sherman had asked him to respond to Pillow’s allegations.  Not surprisingly, the 
Iowan defended his actions.  Curtis denied that “armed men” had taken slaves from Pillow’s 
plantations or any others, unless, of course, the general “had proof that such slaves had been used 
in war against him.”  Moreover, the alleged damage to Pillow’s plantations was, in Curtis’s 
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appraisal, “only such as will attend the armies, such as marked the progress of your . . . columns 
a year ago in Kentucky.”  Sherman acknowledged that Curtis had freed slaves “used as property 
to carry on war,” and though he personally disagreed with this policy, Curtis was his superior, so 
he had “no control over” him.  Sherman also dispelled the rumor that Pillow’s slaves were 
roaming around Memphis “in want and destitution,” and he glibly reported Curtis’s “great 
surprise” at Pillow’s “solicitude” for his slaves in Phillips County, especially since Pillow had 
“sold them all or had transferred them by some instrument of writing for a record to a gentleman 
near the plantation, who is a loyal citizen of the United States.”  Apparently, H. P. Coolidge had 
divulged the nature of his secret agreement with Pillow, and Curtis had declared the sale null and 
void.22 
Curtis’s snide dismissal of Pillow’s concerns did not end the drama surrounding (or the 
destruction of) the rebel general’s Phillips County holdings.  In the months ahead, Union soldiers 
continued to camp and forage on the plantations, thus depriving their African American 
occupants of what little rations remained.23  An Indiana infantryman marveled at the desolation 
in October 1862: 
Among the many rich plantations that the ravages of war have been let loose upon, are 
three of the finest in all Arkansas, close to [Helena], belonging to one certain Gideon J. 
Pillow.  When he beheld them with his eyes, perhaps for the last time, they were in a 
superb condition, with fields of hundreds of acres teeming with bountiful crops, while the 
mellow [voice] of his corr [sic] [of] colored gentry might be heard from morn till night, 
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as he performed his daily task.  Wealth and riches were being counted by the legion, and 
he justly prided himself among the “upper ten” of the chivalrous South. . . .  Could he 
return now to view these plantations, how changed would be the scene!  In lieu of wealth 
and riches are poverty and distress; in lieu of the fields of cotton, which now would have 
been whitening for the spinners, having the appearance of a field of snow, is the broad, 
barren, fenceless commons, and instead of cotton is a crop of weeds such as Arkansas 
alone can produce; in lieu of a beautiful yard and a magnificent mansion that once 
decorated the spot, the briers and the thistle now flourish, and an old wreck of the once 
beautiful mansion, with weather-boards torn off, and windows broken to atoms, is taken 
for the purposes of some enterprising soldier—and in their stead the spider has woven his 
complicated web—marks the spot where once stood the monument of wealth; in lieu of 
the clump of negro huts, that once gave to their chosen location the appearance of a well 
laid out village, is now a heap of ruins; and in lieu of the Southern gods who once 
occupied these buildings is now utter lonliness [sic] and desolation!  And thus it is how 
this cruel war is blasting and blackening the sunny South.24 
 
By January 1863, the circumstances on one Pillow farm had become so dire that Jerome Pillow, 
a self-proclaimed loyalist, reportedly led 183 of his slaves to Helena to consign them to the 
Federals.  “I cannot use them,” Pillow allegedly told the post commander.  “I had bacon to keep 
them on, but it has been stolen.  I had corn, but it has been gobbled.  Now, I have nothing for 
them to eat, and, as Lincoln has turned this army into a nigger boarding house, you will please 
seat these people at your table. . . .  You will not see them starve, I hope.”  Tragically, the 
commander—whose camp was already inundated with indigent freedpeople—rejected the 
newcomers because he had “no food for them” and “nothing for them to do.”25   
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The following month, the U.S. war department commissioned a court of inquiry to 
investigate whether Union officers had been “engaged, or directly or indirectly participated in 
traffic in Cotton or other produce on the Mississippi River or its tributaries, . . . granted licenses 
or permits for trade, . . . [or] used or permitted the use of Government transportation, or other 
public property for private purposes.”  The court examined trade and profiteering throughout the 
Mississippi valley, but it focused primarily on Curtis’s actions at Helena, including those related 
to the Pillow plantations.26   
In late August 1862, Curtis had left Helena to attend a Pacific Railroad convention in 
Chicago.  While he was away, General Frederick Steele took over the Army of the Southwest, 
and Curtis was promoted to command the Department of the Missouri (which included 
Arkansas), headquartered at St. Louis.  Steele, who hailed from “the old hard-shell Democratic 
party” that had “no sympathy with anti-slavery,” opposed his predecessor’s liberal treatment of 
African Americans.  In the name of military necessity, he forbade freedpeople from selling 
cotton, withheld the wages they earned as cooks, teamsters, and fortification builders (until their 
owners’ loyalty could be determined by the courts), ejected those unable to work from the 
army’s lines, and even returned some to their former masters (technically a violation of the 
Second Confiscation Act).  Additionally, Steele and his primary ally, John S. Phelps—a Missouri 
slaveholder and Democratic congressman whom Lincoln had appointed military governor of 
Arkansas—cited Curtis’s handling of the Pillow plantations as evidence of the Iowan’s 
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corruption.  In May 1863, Steele testified that Jerome Pillow’s cotton, supposedly under the 
Union army’s protection, was nevertheless “hauled away by what was called the Staff team of 
Gen. Curtis.”  The implication, of course, was that Curtis had profited from this illegal seizure 
and sale.  Phelps did not testify in the court, but he repeatedly relayed rumors of Curtis’s cotton 
speculation to the war department.  Other members of the Steele clique, for their part, accused 
Curtis of embezzling some of the Pillow slaves’ earnings.27  
The court of inquiry lasted nearly four months, and in the end, it found Curtis guilty of no 
crimes.  It did, however, declare that the general should not have paid the Pillow slaves for the 
cotton they brought to Helena.  While the court conceded that the slaves might have had a lawful 
claim to the portion of the crop they had grown on their own, it determined that most of the 
cotton actually had belonged to their Confederate owners.  Therefore, as contraband of war, it 
“should have been turned over to some officer of one of the administrative branches of the Staff 
and regularly accounted for.”  The slaves, meanwhile, should have been provided for “in a 
regular systematic manner by the proper staff Officers On proper returns made by some officer 
having knowledge of the number, and condition of these negroes.”  Ironically, prior to leaving 
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Helena, Curtis had attempted to do just that.  He instructed C. C. Washburn to organize, employ, 
and care for the freedpeople, many of whom “were in a most deplorable condition suffering for 
both food & covering.”  Steele, however, had reversed many of his predecessor’s policies, 
explicitly forbidding the feeding of unemployed freedwomen and children.28 
The government never acted on the court of inquiry’s findings, but accusations of cotton 
speculation plagued Curtis for the rest of his life.  The Iowan’s actions notwithstanding, Steele 
and Phelps’s allegations gained traction because Helena was, in fact, a hub for cotton trading 
(both legal and illicit) during the Civil War.  Before the war, cotton was the United States’ most 
valuable product.  Cotton cultivated in southern fields fed textile mills in the North and in 
Europe, thus creating what one scholar calls an “economic symbiosis” between the regions.  
When hostilities erupted in 1861, both the U.S. and Confederate governments banned trade with 
the enemy, yet almost immediately, northern merchants, politicians, investors, and manufacturers 
began pressuring Lincoln to restore trade with the South.  The president initially resisted, but 
smuggling between the lines was common.  Cut off by the Union blockade, southerners needed 
salt, pork, medicines, clothing, and other essentials, while enterprising Yankees willingly 
exchanged these items for cotton, for which desperate northern manufacturers paid premium 
prices.  “Few things are so troublesome to the government as the fierceness with which the 
profits of trading in cotten [sic] are sought,” lamented Lincoln in 1863.  “The temptation is so 
great that nearly every body wishes to be in it; and when in, the question of profit controls all, 
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regardless of whether the cotten [sic] seller is loyal or rebel, or whether he is paid in corn-meal 
or gun-powder.”29 
Despite some reservations, Lincoln eventually decided to “let commerce follow the flag.”  
That is, he allowed loyal citizens to trade in those parts of the South occupied by Union forces, 
which, by the summer of 1862, included most of the Mississippi valley.  By reinstituting some 
trade between the sections, Lincoln hoped to satisfy the desire of northern (and European) 
manufacturers for cotton and commence the commercial “reconstruction” of the South.  
Accordingly, in the summer of 1862, the Department of the Treasury began issuing trade permits 
to planters and merchants who pledged their allegiance to the United States.  Federal forces were 
ordered not to interfere with their commerce “except to prevent trade in Articles which are 
contraband,” and soldiers were forbidden from seizing southern cotton unless it was “exposed to 
be destroyed by the enemy.”  In that case, the cotton was to be “receipted for” and “immediately 
turned over to the quartermaster’s department,” which would ship it to market for sale.  If the 
cotton belonged to a rebel or someone “rendering assistance to the enemy,” the U.S. government 
kept the proceeds; if it was owned by a loyal citizen, the government gave him the money minus 
any expenses incurred for transport.30   
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Union soldiers quickly found that preventing trade in contraband goods was easier said 
than done.  To the army’s dismay, a number of northern merchants proved willing to trade 
almost anything for cotton, including salt, flour, clothing, lead, and even ammunition and 
percussion caps—which, if undetected by federal guards, frequently found their way to 
Confederate lines.  In December 1862, for example, a Union expedition from Helena to the 
vicinity of Grenada, Mississippi, found boots, shoes, clothing, and other illegal items that “open 
and avowed rebels” had purchased from northern merchants.  “The Yankees are deluging the 
country with contraband goods,” griped a Union officer.  “[A]nd letters intercepted from the 
army show from whence they are receiving their supplies.  War and commerce with same 
people!” he sarcastically exclaimed.  “What a Utopian dream!”  The officer also believed that 
perfidious northern merchants had spied on him.  “Every secret of our camps is carried, by the 
same men that formerly sold their God for thirty pieces of silver, to our worst enemies for a few 
pounds of cotton,” he continued.  “I have made three expeditions into the enemy’s country 
beyond Helena, and everywhere I find the blighting effects of their cupidity.  No expedition has 
ever been dreamed of at Helena that these bloodhounds of commerce have not scented out and 
carried to our enemies days in advance.”31 
When the Army of the Southwest arrived at Helena, the rules regulating the seizure, 
purchase, and sale of cotton were still being formulated.  From July to December 1862, the 
system for gathering the South’s crop was, in the words of one historian, “haphazard at best.”  As 
a result, local commanders—especially those who, like Curtis, served far from Washington—had 
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a great deal of latitude for dealing with the trade.  Curtis confessed that initially, he “let 
everybody [at Helena] trade in cotton,” but he soon found his camp “infested with Jews, 
secessionists, and spies, and had to issue an order confining the business to a few.”  That order 
came on August 25, 1862, when the general restricted trade to those with a license that bore his 
signature.  To obtain such a license, a trader had to prove he was “unquestionably a loyal 
citizen,” and Curtis estimated that he issued permits “to hundreds” of men who met that criteria.  
Predictably, those who were denied licenses lashed out at the general, and, in Curtis’s mind, they 
spearheaded the cabal that accused him of corruption.  Curtis was not authorized to issue trade 
licenses—that responsibility fell to the treasury department—but the exigencies of war 
compelled him to intervene.  He was aware of the war department’s orders governing the cotton 
trade, but he deemed them unsuitable “in a country where cotton [was] the only available means 
of subsistence.”  A number of destitute families, including many black ones, owned a few bales, 
and Curtis believed they should be allowed to sell them “to buy the necessaries of life.”  He 
asked General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck to modify his orders to account for “such 
emergencies,” but when Halleck neglected to do so, Curtis took matters into his own hands.32 
In late July, Curtis sent a subordinate, Colonel Charles E. Hovey, to establish a cotton 
depot at Old Town, an abandoned landing on the Mississippi River about twenty miles below 
Helena.  One soldier remembered that “[v]ile and unhealthy swamps lay all around” the 
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frequently-flooded town, while another called Old Town “the most pestilential camp we ever 
occupied, and where the men of the regiment sickened and died by the score.  There was no 
reason that we should be sent to that deadly place,” he continued, “except that we would be 
somewhat nearer the cotton area.”33   
From Old Town and Helena, Union forces made regular forays into the Arkansas and 
Mississippi countryside to confiscate rebel cotton and slaves and protect merchants who bought 
(and stole) the crop for shipment north.  African Americans sometimes alerted the Yankees to 
cotton stockpiles; they also loaded bales onto wagons and boats and frequently accompanied the 
soldiers back to camp.  Some left their plantations voluntarily, while others were seized as 
contraband of war.  In August 1862, for example, a Union scout from Helena to Mississippi 
confiscated more than eight hundred bales of cotton, some fifty mules, and approximately four 
hundred slaves who ran to the Union column.  “It was the greatest sight I ever saw,” exclaimed 
one soldier, “but there will no doubt be many of the same kind.  Several slaves were killed by the 
overseers to intimidate the others.  They drive them into the canebreaks [sic] and hills as we 
advanced, but when left they came by the hundreds singing, crying and dancing for joy.  They 
think their day of liberty is dawning and I hope it may be so.”34 
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With Curtis’s permission, steamboats under government contract ferried privately owned 
cotton for three to five dollars per bale, usually at night, when the army did not need them for 
transport.  Occasionally, the navy deployed gunboats to protect the shipments.  Additionally, 
many of the steamers that carried supplies to Helena were emptied and then loaded with cotton 
for their return trip north.  Oftentimes, Confederate guerrillas tried to burn the bales before the 
Yankees could confiscate them; they also frequently attacked the cotton-gatherers.  Despite these 
dangers, traders continuously risked their lives to procure the white gold.  “Men boldly dare the 
shot-gun of the bushwhacker, the perils of water, arrest, imprisonment; the recesses of swamp, 
morass and bayou” to obtain King Cotton, quipped a newspaper correspondent at Helena.  “[I]n 
short, they dare everything and fear nothing in search of altars upon which they can offer their 
devotion to this saint of saints, this king of kings.”35 
Most Union troops did not share the merchants’ devotion to the “white-headed monarch.”  
They welcomed the opportunity to plunder rebel planters, undermine the Confederate rebellion, 
and make money for the U.S. government, but they resented being used as guards for greedy 
speculators, especially when cotton-gathering missions put them in harm’s way.  Some men also 
suspected that their officers personally profited from the trade, a notion that demoralized many 
of the rank and file.  “We are lying still and doing nothing except guarding cotton that is bought 
and sold by the officers for speculation & to line their pockets with,” grumbled a Wisconsin 
soldier encamped across the Mississippi from Helena in December 1862.  “The only thing that 
(in my opinion) is the prolongation of this war but soon that will be played in this part for I 
should think they had got about all the cotton there was to be got within reach of here.”  Years 
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later, an Illinois infantryman expressed similar disillusionment about his regiment’s stint at Old 
Town:  “How much of [our] ‘cotton collecting’ was done for the government, and how much for 
private interests, I do not know, but from the fact that serious trouble on account of it came to a 
number of officers in high command, justifies the opinion that we were not doing very much at 
that time toward saving the county in this hard and dangerous service, and I know that I but 
reflect the feeling of every comrade when I say that every life that was lost in those expeditions 
was a useless and wanton sacrifice.”  Another soldier believed the army’s obsession with cotton 
prolonged the war.  In September 1862, he told wife, “Had we used half the force and industry to 
put the rebels down in Arkansas as we have to steal cotton it would have been better for the 
nation and the Army.”  Even U. S. Grant, who, in the fall of 1862 commanded east of the 
Mississippi, detected his men’s disdain for the trade.  He later wrote, “Men who had enlisted to 
fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to 
the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none 
of their dangers.”36 
Cotton was not the only thing that moved in and out of Helena during the federal 
occupation of the town.  From 1862 to 1865, Helena served as a permanent Union enclave, 
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supply depot, coaling station, and staging ground for federal operations in the Mississippi valley, 
particularly those aimed at the Confederate bastion at Vicksburg.  Although the troops stationed 
there enjoyed the benefits of a river-based supply line, few found comfort in the low-lying, oft-
inundated river town.  In July 1862, an Iowa private said Helena would be “a nice place if the 
river did not over flow so mutch.  the high watter mark in town in the houses is about as high as 
my head.”  Another Iowan who arrived in January 1863 said that “mud and misery were . . . the 
order of the day, with rain, snow, cold and discomfort. . . . We wondered if it always stormed at 
Helena.”  Accordingly, he and his companions nicknamed the place “Hell-in-Arkansas.”  Charles 
Musser of the 29th Iowa Volunteer Infantry Regiment proclaimed his disdain for the town’s 
conditions:  “i would not live here if i owned the whole state of Arkansas.  We have read of 
Helena [that] it is one of the dirtyest holes on the river.  mud is knee deep there all the time.”37     
 The wet, swampy conditions in Helena were a breeding ground for disease, discomfort, 
and death for Union soldiers and civilians.  Between July 1862 and January 1863, Helena 
surgeons recorded 1,002 cases of intestinal problems (mostly diarrhea and dysentery) among 
soldiers in the town, 163 cases of typhoid (and typho-malaria) and 573 instances of malarial 
fever.  According to one historian, one in six cases of intestinal disease in Helena was fatal, 
compared to only one in fifty-nine in the Department of the Tennessee (of which Helena became 
a part in January 1863).  One in three soldiers at Helena who suffered from typhoid died, while 
one in 7.5 malaria cases was fatal.  For the department, those ratios were only one in six and one 
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in 131, respectively.  As indicated by these figures, soldiers in Helena were much more likely to 
die of disease than were their counterparts in other areas in the department.  When one considers 
the inadequacy of Civil War medical records, as well as the tendency of nineteenth-century 
doctors to misdiagnose illnesses, disease in Helena was likely even more severe than the 
numbers indicate.  On account of these factors, thousands more cases of intestinal disease, 
typhoid, and malaria likely went unrecorded in Helena.38   
Contemporary sources also indicate that disease in the town was rampant.  In January 
1863, Helena was so sickly that a journalist warned his readers to stay away.  “This is a dreary 
little town,” the correspondent wrote.  “If you have never been at Helena, take a friend’s advice 
and never go if you can help it.  It is low, marshy and unhealthy.  The soldier[s] call the fever 
they have there ‘the Helen-fever,’ and their rows of huts and tents loomed out of the fog, as if the 
miasma had fairly wrapped them in its folds. . . .  One thinks, as he looks at this country, of that 
expression—God-forsaken!  There is something utterly desolate and dreary in the whole 
landscape as far as eye can see.”  That same month, Benjamin Palmer of the 29th Iowa 
complained that “the Balance” of his comrades was “on the Sick list and greater A number of 
them in the Hospital. . . .  [T]heir [sic] are a Great many Diseases among the men here, it is hard 
to tell what is the matter with them all.”  Two weeks later, he reported that he and his comrades 
had “Buried as high as Five in A Day [in Helena] this is loosing men very fast for so short a 
time.”39   
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Palmer indicated that his regiment was camped on the muddy banks of the Mississippi, 
which certainly did not facilitate the troops’ health.  Soldiers frequently drank from the river, 
which they mistakenly supposed was healthier than the water that flowed from nearby springs.  
They also were bitten by swarms of mosquitoes, which, like enemy combatants, decimated the 
Federals by spreading malaria—a disease the troops believed emanated from miasmatic swamps 
near their camps.  By February 1863, Charles Musser estimated that forty Helena men died every 
day of disease, and on February 17, alone, he witnessed five disease-induced funerals.  Eighteen 
months later, the health of Helena’s soldiers apparently had not improved, as a Union inspector 
declared that the town “appear[ed] to be the most deadly place on the river.”40 
Sickness at Helena was exacerbated by the thousands of horses and mules marshalled at 
the post.  The animals routinely died of disease, exhaustion, and in combat, and the soldiers 
frequently left their corpses in the mud.  The carcasses attracted rodents, which carried fleas 
infected with bacteria that caused murine typhus in humans.  In February 1863, an aid worker 
observed that the streets of Helena were “almost impassable except for heavy mule teams,” 
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which “flounder in the ponds, fall in the holes in . . . the mire, [and] often lie there & die they are 
so exhausted & abused.”  The following month, a Kansas cavalryman expressed similar concern 
about the dead livestock in the town.  “I dread spending another summer here,” he remarked.  “If 
the army remains at this place through the coming summer, it’s ranks will be thinned out by 
diseases, to an alarming extent, unless prompt measures are instituted to remove the thousands of 
dead horses and mules which cover the ground for acres and acres in the vicinity of the camps, 
which added to the filth which of necessity, accumulates in an army of thirty thousand makes a 
stench sufficient to turn the stomach of a sick horse.”41 
If Helena’s insalubrious environment contributed to widespread disease, the town’s 
severe overpopulation during Union occupation also did not help its inhabitants’ health.  When 
Curtis’s Army of the Southwest entered Helena in July 1862, some 20,000 to 24,000 soldiers 
overwhelmed the town’s 1,500 inhabitants.  Between Curtis’s arrival and July 1863, the military 
population of the town fluctuated between approximately 1,600 and 25,000 troops.  In February 
1863, Charles Musser believed that thirty thousand soldiers were camped in and around the 
town, and the following month, C. C. Washburn described the scene for his daughter in 
Wisconsin:   
You, my dear, who are living so pleasantly and quietly at home have little idea of the 
misery and unhappiness that war brings.  Just imagine ten or twenty thousand rude men 
coming into La Crosse [Wisconsin] some morning and taking possession of the town, 
going into houses of the people and helping themselves to whatever they want, burning 
houses, killing cattle, hogs, sheep, chickens, and almost everything they see, destroying 
furniture,—and you will have a pretty good idea of the march of an army through a 
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country.  The people [in Helena] are paying dearly for their wickedness in trying to 
destroy our government.42 
    
Adding to the overcrowded conditions, scores of runaway slaves continued to flock there 
on a daily basis to seek refuge behind Union lines.  Most of these refugees, labeled 
“contrabands” by the soldiers, lived in shanties, “condemned and cast-off tents of the army, and 
in caves and shelters of brush” built just inside Union picket lines.  Others crammed inside the 
“poorer houses” of Helena or in dilapidated huts deserted by the troops, who sometimes returned 
from their expeditions elsewhere and expelled the homeless refugees.43  In early 1863, Charles 
Musser complained that Helena was “nearly overrun with contrabands, and they are still coming 
in by dozens every day.”  An Indiana soldier also grumbled that his camp was “over-run with 
‘contrabands’ of every shade of color and character, who flocked in from Mississippi and 
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Arkansas plantations, anxious to do anything for the soldiers that would place them under the 
protection of the stars and stripes.”  By January 1863, an estimated three to four thousand 
freedpeople lived in and around Helena, thus making the post one of the largest contraband 
centers in the South.44   
Tragically, most of the refugees found that freedom did not live up to its promise.45  
Freedwomen cooked, cleaned, and prostituted themselves to make ends meet, while able-bodied 
men built fortifications, dug trenches, shoveled coal, drove mules, chopped wood, and “wade[d] 
through the deepest mud along the river bank in loading & unloading government stores,” all for 
government wages that most were never paid.  Meanwhile, the young, elderly, and infirmed died 
in droves from hunger, exposure, and such diseases as smallpox, which white doctors ignorantly 
interpreted as evidence of the black race’s pending extinction.  Although a number of the soldiers 
welcomed the contrabands’ contributions—many bragged about their black cooks, for 
example—others robbed, raped, and murdered the impoverished refugees.  “Freedom in the 
abstract is a fine thing,” remarked a newspaper correspondent at Helena.  “[B]ut when Freedom 
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amounts to no more than what the negroes obtain at Helena, it is a different affair.  There it 
means simply freedom to starve, rot, die, and the sooner the better.  Since I reached that place, 
the average daily mortality among the contrabands has been from ten to twenty.  Nobody takes 
any further interest in them than to kick them out of the way whenever they get in it, and to curse 
them upon all occasions as a source of the most serious demoralization to the army.  Their 
condition is not a single remove above that of brutes—a more degraded, helpless class of people 
exists no where on the Continent.  If our philanthropy is to end in taking them away from their 
masters, we had better, in mercy to them, decree that as fast as emancipated they shall be shot.”  
Given such conditions, it is no wonder that some of the freedpeople said they “wish[ed] they 
were back with their masters,” while scores of others reportedly acted on that wish.46 
 There were, however, some people in Helena who were eager to help the black refugees.  
In November 1862, the chaplains of the District of Eastern Arkansas—led by Samuel Sawyer of 
the 47th Indiana and J. G. Forman of the 3rd Missouri—wrote to the New York Times to alert its 
readers to the freedpeople’s privations (and Steele’s draconian treatment of them) and to appeal 
for aid.  The following month, they wrote a similar letter to General Curtis in St. Louis and 
begged, “For the sake of humanity, for the sake of christianity, for the good name of our army, 
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for the honor of our country, cannot something be done to prevent this oppression & to stop its 
demoralizing influences upon the Soldiers themselves?”  The chaplains wanted the government 
to appoint someone to oversee the freedpeople’s welfare, and in January 1863, Sawyer was 
named Superintendent of Contrabands at Helena.47   
In that same month, the Western Sanitary Commission—a philanthropic organization in 
St. Louis whose agents had aided the Army of the Southwest since the battle of Pea Ridge—sent 
Maria R. Mann, a New England humanitarian (and the niece of educator Horace Mann), to 
Helena to “fit up a better hospital” for the contrabands and “minister generally to their wants.”48  
When Mann arrived, she found the “personal condition” of the patients in the contraband 
hospital to be “so deplorable that any idea of change for the better seems utterly impossible.  
Many of them seem to come there to die,” she observed, “& they do die very rapidly.”  Mann 
complimented the efforts of Sawyer and Forman, but otherwise, she believed the black refugees 
had few friends among the officials at Helena, a “sickly, pestilential, crowded post,” which, 
though certainly unfavorable for the freepeople’s “colonising,” was nevertheless the only place 
below Memphis where there was “nominally an army to protect & furnish food & employment.”  
Over the next eight months, Mann established a new contraband hospital at Helena, taught 
freedwomen how to make their own garments, and distributed food, medicine, and clothing to 
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the refugees.  She and the chaplains also gathered the freedpeople in churches and taught them 
the alphabet “from charts hung in front of the pulpits.”  “It was interesting to watch them,” 
declared one aid worker, “to see their eagerness to learn.”49  
From July 1862 until July 1863, Helena stood as the southernmost permanent federal 
outpost on the Mississippi River above Vicksburg.  Over the same time period, it remained the 
only significant Union stronghold in eastern Arkansas.  Because it was located in Arkansas, 
Helena officially stood within the geographical boundaries of the Confederacy’s Trans-
Mississippi Department, which consisted of all the territory west of the Mississippi River.  The 
Federals, however, did not designate the area west of the Mississippi as a separate arena of 
conflict.  In fact, over the course of the war, troops from Helena were deployed on the river’s 
east bank almost as often as they were on its west bank.  The town’s proximity to Little Rock 
made it an ideal staging ground for an assault on the Arkansas capital, but its location on the 
Mississippi made it equally capable of playing a role in the campaign against Vicksburg.  
Consequently, Helena’s position created a great deal of confusion amongst the Union high 
command, which remained ambivalent about the strategic role it envisioned for the garrison 
throughout the fall of 1862.50 
                                                 
49 Forman, The Western Sanitary Commission, 112-113; Maria R. Mann to Dear Elisa, 10 
February 1863, Mary Tyler Peabody Mann Papers, LOC; Levin Coffin, Reminiscences of Levi 
Coffin, The Reputed President of the Underground Railroad (Cincinnati, Ohio:  Western Tract 
Society, 1876), 641; L. P. Brockett and Mary C. Vaughn, Woman’s Work in the Civil War:  A 
Record of Heroism, Patriotism and Patience (Philadelphia:  Zeigler, McCurdy & Co.; Boston:  
R. H. Curran, 1867), 697-702.  St. John’s Episcopal Church was one of the churches used as 
school for black children.  Dale Kirkman, A History of St. John's Episcopal Church, Helena, 
Arkansas (Helena:  St. John's Episcopal Church, 1968), 9; “Our Helena Correspondence,” 
Memphis Daily Appeal, December 20, 1865; Henry C. Lay to My Dearest Wife, 31 December 
1865, Henry C. Lay Collection, UALR Center for Arkansas History and Culture, Arkansas 
Studies Institute. 
50 William L. Shea, “The War We Have Lost,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 70 
(Summer 2011):  107-108. 
175 
 
 During the first few months of Union occupation, Helena was deemed most important for 
its ability to serve as the base of operations for a federal campaign against Little Rock.  In July 
1862, Brigadier General John M. Schofield, who commanded all of the Union militia in 
Missouri, feared that the Confederates were planning an attack on southern Missouri.  Therefore, 
he asked Curtis to move his Helena force against Little Rock to divert the rebels away from the 
border.  Halleck, then serving as commander of the Department of the Missouri, concurred with 
Schofield’s plan.  Curtis, however, did not believe the Confederates posed a serious threat to 
Missouri, and since the rebels controlled the mouths of most of eastern Arkansas’s primary 
rivers, he did not deem an attack on Little Rock to be possible.  Furthermore, he believed that 
operations in Arkansas should remain subordinate to those on the Mississippi:  “The hopes of the 
West float on the Mississippi, and all my hope of reducing Arkansas and supporting Missouri 
depend on this river.”51   
In the late summer and fall of 1862, Halleck was promoted to general-in-chief of all 
Union armies, Curtis succeeded Halleck as commander of the Department of the Missouri, Steele 
took over the Army of the Southwest at Helena, and Schofield took command of the Army of the 
Frontier.  Even after the personnel changes, Halleck and Schofield continued to press for the 
Helena troops to make a move, either into the Arkansas interior as a diversion or toward the 
Missouri border to assist Schofield directly.  Curtis and Steele disagreed.  Curtis continued to 
doubt the presence of any danger to Missouri, and he feared that if Helena’s troops were 
removed, the Confederates might strike its weakened garrison.  However, in late September and 
early October, Curtis became convinced that Missouri was indeed threatened by Confederate 
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forces.  He capitulated to Schofield’s request, ordering forces from Helena to march toward 
Missouri.52   
Adding to the confusion, Halleck also changed his mind about the role of the Helena 
garrison in October 1862.  In an administrational about-face, he told Curtis that he had always 
advised against the weakening of Helena, which was “too important a place to risk.”  Rumors of 
an impending Confederate attack against the eastern Arkansas port only served to reinforce 
Halleck’s position, but by that time, the detachment from Helena was already on the move.  A 
confused Curtis reminded Halleck of his orders.  Nevertheless, he assured Halleck that future 
operations would be fully focused on carrying out the general-in-chief’s main objective “to open 
and hold the Mississippi.”  However, by this time, Halleck’s plans for the Helena garrison did 
not involve the Mississippi River.  He openly disapproved of Curtis’s decision to move troops to 
Missouri and reminded the general that “the main object in taking Helena was to make it the base 
of operations against Arkansas.”  In the fall of 1862, it seemed that no federal officer could make 
up his mind about what role the Helena garrison should play in overall Union military strategy.53 
In November and December of 1862, the strategic focus of the Helena garrison shifted 
almost entirely to operations on and across the Mississippi River.  For the next nine months, until 
the Union capture of Vicksburg in July 1863, Helena served as an important staging ground and 
supply depot for troops and materiel participating in the federal expedition against Vicksburg.  
During that time, Halleck continued to send conflicting signals.  On the one hand, he asserted 
that Helena’s primary role was to serve as a staging ground for the eventual capture of Little 
Rock.  On the other hand, he almost always consented when troops were requested for operations 
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against Vicksburg.  Halleck stressed that Helena’s forces should not be weakened so much as to 
“endanger any necessary operation in Arkansas,” but he made it very clear that both he and 
President Lincoln wanted Helena troops to be employed in the Vicksburg campaign.  “The 
security of . . . Helena,” Halleck proclaimed, “is of vital importance to our future operations on 
the Mississippi.”54 
By November, Curtis was convinced that he should do everything possible to assist in the 
operations against Vicksburg.  In accordance with Grant’s request, he directed a Helena force 
under General Alan P. Hovey to destroy a portion of the Mississippi Central Railroad near 
Friar’s Point, Mississippi.  One month later, when Halleck asked how many troops he could 
spare for Grant’s operations on the Mississippi, Curtis offered to send 20,000 troops downriver:  
“In this I propose to give all my available force to the primary object of opening the Mississippi, 
leaving at Helena only enough to hold that point, deferring any and all interior movements until 
main downriver forces can be returned. . . . I feel that the downriver movement is of the first 
importance, not only to your entire command in the West, but to this department especially.”55   
Halleck responded to Curtis’s enthusiastic support for the Vicksburg campaign by 
continuing to be unclear about the purpose of Helena troops.  He reprimanded the general for 
sending men to Grenada, again stressing that “the first object of sending troops to Saint Helena 
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was stated to be the capture of Little Rock, which has been continuously urged on me for the last 
six months.”  Perplexed by Halleck’s ambiguity, Curtis reduced the number of troops to be 
allocated down the Mississippi to 12,000, thereby leaving 13,000 in Helena to operate against 
Little Rock.  He then ordered a force from Helena to advance on Little Rock as soon as possible.  
Halleck approved of the plan, telling Curtis to “use the forces at Helena as you propose.”  
Unfortunately for Curtis, that advance never occurred.56   
In late December 1862, a Union expedition under the command of William T. Sherman 
arrived in Helena.  In accordance with Grant’s plan, Sherman was to pick up several thousand 
troops and proceed to Vicksburg, where his expedition would serve as part of a two-pronged 
attack against the Confederate Mississippi bastion.  To Curtis’s dismay, Sherman unexpectedly 
took 13,000 troops instead of 12,000, leaving Helena’s garrison, which had also been weakened 
by sickness, with only 4,000 effective infantry and 3,000 effective cavalry—too few to move on 
Little Rock and defend Helena.  According to Brigadier General Willis A. Gorman (who 
commanded at Helena from December 1862 to February 1863), without reinforcements, Helena 
troops could do nothing “more than lay here in this wonderfully muddy hole.”57 
  The Helena soldiers transported downriver with Sherman in December 1862 were placed 
under the temporary command of General Grant.  According to the battle plan, Grant’s army 
would move down the Mississippi Central Railroad and attack Vicksburg by land.  At the same 
time, Sherman’s flotilla would proceed down the Mississippi and up the Yazoo River to assault 
an area north of the city called Chickasaw Bayou.  If all went according to plan, Grant believed 
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the Confederates would be unable to repel the two-pronged offensive.  Unfortunately for the 
Union, nothing worked according to plan.  Grant was forced to abandon his overland campaign 
when rebel cavalry forces cut his northern supply line.  Grant’s retreat then allowed the 
Confederates in Vicksburg, who were alerted to Sherman’s move downriver, to fortify the bluffs 
north of town.  When Sherman’s troops launched their final assault on December 29, the 
Confederates were well entrenched.  Sherman’s amphibious assault at Chickasaw Bayou ended 
in bloody defeat, and the Federals were forced to rethink their strategy for taking Vicksburg.58 
 Despite Grant’s failures in 1862, Curtis remained willing to supply him with Helena 
troops in 1863.  On January 12, he forwarded Grant a copy of his telegram to Gorman in which 
he instructed Gorman to “continue to regard the Vicksburg move of primary importance.  Let all 
other moves delay, if deemed necessary.  Send boats and men for that object, but do not weaken 
Helena so as to endanger the position.”  Curtis’s willingness to cooperate must have been a relief 
to Grant, who had become so accustomed to drawing on Helena for his Vicksburg operations that 
he even wondered if Helena was in his department.  By the end of the month, Grant’s wishes had 
come true, as he assumed command of “all troops in Arkansas” which were “in reach of his 
orders.”  The Helena garrison was most certainly within Grant’s reach.59 
Between January and July 1863, troops at Helena continued to play a significant role in 
Union operations on the Mississippi River.  On January 10, they participated in a federal 
expedition against Arkansas Post, a Confederate fort positioned fifty miles above the mouth of 
the Arkansas River.  Major General John A. McClernand believed the rebel garrison at Arkansas 
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Post posed a threat to the Union’s line of communication on the Mississippi, and on January 11, 
his force of 32,000 men, six gunboats, and three ironclads forced the fort to surrender.  The 
following month, troops from Helena participated in the Yazoo Pass Expedition, yet another 
federal attempt to take Vicksburg from the north.  On February 3, 1863, a Union party stationed 
on the east bank of the Mississippi River about six miles below Helena destroyed an earthen 
levee along an old channel of the Mississippi called the Yazoo Pass.  General Gorman sent five 
hundred soldiers from Helena to assist in the breaching.  The Federals hoped the levee’s 
destruction would flood the Mississippi bottomlands and fill a winding maze of small streams, 
thus opening a navigable backdoor waterway to the Yazoo River and to Vicksburg.  The project 
succeeded, and on February 24 a Union flotilla began motoring toward Vicksburg.  When the 
Confederates learned of the approaching boats, they felled trees in the channel to obstruct the 
Union advance.  The Federals struggled for weeks to remove the obstructions, cut overhanging 
trees, and navigate the swampy streams.  To further hinder the federal procession, the rebels 
erected an earthen fort—which they named Fort Pemberton—at the head of the Yazoo River.  On 
March 11, 13, and 16, Smith’s flotilla engaged the fort.  The strong Confederate fortifications 
combined with reinforcements from Grenada repelled the federal attack, and the flotilla was 
eventually forced to return to the Mississippi River.60 
The federal troops from Helena who participated in the Yazoo Pass Expedition 
experienced the hardships of overcrowded river transports, poor sanitation, limited food, and 
widespread sickness.  Benjamin Palmer left Helena in early 1863 to take part in the expedition.  
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After toiling in the bottomlands for over a month, Palmer was elated to return to Helena in early 
April:   
We had a very hard time while we were Gon[e].  We were on Picket Every other Day 
while we were Stationed their [sic]. . . . We Landed here [in Helena] from the yazoo Pass 
Expedition on the 8th of this month and have Been very Busy Ever Since A Leavling [sic] 
and Ditching our camp Ground. . . . But I would Rather Be In camp and Drill half of the 
time than to Be crammed up on A Steamboat two or three weeks at A time and Get no 
Exercise at all and Live on Food half cook[ed]. . . . I Am Sick of Steam Boating I hope I 
will not Be Put on Board of another one as long as I am In the Survise [sic].61 
 
A. F. Sperry, a musician in the 33rd Iowa who left Helena for the Yazoo Pass in February, also 
cited the journey’s danger and adversity.  According to Sperry, the expedition was “in some 
respects . . . the hardest of our soldiering. . . .  Diarrhea was universal, almost unanimous.  Few 
of us remained in as good health as usual, and many contracted diseases to whose sad end the 
lonely grave-yard on the bare Helena hills, within the new few months bore witness.”62 
 Helena’s significance as a federal river outpost was not limited to its role as a base of 
operations.  The town also served as a convenient supply and reinforcement depot for Union 
flotillas heading to various locations on the Mississippi.  The number of federal troops who 
actually camped in Helena paled in comparison to the number of men who passed by the town on 
transports on their way to Vicksburg, Memphis, and other points along the river.  The diaries and 
letters of soldiers who were stationed at Helena between July 1862 and July 1863 are filled with 
observations of Union fleets that either bypassed the town or stopped for reinforcements and 
supplies.  “The many vessels that lay at the landing and the countless numbers of teams that 
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crowded the streets together with the great number of encampments, give the place the 
appearance of a great military depot,” observed a Wisconsin soldier in January 1863.63   
The previous month, Joshua W. Underhill, a Indiana surgeon, witnessed Sherman’s 
flotilla docking at Helena on its way to Chickasaw Bayou:  “This morning a large number of 
transports arrived loaded with troops—been coming all day—72 [transports] are said to be here 
and on the route. . . . This will swell the number of troops [on the expedition] to at least sixty 
thousand.  Vicksburg is thought to be the point of attack.”  According to Underhill, Sherman’s 
fleet did not linger in Helena for long; it picked up Helena soldiers for the Chickasaw expedition 
and began heading downriver before dark the following day.  On January 21, 1863, Iowan Minos 
Miller observed 10,000 troops landing at Helena on their way to Vicksburg.  In early June, 
Miller estimated that “between 15 and 20 thousand troops passed here within the last week for 
Viksburgh and just now 10,000 thousand more are passing down.”  A. F. Sperry noted his 
cohorts’ excitement when they witnessed Union transports headed for Vicksburg in late January 
1863:  “While we were here, General Grant passed down the river to Vicksburg, with a portion 
of his army.  The sight of the fleet loaded with troops, with colors flying, bands playing, and men 
shouting and cheering, was a new and grand one to us. . . . [T]he regiment all broke camp and 
scattered up and down the levee, to get a better view.”  Five months later, an Iowa infantryman 
estimated that in one week, some 45,000 federal troops passed through Helena on their way to 
Vicksburg.  Although some of the soldiers’ figures were likely exaggerated, the large numbers of 
troops and transports they observed confirm Helena’s prominent role as a steamboat landing and 
                                                 




supply depot for federal operations on the Mississippi River, particularly those aimed at 
Vicksburg.64 
Over the course of the Vicksburg campaign, Curtis and his successor Schofield sent over 
30,000 troops from the Trans-Mississippi Department across the Mississippi River to Grant.  
According to one historian, this number accounted for approximately one-half of the army that 
successfully captured Vicksburg.  Many of these troops either came from Helena or were 
stationed there at one time, and an even greater number temporarily stopped at Helena on their 
way to Vicksburg and other points along the Mississippi.  The sustained Union presence in 
Helena from July 1862 to July 1863 posed a serious threat to Confederate control of the 
Arkansas interior, including Little Rock.  Even more, it endangered the rebel presence on the 
Mississippi River, particularly at Vicksburg.  It is little wonder then that throughout 1862 and 
1863, the Confederate high command viewed the retaking of Helena as a strategic military 
necessity.65 
Less than a week after Curtis’s Army of the Southwest had occupied Helena, the 
Confederates contemplated an attack on the Union post.  From the very beginning, the 
Confederate desire to retake Helena was dictated by the town’s relation to Vicksburg.  
Confederate officials believed that occupying Helena was an important step in protecting not 
only Vicksburg but also Confederate interests in other parts of the Mississippi valley.  Moreover, 
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if Vicksburg fell, the Confederate high command believed that possession of Helena would 
“secure a great future advantage to the Confederacy.”66 
On July 15, 1862, only three days after Curtis reached Helena, Confederate General 
Samuel Cooper in Richmond ordered Thomas Hindman in Little Rock to assault and retake the 
town.  Lacking the force he believed he needed to do so, Hindman respectfully declined 
Cooper’s request.  Two months later, another call for an attack on Helena came from the 
Confederate war department.  On October 20, Secretary of War George W. Randolph urged 
Theophilus H. Holmes, an ineffective veteran of the Eastern Theater (and West Point classmate 
of Jefferson Davis) who had assumed command of the Trans-Mississippi Department on July 30, 
to advance upon Helena for the sake of protecting the Confederacy’s position on the Mississippi:  
“After providing for the defense of Arkansas and the Indian Territory, neither of which I 
presume will be seriously menaced from Missouri, your next object should be speedy and 
effective co-operation with General [John C.] Pemberton for the protection of the Mississippi 
Valley. . . . [A]n advance upon Helena would seem to be the first step necessary.”  President 
Davis agreed with Randolph’s assessment.  “It was rather hoped that [Holmes] would be able to 
retake Helena,” he told the secretary in November 1862, “which would greatly contribute to the 
security of the country below, both in and out of Arkansas.”67 
No Confederate attempt to retake Helena took place in 1862.  However, rebel cavalry and 
guerrilla bands continually harassed the garrison’s outer pickets in an effort to keep the Federals 
confined to their enclave.  One such attack occurred in September 1862, when fifty rebel 
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skirmishers charged upon a Union picket on the outskirts of town, killing one federal soldier and 
capturing two others.  The Union colonel who reported the incident requested the help of 
additional cavalry units to protect the town’s borders from “[rebel] parties hovering around us on 
all sides.”  The following month, Joshua Underhill of the 46th Indiana reported that “a party of 
200 guirrellas attacked and captured a number of [Union] teams that were out foraging.”  On 
December 27, he claimed that Helena’s pickets were fired upon by guerrillas almost every night.  
Federal attempts to secure the Helena garrison were further hindered by Confederate 
sympathizers (living in and around town) who assisted the rebels in any way they could.  The 
same colonel who reported the assault on his pickets also claimed to have arrested a number of 
civilians who were caught delivering important information about Union positions to the 
Confederates stationed nearby.68  
In the absence of an assault on Helena, the Confederates focused their attention on the 
protection of Vicksburg and the Mississippi valley.  Throughout November and December 1862, 
the war department asked Holmes to send 10,000 reinforcements across the river to Vicksburg, 
which was being threatened by Grant’s army.  Holmes stubbornly refused, arguing that it would 
take his men no less than two weeks to get to Vicksburg, and by then, Union forces would have 
moved out of Helena and captured Little Rock.  However, Holmes continued to contemplate an 
attack on Helena.  In November, he asked Hindman, whose army was stationed in northwest 
Arkansas, if he had enough troops to protect the Indian Territory and northwest Arkansas and 
still attack Helena, “the object being to hold and fortify it for the purpose of securing the 
navigation of the Mississippi.”  Hindman replied that conditions in northwest Arkansas forbid 
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any such campaign.  In early December, Union forces defeated his army at the battle of Prairie 
Grove.  To make matters worse for Holmes and the Confederates, Union troops under General 
McClernand captured the Confederate fort at Arkansas Post only one month later.69  
 Following these defeats, Holmes lost the confidence of his military cohorts both inside 
and outside of Arkansas.  A new Confederate secretary of war, James A. Seddon, noted that 
Holmes, “while esteemed for his virtues, [seemed] to have lost the confidence and attachment of 
all.”  Common soldiers referred to their partially deaf, elderly general as “granny Holmes,” while 
newspapers called him “old fogy.”  Army doctors diagnosed him with “softening of the brain,” 
and one of his subordinates later wrote, “Mental suffering, old age, and a life of great exposure 
had told heavily upon [Holmes’s] physical development and correspondingly upon his 
intellectual faculties.”  Even Holmes’s spiritual leader, Episcopal Bishop Henry C. Lay, 
characterized his parishioner as “a very old man” with “memory, will, [and] judgment all 
debilitated to a degree which incapacitates him for any efficient administration.”  In January 
1863, a Texas cavalryman observed that Holmes “looks to be about seventy years old, though he 
is said to be only fifty-seven.  He is getting frail,” the soldier continued, “and looks more like an 
old farmer who had lived about long enough than the General of the Trans-Mississippi District.”  
Perhaps the Texan had a premonition, for the following month, President Davis replaced his old 
friend and classmate with General Edmund Kirby Smith, and Holmes was subordinated to 
command the District of Arkansas.70 
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Throughout the spring and summer of 1863, the Confederate war department continually 
urged Smith to do everything in his power to assist in operations across the Mississippi, either by 
sending troops across the river or by making a diversion on the river’s west side to take pressure 
off of Vicksburg.  In early May, President Davis asked him to strike Union bases in southern and 
western Louisiana.  A month later, Seddon asked him to establish artillery detachments at 
various points along the Mississippi above Vicksburg “to endanger and destroy the vessels and 
frail transports of the enemy passing up or down, frequently laden with troops.”  However, Smith 
took no significant action.  According to one scholar, the Trans-Mississippi commander had 
neither the manpower nor the materiel to make any effective moves on behalf of Vicksburg.  
Davis understood Smith’s predicament.  If his general made no diversionary move, the president 
assured him he knew “it was because [Smith] had not the means.”71 
Meanwhile, the Union’s attempts to converge on Vicksburg from the swamps and bayous 
of the Mississippi delta had failed.  In March 1863, Grant mobilized 24,000 troops camped on 
the west side of the Mississippi River at Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana, and marched them overland 
approximately twenty-five miles below Vicksburg.  With the help of Admiral David D. Porter’s 
fleet, he transported his force across the Mississippi to the river’s east bank.  Next, instead of 
marching on Vicksburg (which seemed like his obvious next step), Grant moved his army inland.  
On May 14, he captured the Mississippi capital of Jackson, thirty-five miles east of Vicksburg.  
General Pemberton, commander of the Confederate forces at Vicksburg, was thoroughly 
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confused by Grant’s movements.  On May 12, he moved a portion of his garrison between 
Vicksburg and Jackson with the hope of stopping Grant before he could move on Vicksburg.  On 
May 16, Grant attacked Pemberton at Champion’s Hill, about eighteen miles east Vicksburg.  By 
the end of the day, the Confederates were fleeing back to the defenses of their port city.  During 
the next week, Grant tried twice to assault and capture Vicksburg.  When his efforts proved 
futile, he ordered his army to lay siege to the rebel town.  Outnumbered nearly two to one by 
their Union counterparts, Pemberton and the Confederates were forced to hold on and wait for 
help.72 
News of Pemberton’s retreat and entrapment quickly spread to the Confederate war 
department.  At this urgent stage in the war, the rebel high command was committed (verbally, at 
least) to doing everything possible to save Vicksburg and preserve the diminishing Confederate 
presence on the Mississippi River.  On May 23, Secretary of War Seddon sent an important 
message to Joseph E. Johnston, the general in command of the rebel forces responsible for 
relieving Vicksburg from the east.  Seddon suggested that forces in the Trans-Mississippi 
Department should, if possible, attack Helena in order to divert Union attention away from 
Vicksburg.  Also, if Vicksburg were to capitulate, the secretary thought Helena would serve “a 
great future advantage” in the Confederacy’s efforts to control the Mississippi.  Seddon believed 
Helena’s garrison had been weakened by Grant’s acquisition of troops for the Vicksburg 
campaign.  It might, therefore, might be more easily captured.  In closing, he stressed to 
Johnston, “Had I command of communication, this suggestion would be directly addressed and 
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pressed by the [War] Department.  Its policy is so apparent that it is hoped it will be voluntarily 
embraced and executed.”73 
Johnston agreed with Seddon that “the time [was] favorable for attacking Helena,” and he 
forwarded the secretary’s proposal to Smith on June 3.  Smith, who was stationed across the 
Mississippi in Shreveport, Louisiana, did not receive the message for several days.  When he 
read Seddon’s suggestion, he believed he was too far away from Helena to ascertain the strength 
of the Union garrison there or give any orders for an attack.  Therefore, on June 13, he forwarded 
Seddon’s message to General Holmes in Arkansas and instructed him to “act as circumstances 
may justify.”  Even General Robert E. Lee, operating hundreds of miles east of Helena with the 
Army of Northern Virginia, believed an assault on Helena should be made at this time.  On June 
2 he told Jefferson Davis that “General Kirby Smith ought, if possible, to collect a sufficient 
force and occupy Helena or some better point on the west bank of the river.”74 
The Confederate generals in the Trans-Mississippi Department had considered the 
prospects of attacking the Union outpost at Helena even before Smith had received Seddon’s 
dispatch.  On June 4, the Trans-Mississippi commander wrote to Thomas C. Reynolds, the 
Confederate governor of Missouri:  “Helena is the point looked to; it is the strategic point in that 
section, and, if a favorable opportunity offers for securing its possession, it should be improved.  
I hope, however, no attempt will be made by General [Holmes] without first obtaining accurate 
information of the works, the strength, garrison, &c.”  Four days later, on his own initiative, 
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Holmes departed Little Rock for Jacksonport, Arkansas, the headquarters of Major General 
Sterling Price.  Holmes wanted to ask Price, his top subordinate, if he believed the Confederate 
forces in Arkansas “could with propriety attack Helena.”  Holmes’s ambulance broke down 
before he reached Jacksonport, so he sent a messenger ahead to deliver his query to Price.  Price 
responded enthusiastically to his commander’s suggestion, saying that his troops were “fully 
rested and in excellent spirits.”  Furthermore, he notified Holmes of a scouting report obtained 
by Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke that placed the Helena garrison at “not more than from 
4,000 to 5,000” strong.  If an attack was “conducted with celerity and secrecy,” Price had no 
doubt that they could “crush the foe” at Helena.75 
Marmaduke’s scouting report made Holmes reconsider the proposed attack on Helena.  
An assault on 4,000 or 5,000 fortified Union soldiers “would cost too much,” he told Price on 
June 13.  Alternatively, Holmes believed that better service would be rendered by establishing a 
battery on the Mississippi River below Memphis.  From there, Confederate troops could attack 
federal transports passing along the river and disrupt the flow of Union supplies and 
reinforcements to Vicksburg.76 
Over the next two days, Holmes received two dispatches that caused him to recover his 
enthusiasm for an assault on Helena.  First, he obtained information indicating that the number of 
Union troops in Helena was less than he had previously thought.  According to Marmaduke, “all 
Federals troops that [could] be spared [were] being sent to re-enforce Grant,” leaving Helena 
“very weak.”  Second, he finally received the secretary of war’s recommendation for an attack 
on Helena.  On June 15, Holmes instructed Price to make no move until further notice.  “I will 
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probably be with you on Wednesday night,” he added.  That same day, he wired his commanding 
officer, Smith, in Shreveport:  “I believe we can take Helena.  Please let me attack it.”  On June 
16, Smith sent the encouraging reply Holmes had hoped for:  “Most certainly do it.”77 
 One hundred miles east of Little Rock, Charles Musser sat at Helena with the 29th Iowa 
Infantry Regiment.  Unaware of the decisions being made by the Confederate high command, he 
wrote to his father on June 12:  “There is nothing going on around here, only the fortyfying of 
the place.  it would take a large number of troops to take this place.”  Like Musser, rebel 
infantryman Fontaine Richard Earle knew nothing of Holmes’s plans.  On June 11, while 
camped on the outskirts of Little Rock, Earle wrote to his sweetheart:  “We have good health, a 
pleasant camp, good water (wells), plenty to eat (beef & cornbread), light drill and upon the 
whole are fairing [sic] well.  No prospect of our moving. . . . If however the war can move on as 
well without our moving as with it I am willing to be easy.  But if there is need for us in the field 
I will gladly go.”  Although he did not know it at the time, the Confederate army would call on 
Earle and his cohorts in the coming days.78 
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Chapter 5:  The Helena Campaign 
 
 
As the Confederate generals in Arkansas eagerly planned their assault on Helena, federal 
soldiers at Helena’s garrison continued their daily routines.  Regular drilling, fortifying, and 
picketing occupied the life of every soldier in the camp, especially after rumors of an impending 
rebel attack began to circulate amongst the soldiers.  “About the 1st of June, there began to come 
rumors of an approaching attack by the rebels,” chronicled A. F. Sperry of the 33rd Iowa.  
“Occasionally we would have to stand ‘at arms’ from an early reveille till after sun-rise.  One 
effect of all this was, that at last we grew to believe there would never be any attack on the place, 
and that all the long days of work on the fortifications, and the false alarms and every thing of 
the kind, were but the means adopted by our commanding officers, to keep us from rusting in 
rest.”  Captain Edward S. Redington of the 28th Wisconsin also complained about the incessant 
drill and discipline in the Union camp:  “We have had about our usual number of false alarms.  
The night before last everyone was up and our Company sent into the rifle pits until morning, but 
it all ended in smoke as usual.  I . . . spent nearly the entire night riding through the woods and 
hills to visit the pickets and outposts to see that all were on the alert[.]”1   
Although habitual training bored some federal soldiers and made many complacent about 
the looming Confederate threat, it equipped them for the day when an attack might come.  The 
commanders at Helena wanted to prepare their garrison as much as possible, and most of the 
troops understood this, regardless of whether they enjoyed the drilling.  “The progress of the 
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rebels . . . seemed to have been well known to our commanders,” observed Sperry, “and our 
force at Helena was therefore kept well in readiness.”2 
The commanding officer in Helena in the spring of 1863 was Major General Benjamin 
M. Prentiss, a Mexican War veteran who took charge of the District of Eastern Arkansas in 
February 1863.  Before arriving in Helena, Prentiss had served as an officer in Ulysses S. Grant’s 
Army of the Tennessee, where he made a name for himself at the battle of Shiloh.  On April 6, 
1862, 44,000 Confederates attacked and routed 40,000 Federals who were camped near Pittsburg 
Landing, Tennessee.  With disaster looming, Prentiss helped rally a defensive line to slow the 
rebel assault.  The fighting that ensued was so intense that the position occupied by the Union 
army came to be known as the “Hornet’s Nest.”  The Confederates eventually overran the Union 
lines, taking Prentiss prisoner in the process.  However, by that time, the general and his 
companions had held off the rebels for six hours, just long enough to allow Grant to arrive with 
25,000 reinforcements and save the day for the Federals.3   
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When Prentiss was released six months later in a prisoner exchange, he returned to the 
Union army a man permanently marked by his experiences at Shiloh.  On March 15, 1863, he 
gave a speech to his troops at Helena, and Joshua Underhill of the 46th Indiana was in the 
audience:  “[Prentiss’s] remarks were to the point and made some good hits.  Spoke of his 
capture at Shiloh and the treatment he suffered.  Altogether he made a favorable impression—
about one thousand persons present.”  Apparently, Prentiss was rather fond of recounting his 
reputed heroics at Shiloh, for he delivered a similar speech in mid-June.  A soldier who stopped 
at Helena en route to Vicksburg recalled that “Gen Prentiss made us a Short Speech and told us 
to remember at Vicksburg the sufferings of himself and troops while prisoners there.”4   
While in command at Helena, Prentiss would do everything in his power to ensure that 
his Shiloh experiences would not be repeated.  In March, he closed the lines around town and 
allowed only those citizens who had sworn an oath of allegiance to the United States to enter.  
Males over the age of eighteen who refused to take the oath before a provost marshal were put 
outside the lines.  Additionally, trade with the surrounding countryside was banned, and those 
who wished to pass through the lines were required to carry official passes.  On May 14, a 
Kansas cavalryman reported that two groups of Confederates bearing flags of truce recently had 
come to Helena, “but they don’t find out so much as they used to.  Gen. Prentice [sic] don’t 
honey fuggle round them as much as the other commanders of the past used too [sic],” he 
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explained.  “He don’t supply them in clothes, salt, etc.  He was a prisoner among them too long, 
and suffered too much from their hands, to love them any.  He was taken prisoner at Shiloh.”5 
Prentiss also buttressed his garrison with regiments of black troops, though interestingly, 
he was not the first person in Phillips County to suggest that African Americans be armed.  On 
July 17, 1861—only two and a half months after Arkansas seceded—W. S. Turner, a Helena 
planter, asked the Confederate secretary of war for permission to raise black regiments for rebel 
service.  “Our negroes are too good to fight Lincoln hirelings,” he declared, “but as [the 
Yankees] pretend to love negroes so much we want to show them how much the true Southern 
cotton-patch negro loves them in return.”  A spokesman for the Confederate war department 
politely declined Turner’s offer, explaining two weeks later that although “this Department is not 
prepared to accept the Negro regiment tendered by you, . . . it is not doubted that almost every 
slave would cheerfully aid his master in the work of hurling back the fanatical invader. . . .  But 
now there is a superabundance of our own color tendering their services to the Government in its 
day of peril and ruthless invasion.”  Both Turner and the spokesman must have been horrified by 
the way black Arkansans welcomed Samuel R. Curtis’s army the following summer.6   
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 The Confederacy did not officially consider arming black troops until the waning months 
of the war, but the U.S. government took steps to do so in the spring of 1862.  The Second 
Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, authorized the president to employ “persons of African 
descent” to suppress the rebellion, while the Militia Act, passed on the same day, sanctioned the 
employment of African Americans in “any military or naval service for which they may be found 
competent.”  Six months later, President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation 
expanded the parameters of black service.  In addition to freeing all slaves who lived in the states 
still in rebellion, the president declared on January 1, 1863, that African Americans “of suitable 
condition” would be “received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, 
positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.”  Although 
Lincoln did not specify combats roles for black men, African Americans and their abolitionist 
allies seized upon the proclamation to urge black enlistment.  Their appeals, together with 
mounting federal casualties and the corresponding need for manpower, convinced increasing 
numbers of white northerners that African Americans should share the burden of the fight.7  
In the spring of 1863, Lorenzo Thomas, the adjutant general of the U.S. Army, toured the 
Mississippi valley to enlist black soldiers.  On April 6, Thomas visited Helena, where he 
launched a recruitment drive with a rousing speech to an estimated 5,000-7,000 troops.  “I briefly 
defined my general plan,” Thomas later reported, “and told the soldiers . . . that their 
commanding officer [Prentiss] thought he could raise a colored regiment at once, and I had 
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authorized him to do so.”  In his speech, Thomas also introduced a program to put the region’s 
freedpeople to work and, in the parlance of the times, help them become “free laborers.”  Under 
his plan, the army would seize farms abandoned by (and confiscated from) local rebels and lease 
them to loyal men—many of them discharged Yankee officers—who, in turn, would hire 
freedpeople to work.  Despite its admirable goals, this plantation-leasing system, as it came to be 
called, in some cases resembled the system of tenancy and sharecropping that dominated the 
postwar South.  Lessees duped workers into signing unfair contracts, and conditions on most of 
the plantations were harsh.  In 1865, some twenty-three federal plantations were leased around 
Helena, and they became regular targets for rebel guerrillas.  African American troops often 
guarded the plantations, which further enticed vengeful Confederates to attack them.  In the 
spring of 1863, however, plantation-leasing lay several months in the future.  On April 6, 
Thomas’s primary goal was to recruit black soldiers.8 
At the conclusion of Thomas’s speech, Prentiss joined him on the speaker’s platform and 
“indorsed in a forcible and eloquent speech the policy announced by Adj’t Gen. Thomas.”  In 
typical fashion, Prentiss also recounted his experiences at Shiloh, telling his audience that “from 
the time he was a prisoner, and a negro sentinel with firm step, beat in front of his sell [sic] . . . 
he prayed God for the day of revenge, and he now thanked God that it had come.”  He then 
reportedly turned to Thomas and said, “[T]ell the President for me.  I will receive [black troops] 
in the lines—I will beg them to come in—I will make them come in!  and if any officer in my 
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command, high or low, neglects to ‘receive them friendly and treat them kindly,’ I will put him 
outside the lines.”  The troops reportedly responded to their commander’s bombast with 
“Tremendous applause,” and the following day, recruitment began for the First Arkansas 
Volunteer Infantry, African Descent (A.D.).  In May, the newly-formed regiment was ordered to 
Louisiana, but the Second Arkansas, A.D.—also authorized before Thomas left Helena—
remained in Phillips County through the summer.  In the days following the adjutant general’s 
speech, Minos Miller of the 36th Iowa applied for an officer’s commission in the Second 
Arkansas, A.D.9 
 Recruiting black regiments was not the only way that Prentiss sought to bolster his 
position at Helena; he also set out to use the surrounding landscape to his defensive advantage.  
Previous Yankee garrisons had already established suitable defenses prior to Prentiss’s arrival, 
but the general supervised their improvement.  Just west of town stood four prominent hills—the 
foothills of Crowley’s Ridge—which, according to one soldier, were “divided by numerous deep 
and narrow gorges, where in many places a man could only walk with difficulty.”  These gorges, 
the product of years of erosion of the ridge’s loess cap, shielded the town’s western 
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approaches.10  Prentiss, however, had no intentions of relying solely on Helena’s natural 
defenses.  Under his supervision, Union troops and former slaves adapted the terrain to their 
advantage by building batteries on the peaks of the hills, each armed with two guns and protected 
by earthen walls, sandbags, and a series of connecting rifle pits.  The Federals labeled the 
batteries, from north to south, A, B, C, and D (Figure 6).  Cavalry, rifle pits, and additional 
batteries protected the flanks of this western line of defense.11 
To fortify their garrison further, the defensive-minded Yankees felled trees in the ravines 
and roads leading into town.  The trees, which included oak, hickory, American beech, sugar 
maple, yellow poplar, and other hardwoods that grew atop Crowley’s Ridge, obstructed the 
avenues through which enemy artillery might be brought to bear on the post.  Confederate 
assailants later identified these trees as abatis—defensive barriers formed by cutting limbs, 
lining them up (with sharpened branches turned toward the enemy), and securing their butts in 
the ground.  Whether the Federals built actual abatis or simply slashed the trees and let them lie 
where they fell, the result was the same—solid fronts of jagged, intertwining branches that would 
thwart, or at least slow down, any rebel assault by land.12   
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Helena’s troops loathed the hard work required to secure their post, but they continuously 
bragged about its natural and man-made defenses.  One soldier insisted, “This is a very well 
fortified place and . . . the country in the rear of town is a continuation of hills which are the most 
natural fortifications I have ever seen.  On many of them, we have Batteries planted and rifle pits 
dug so it seems as though every avenue into the town is so commanded as to make it impossible 
for a rebel army to get in here.”  Another boasted that “fifty thousand men could not take this 
town by attacking it.  in the rear, the batteries command the whole country around.  the country 
is very rough and hilly in the rear of the town, and no artillery can be brought against it.”  A 
month later, he added,  “[W]e have a line of batteries and rifle pits all round town, and all the 
roads are blocked up by the falling of heavy timber.”  Minos Miller also observed efforts to 
strengthen the garrison’s defenses:  “The troops here are still fortifying and diging rifle pits,” he 
wrote in early June.  There is some talk of [General John S.] Marmaduke attacking this place but 
no fears of it.”13   
In the summer and fall of 1862, the Federals had constructed their most formidable 
defense mechanism, an earthen redoubt on the western edge of town called Fort Curtis.  
According to local lore, the fort—named for the erstwhile federal commander at Helena—sat on 
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the same mound where the white stag of Pacaha had stood; where Hernando de Soto had planted 
his silver cross in the 1540s; and where Helena’s founding proprietor, Sylvanus Phillips, had 
made his home.  In the summer of 1862, the site was owned by Phillips’s only surviving child, 
Caroline Phillips Hanly, the wife of the esteemed Judge Thomas Hanly.  Because Hanly was a 
Confederate congressman, and his wife a rebel sympathizer, federal forces confiscated the 
property without compensating the couple.  The Yankees broke ground on the fort in August 
1862, and on October 30, they celebrated its completion with a formal dedication.  Most of the 
work of building the fort was performed by freedmen, who swung pickaxes, shoveled dirt, and 
hauled guns while white soldiers “lay in the shade an[d] drill[ed].”14 
Fort Curtis was not, as the name implies, a military administration center (Figure 7).  
Rather, it was a mostly subsurface structure containing two powder magazines and a well.  On 
the surface, it was equipped with several large siege guns, the exact locations and specifics of 
which have been disputed.  Archaeological research conducted in the late 1960s revealed that the 
fort was equipped to hold four 24-pound Barbette guns, one in each corner, with three additional 
guns mounted somewhere along the fort’s outer walls.  Joshua Underhill, who visited Fort Curtis 
in November 1863, said it was “a pretty substantial fortification” occupying “one city square” 
and armed with “large guns,” the largest being a 42-pounder.  The exact size of Fort Curtis, be it 
one city block or smaller, has also been disputed.  However, one thing is certain—its defenses 
were substantial, and the Federals believed it would provide them with ample protection in the 
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event of an attack.  A week after the fort’s dedication, one soldier boasted, “Helena is so situated 
that it could be defended by a small force against vastly superior numbers, merely with the help 
of its natural advantages, and with the aid of Fort Curtis—which is just finished—we consider it 
nearly impregnable.”  Two months later, the garrison remained eminently confident.  “I do not 
think [the rebels] will ever attack this place,” predicted Minos Miller, “for about fifty yards east 
of us is one of the best Foarts in the U.S. it has nine thirty two pound cannons which would mow 
them down as fast as they could come up I think the only thing they will try to do is to harrass 
our pickets or if they can catch a small squad of our me[n] [and] take them prisnors.”15 
Miller’s contention that the Confederates would never try to seize Helena ultimately 
proved untrue, but his prediction that they would harass Union pickets was prophetic.  
Throughout the spring of 1863, small bands of rebel guerrillas and regular cavalrymen continued 
to attack the Union pickets around Helena and federal foraging parties that ventured out of the 
garrison.  The diaries and letters of Union soldiers stationed at Helena are filled with references 
to guerrilla attacks and minor skirmishes on the outskirts of town.  In February 1863, Miller 
himself reported a small clash between Union picket guards and Confederate skirmishers.  
According to Miller, a Kansas cavalry unit was dispatched to the scene, and four federal soldiers 
were wounded in the fight.  In April, another Iowa soldier wrote to his friend at home:  “Well 
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Han, Since I last Wrote to you I Have Heard Rebel Bullets Sing But we Have Had no General 
Fight we was Fired on Several times By Gurillas Fired on us & Slightly Wounded 2 of our Co.”  
In May 1863, Benjamin Palmer of the 29th Iowa reported that a Union foraging party from 
Helena was attacked near Clarendon, Arkansas, by “quite a large force” of rebels.  When the 
troops in Helena received word of the skirmish, they “were cauled out and formed In line of 
Battle.  Stacked their arms and Prepared themselves with thirty Rounds of cartage [sic], 
expecting every moment to Be marched away.”  Although such minor skirmishes did not 
seriously threaten the Union post, they did keep the soldiers alert to the possibility of more 
substantial Confederate attacks.  They also prevented the Federals from controlling any part of 
Phillips County beyond Helena and those areas adjacent to Union encampments.16 
White civilians who found themselves in the paths of the two armies sometimes suffered 
immensely.  Most supported the Confederate cavalryman (and bushwhackers) who roamed the 
eastern Arkansas countryside, ambushed Union patrols, and sniped at the Helena garrison, and 
they sometimes provided the rebels with food, shelter, and intelligence.  The Federals, of course, 
knew the loyalties of most white locals, and they occasionally retaliated against enemy civilians 
by burning their houses, destroying their farms, and stealing their crops and livestock.  Such 
harsh tactics, in conjunction with sanctioned Union foraging, devastated large swaths of the 
Arkansas Delta.  In May 1863, Edward Redington described the country outside Helena as 
“desolation itself.”  A scouting expedition in which Redington participated departed Helena on 
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the Little Rock Road, which “ran through one continued series of plantations of the best land in 
the world, all deserted, not an acre under cultivation.  The houses were almost all empty,” 
Redington recalled, “and when anyone was to be seen, it was the wife and children of some poor 
white trash (as they call them here) who wither voluntarily or involuntarily were in the Rebel 
army, and were obliged to stay from sheer necessity.  The poor things looked frightened to death, 
and well they might be, for many of the troops, especially the Kansas [regiment] was composed 
of men who had their homes spoiled by the raids of the Rebels and have about as much feeling 
for a Secesh as a wolf has for a lamb.”17 
The Union brass anticipated a Confederate attack against Helena as early as the fall of 
1862.  The Federals understood the strategic importance of their eastern Arkansas outpost, and 
they knew that the rebels would eventually try to reclaim it.  In September 1862, General Curtis 
reported that Theophilus H. Holmes and the Confederates were on the move, “probably to invest 
Helena.”  The following month, General Eugene A. Carr, in command at Helena before Prentiss, 
told Curtis that he also thought the garrison would be attacked.  Curtis responded by asking 
Admiral David D. Porter to send gunboats there to provide additional protection.  In December, 
Grant also believed Holmes was moving against Helena, but he thought the federal force there 
was strong enough to protect the town.18   
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Rumors of an impending rebel attack continued to circulate throughout the spring of 
1863.  “We have rumors this morning, that [Confederate generals Sterling] Price and [John S.] 
Marmaduke have joined their forces and are marching on this place,” reported Edward 
Redington on May 16, “but I guess it is all bosh.  But let them come if they want to, I think they 
will be glad to get away again.”  Two and a half weeks later, one of Redington’s comrades 
described the garrison’s heightened state of awareness to his friend:  “A man from the country 
just brot [sic] in, states to Gen. Prentis [sic] that Marmaduke is but 7 miles from here with 7000 
men, and Price is 18 miles farther behind, an attack is expected by morning.  I mention this to let 
you know how we are kept in a state of anxiety I might say fear for these reports are frequent and 
often we have to march into the country a few miles to meet the enemy, but as yet the Infantry 
has seen no force at all, not even one Reb.”  Two days later, the soldier happily reported,” The 
anticipated fight is over and we still hold Helena.  The fact is, the fight amounted to only a scare, 
as I expected at first.”19   
In April and May, Curtis worried that Confederate forces in Arkansas were being massed 
for a renewed assault against Missouri, and he recommended that Helena forces attack them 
before it was too late.  However, Prentiss, who had taken command at Helena by this time, 
believed Confederate threats to Missouri were only a feint for their plan to move on Helena, and 
he expressed concern that his garrison was too small to withstand an attack.  On June 12, General 
Stephen A. Hurlbut reported from Memphis that Price had left Little Rock with a force of about 
4,800 men and was moving toward Helena.  Porter heard similar reports later that month, and as 
a precautionary measure, he sent a force of gunboats to Helena, including the U.S.S. Bragg, 
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Tyler, and Hastings.  The Federals had already exploited Helena’s topographical advantages; 
now they sought to utilize the town’s riverside location.20 
While reports of an impending Confederate assault against Helena circulated amongst the 
Union command, the rebels began putting their plan into motion.  On June 16, two days after 
asking General Edmund Kirby Smith for permission to attack Helena, Holmes traveled to 
Jacksonport, Arkansas, to meet with Price and Marmaduke to discuss the plan of battle.  Holmes 
must have been confident that his attack would be approved, for he made his trip before 
receiving Smith’s reply.  Even then, Holmes remained noncommittal.  According to an 
acquaintance, the general “vacillated as to [the attack’s] propriety and did not finally decide on it 
until he came to Jacksonport, and held a consultation with Generals Price and [John Sappington] 
Marmaduke, who both advised it.” 
According to the plan devised at the meeting, Confederate forces totaling approximately 
7,600 men would converge on Helena.  Price’s 3,095-man infantry division, which consisted of 
Brigadier General Dandridge McRae’s Arkansas brigade and Brigadier General M. Monroe 
Parsons’s Missouri brigade, would leave Jacksonport and rendezvous at Cotton Plant, Arkansas, 
about sixty miles northwest of Helena, on June 26 (Figure 5).  Marmaduke’s 1,750-man cavalry 
division, which consisted of Colonels Colton Greene’s and Joseph Shelby’s Missouri brigades, 
would join them there.  An additional infantry brigade, Brigadier General James F. Fagan’s 
1,339 Arkansans, would leave its base in Little Rock and move to Clarendon, about fifty miles 
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west of Helena.  The two separate columns would then converge on Helena for the attack.  In the 
meantime, Brigadier General Lucius M. Walker’s 1,462-man cavalry division, which was 
already operating in the vicinity of Helena, was responsible for helping the Confederates achieve 
an element of surprise.  Holmes instructed Walker to picket all the approaches to Helena and 
prevent anyone from entering or exiting the town.21 
With the plans finalized, Holmes reportedly turned to Price and said, “I determine on this 
expedition with some fear of an unsuccessful result; you have great weight and popularity, and if 
the expedition fails, I rely on you to sustain the action taken in ordering it.”  Price allegedly 
assured his commander he would do so.  At that, Holmes returned to his headquarters in Little 
Rock, where he received Smith’s authorization for the attack.  On June 21, Holmes wired Price 
that the attack had been approved.  He also ordered Price to move his division to a place called 
Switzer’s (or Oakland Post-Office) instead of Cotton Plant.  Two days later, Holmes issued a 
spirited order to his troops.  “Comrades!” he exclaimed.  “Your time has come to strike a blow in 
the good cause.  You are ready.  Your discipline and manhood are confidently relied on. . . .  The 
invaders who seek to subjugate you have been driven from Arkansas save at one point, Helena!  
We go to retake it!”  On June 26, Holmes traveled to Clarendon to assume personal command of 
the operation.22   
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Price had assured Holmes that if the Confederates moved against Helena with “celerity 
and secrecy” the Federals undoubtedly would be crushed.  Unfortunately for the rebels, the 
natural environment of eastern Arkansas prevented the Confederates from achieving either of 
those ends.  In fact, what happened next became a small-scale version of General Ambrose 
Burnside’s notorious “Mud March” in Virginia earlier that year.23 
On June 22, Price and Marmaduke began their marches toward Switzer’s, and two days 
later, heavy rains started falling, transforming the roads on their route to mud and the creeks in 
their path to torrents.  The rain fell incessantly for four days, and three different streams—now 
all overflowing their banks—mired the Confederate advance.  “The heavy rains had swollen all 
the streams and still it rained until the time of Old Noah seemed coming again,” recalled a 
Confederate colonel.  The rebel rendezvous was supposed to occur on June 26, but on that day, 
most of Price’s infantrymen were stopped several miles from Switzer’s, unable to cross the 
swollen Cache River.  Jacob H. Rockwell, a cavalryman in Shelby’s brigade, said the Cache was 
“always on a rampage at that season of the year and when we reached it[,] it was at its old game 
of swamping the country, and it surely is a swamp too.”  General McRae summed up the rebels’ 
predicament on the banks of the river:  “It is utterly impossible to get my train across Cache. . . . 
The mud is so deep . . . that mules cannot stand up.”  William McPheeters, a surgeon in Price’s 
division, was forced to abandon his carriage, which was “too weak to stand the horrible roads of 
the Cache [River] bottom, famous for its almost impassibility.”  By June 26, only Marmaduke’s 
                                                 
23 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, p. 863.  The best analysis of Burnside’s “Mud March” is A. Wilson 
Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud:  The Army of the Potomac, December 16, 1862-January 
26, 1863,” in The Fredericksburg Campaign:  Decision on the Rappahannock, ed. Gary W. 
Gallagher (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 171-227.  The best 
environmental interpretation is Harold A. Winters, “The Battle That Was Never Fought:  






cavalry had reached Switzer’s.  When Price’s infantrymen finally crossed the Cache, two more 
flooded streams, Bayou DeView and Caney Creek, stood in their way.  Price sent his engineers 
ahead to construct bridges across the creeks, but floods swept away the bridges before the 
infantry could cross them.   
It was June 29, three days after they were supposed to arrive, when Price’s infantrymen 
were across Caney Creek and camped near Switzer’s.  “None of the soldiers who participated in 
that march can forget its hardships,” remembered a Confederate captain.  “The crossing of the 
Cache River, Bayou de View, Candy and Big Creeks, with their attendant six days’ wading 
through mud and water, from ankle to waist high, whether in timber or prairie, it was ‘splash’ 
after ‘splash’ from one to four feet deep, and creeks two miles wide.  Some of the nights 
following these weary days were spent without rations or shelter, for the wagons could not reach 
camp.  Yet, through all this disheartening hardships the troops bore themselves with heroic 
fortitude.”  Likewise, a Missouri historian called the march “one of the most extraordinary . . . in 
the history of the war.”  And, with a bit of hyperbole, he added, “Napoleon’s passage of the Alps 
was hardly more arduous than the march of this army from Jacksonport to Helena.”24 
Predictably, Fagan’s brigade faced similar difficulties on its journey east from Little 
Rock.  “[W]e crossed the [Arkansas] river at Little Rock on the 18th June, the main army having 
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crossed the day before,” reported one soldier.  “We then marched through nearly an incessant 
rain from then until after we crossed White river at Clarendon.  Which made it very hard 
traveling, to say nothing of uncomfortableness of being wet.”  Another soldier later wrote, “It is 
useless to tell . . . anything of the hardships of our marches through the . . . swamps, no one but 
an actual participant, can picture anything like the reality.  It was mud & water all the time from 
‘knee’ deep up to the arm pits.  It would not be surprising if the number of sick from exposure on 
this trip will equal that of the killed and wounded in the fight.”25 
Unbeknownst to them, the exasperated Confederates were slogging their way through an 
area modern geographers call the Grand Prairie, a subregion of the Mississippi Alluvial Plain 
that is covered with a fertile topsoil (Figure 2).  Beneath that topsoil, however, lay a deep layer 
of dense, silty clay that drains poorly.  This makes the Grand Prairie ideal for rice cultivation but 
not for marching, especially after heavy rains.26  After traversing the Grand Prairie, the soldiers 
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had to march through the White River Lowlands, a region regularly inundated by the White, 
Black, Cache, L’Anguille, and Mississippi rivers, as well as Bayou DeView.  When German 
sportsman Friedrich Gerstäcker hunted the Lowlands in the late 1830s, he found “the ground was 
covered with water, in many places knee deep.”  It was a land of “almost impenetrable swamps,” 
he wrote, where a “few dry strips of land ran across the country from north to south, the 
intermediate spaces being about a foot or a foot and a half under water, with here and there 
channels three or four feet deep.”  A quarter of a century later, the Lowlands had changed little.  
As one Confederate cavalryman recalled of the summer of 1863, “The entire country between 
Jacksonport and the Mississippi river became one vast lagoon streaked innumerably by now 
swimming streams and bottomless bayous.”27 
In spite of the obstacles, Holmes (and Fagan’s brigade) reached Clarendon on June 26 
and began moving toward Trenton, Arkansas, the next day.  At Clarendon, Holmes issued further 
orders for the attack:  Price’s division, shielded by Marmaduke’s cavalry, was to march from 
Switzer’s to Helena.  Fagan’s column, shielded by a portion of Walker’s cavalry, would march 
from Clarendon toward Helena via the lower Little Rock Road.  On June 28, Holmes and Fagan 
reached Trenton, approximately fifteen miles west of Helena.  By this time, William and John 
Shibley, brothers in Fagan’s brigade, had learned why their unit was advancing toward Helena.  
In a letter home, they informed their parents of their expedition:  “It is thought to be our intention 
to try and divert the attention of the Federals from Vicksburg.”  J. W. Paup, Fagan’s acting 
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inspector-general, expressed a more sinister motive for attacking Helena.  On June 29, he 
reported that the Yankees there had established “two Etheopean [sic] schools in which they have 
some 5 or 6 hundred negroes in each.  Teaching them how to read and write, and instilling into 
them their hellish doctrin [sic] of insurrection.  God grant that we may be able to murder the last 
one of them,” he told his wife.  “I would be willing any day to sacrifice my own life to 
accomplish their destruction.”28   
Price’s progress, meanwhile, continued to be hampered by bad weather and impassable 
streams.  Marmaduke, whose cavalry had been moving ahead of Price’s column during the 
preceding week, was forced to halt on June 30 and wait for the infantry to move forward.  Price’s 
continual tardiness caused Holmes a great deal of angst, as he feared the holdup would allow the 
Federals to learn about the attack.  On July 1, a frustrated Holmes informed Price from Trenton:  
“I deeply regret the difficulties that cause the delay in your march.  I have used every precaution 
to prevent a knowledge of our approach reaching the enemy, and have what I believe to be 
certain information that I had succeeded up to the night before last.  I fear these terrible delays 
will thwart all my efforts.”29 
As it turned out, Holmes’s fears were justified—nature had blown the Confederates’ 
cover.  On June 24, Hurlbut wired Prentiss to alert him to Price’s location in Jacksonport.  Three 
days later, Prentiss responded by saying that he had heard Price was there, but that the latest 
intelligence had him moving toward the Red River, not Helena.  However, Prentiss 
acknowledged that his scouts had been unable to obtain much information on Price’s movements 
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because Confederate cavalry had been blocking his communication with the Arkansas interior.  
Additionally, the rebels were preventing people living outside of Helena from entering the town 
(apparently, Walker’s cavalry was doing its job).  This, Prentiss later admitted, made him 
suspicious of an attack.  Therefore, for an entire week before the battle, he issued orders that the 
“entire garrison should be up and under arms at 2.30 o’clock each morning.”  On July 1, Prentiss 
learned that the Confederates had congregated about fifteen miles from Helena, and he became 
convinced that an attack was imminent.  His suspicions were confirmed the following day, when 
Hurlbut reported that “a man who has escaped from Price’s army informs me that Price is 
moving south, and will make an attempt on Helena.”  To his soldiers’ dismay, Prentiss cancelled 
the garrison’s scheduled Fourth of July celebration as a precautionary measure.  Minos Miller, 
recently promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the Second Arkansas, A.D., heard rumors of the 
Confederate approach:  “[W]e recd news on the 2d that there was a large rebble force fifteen 
miles from here and that they intended to celebrate the 4th in here so all the troops here was 
ordered to be in line a half hour before day each morning.”30   
On July 3, the Confederate forces finally converged on the outskirts of Helena.  After 
nearly two weeks of trudging through the mud and fording swollen streams, the tired and 
dispirited rebels had at least reached their objective.  The natural environment, though, had 
prevented them from doing so according to schedule.  One rebel soldier later recognized the cost 
of the delays:  “There had been heavy rains which made the roads impassable and corduroy roads 
had to be constructed the entire way; this with the building of bridges across all swollen streams 
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delayed the movement so much that the enemy learned of our coming and had ample time to 
prepare for our reception.”  General Holmes concurred.  “Price was unavoidably four days 
behind time in consequence of high water and bad roads,” he lamented, “which gave the enemy 
ample time to prepare for me.”31   
Nevertheless, the Confederates moved forward with their plans.  On July 3, Holmes met 
his subordinate generals at the Allen Polk house, five miles west of Helena, to discuss the order 
of battle.  He also briefed them on Helena’s defenses, which were stouter than he had originally 
believed them to be.  “[T]he place was very much more difficult of access,” he declared, “and the 
fortifications very much stronger, than I had supposed before undertaking the expedition, the 
features of the country being peculiarly adapted to defense, and all that the art of engineering 
could do having been brought to bear to strengthen it.”  General McRae agreed.  “From what I 
can learn [the Federals’ position] is one of the strongest positions imaginable,” he wrote to his 
wife on July 3.  “May the Lord deliver me from a[n] imbecile old man like Genl H[olmes].  If I 
am killed in this fight charge it to Jeff Davis through his clerk Holmes for if we could be 
sacrificed he would or will do it.”32   
Faulty intelligence, poor reconnaissance, and the Federals’ strategic use of the 
environment had placed the rebels in a precarious position before the first shots were fired.  Still, 
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Holmes stayed committed to the attack.  To achieve coordination, he ordered his subordinates to 
attack on July 4 at “daylight,” a vague time designation that had disastrous consequences the 
following morning.  According to the plan, the rebels would strike the federal garrison 
simultaneously from three different positions (Figure 6).  Price’s division was ordered to assault 
Graveyard Hill due west of town, where the Federals’ battery C was located.  Marmaduke’s 
cavalry would take Rightor Hill on the north side of town, which was protected by battery A.  
Fagan would capture battery D on Hindman Hill on the town’s south side.  Finally, Walker’s 
cavalry unit was ordered to proceed to the Sterling Road north of Helena (and left of 
Marmaduke), where it would “resist any [federal] troops that may approach Righter Hill.”  When 
Rightor Hill was captured, he should “enter the town and act against the enemy as circumstances 
may justify.”  According to Holmes, all of the officers agreed with the plan.33 
While the rebels mobilized for their Independence Day assault, the Federals cautiously 
anticipated an attack.  As late as June 28, they were still adapting the land to their advantage by 
digging “ditches” and “big holes so that [rebel] cavalry cannot cross.”  Like many of his cohorts, 
James B. Loughney of the 28th Wisconsin loathed the hard work required to strengthen Helena’s 
fortifications.  However, when he took his position on July 3, he was glad those defenses were in 
place:  “Our Officers here . . . very wisely had the place strongly fortified at every assailable 
point, as batteries & breastworks comanding all the roads.  This imposed heavy duty on the boys, 
who in their ignorance of the true state of affairs often cursed the projectors of these works as 
they did not believe that their heavy labors would be of any avail & were not needed.”  Writing 
home to his wife the night before the battle, Loughney’s comrade, Edward Redington, knew that 
                                                 





a fight was coming:  “Tonight since eight o’clock news has come in that Price is within a few 
miles . . . and will surely make an attack on us tomorrow or next day.”34 
 Just offshore of Helena, on the Mississippi River, the crew aboard the U.S.S. Tyler also 
prepared for a rebel attack.  The Bragg and the Hastings had since left for operations elsewhere, 
so that on July 3, the Tyler was the only naval vessel anchored at Helena.  Under the command 
of Lieutenant Commander James M. Pritchett, the Union ironclad, 180 feet long and 42 feet 
wide, was armed with a deadly thirty-pounder Parrot on its stern and six eight-inch guns.  
Pritchett had been alerted to the approaching rebel force, and he was prepared to assist Prentiss 
in any way he could.35 
 As the Federals prepared for the coming fight, Major Robert Henry Smith, a 
quartermaster in Marmaduke’s division, sat in the Allen Polk house the night before the battle.  
Before eating his supper, he wrote home to his wife:  “I cannot refrain from writing you a line or 
two before going into this fight.  It may, My Darling, be the last thought transcribed to paper in 
this encounter from your loving Husband. . . . If I fall do not think harshly of me, for I think that 
I have your approbation to fight for liberty rather than live as a slave, to drag my family down, 
down to the lowest depths of slavery and misery by such an enemy.”  Smith’s premonition about 
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dying in the fight turned out to be true.  The following morning, while manning a canon near 
Rightor Hill, Smith was struck and killed by federal fire.36   
Shortly before midnight on July 3, the Confederates began moving into their respective 
positions for the coming battle.  Price’s division was led by Parsons’s brigade, itself spearheaded 
by two units of sharpshooters:  Major Lebbeus A. Pindall’s Ninth Missouri Sharpshooters, and 
Captain Cameron N. Biscoe’s company of Helena-area Arkansans.  A brother-in-law of Thomas 
Hindman, Biscoe was sent to the front because he was familiar with the country.  As it 
approached the town from the west, Biscoe and his comrades encountered deep ravines, steep 
hills, and felled timber.  The rough terrain and darkness made it virtually impossible for Price’s 
column to transport its artillery, so the general ordered his guns to be left behind.  Furthermore, 
he instructed the soldiers who operated the artillery to arm themselves and prepare to capture and 
man the federal guns on Graveyard Hill.  William J. Bull, an artilleryman in Captain Charles B. 
Tilden’s Missouri battery (of Parsons’s brigade), was one of the volunteers called “to go in with 
the infantry and serve any guns that might be captured.”  John D. Waller, also an artilleryman in 
the brigade, observed that “the Feds are prety well fortified[.]  the artillery canot get in[.]  32 of 
our canoners are going to take muskets and goin with the Infantry.”37   
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After marching for much of the night, Price halted his column a little over a mile from 
Helena.  Apparently, Price had interpreted Holmes’ instructions to attack at “daylight” to mean 
“sunrise,” so he stopped his men for fear of arriving on the battlefield prematurely.  According to 
William Bull, Parsons’s brigade reached the outskirts of Helena “several hours before the time 
for the assault.”  The soldiers spent this idle time visiting, joking, and speculating about the 
coming battle.  Others wrote home to their families and loved ones or mulled over their chances 
of surviving the upcoming fight.  Bull, who was exhausted from a combination of illness and the 
long week of marching through wetlands, lay down on the ground and slept.  Anticipating that it 
would be difficult to transmit orders once fighting ensued, Parsons utilized the down time to 
brief his subordinates on the plan of attack.  According to Price, Holmes joined his column 
during this idle time and remained with it until dawn, when the troops resumed their march 
toward Helena.38 
At daylight, Price’s division started moving again, following the lead of several local 
guides.  The rebel advance toward battery C, as well as their advances elsewhere, was aided by 
the cover of a dense morning fog.  “A heavy fog settled over the scene, giving a weird and 
strange look to the lines of the two contending armies as they loomed up in the rising mist,” 
recalled a Yankee adjutant.  Additionally, a series of “heavily wooded” hills stood between 
Price’s column and Graveyard Hill.  According to William Bull, these hills were not as steep as 
those on which the federal batteries were located.  However, they “had been covered with heavy 
timber” whose “limbs [were] allowed to lie where they fell.  This made a most excellent abatis.”  
The obstructions significantly slowed Price’s advance and created a great deal of confusion in 
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the rebel ranks.  “[T]he steep ridges and deep ravines . . . rendered the movement very slow and 
fatiguing,” Parsons recalled.39 
Inside the Helena garrison, 4,129 federal soldiers were roused out of bed on July 4 at 
around 2:00 a.m.  After only a few minutes, they assumed their respective positions and stood at 
arms.  Because they had been drilling in this manner for months (and had been arising at this 
hour for almost a week), many soldiers still doubted the presence of a Confederate threat.  A. F. 
Sperry suspected that “some thing [was] up,” but even he wondered if the rebels would attack.  
Although he had heard that Price was coming, Edward Redington still doubted that a fight would 
come on that day:  “[T]he drums beat the assembly, and we were quickly under arms.  Still, 
almost every one thought it all nonsense, and we were sitting around, talking of everything but a 
fight.”  When the alarm gun fired at Fort Curtis, signaling the coming attack, some soldiers 
remained skeptical.  A “few minutes after four . . . the alarm gun on Fort Curtis [brought] every 
one all standing,” Redington recalled.  “Still, hardly any one believed then there would be a 
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fight, and after a few minutes settled down again, thinking perhaps it was only meant for a salute 
at sunrise, in honor of our natal day.”40 
However, when the Federals heard continuous shots fired around their pickets, virtually 
everyone became convinced that a fight was imminent.  By this time, the soldiers guarding the 
Union pickets needed no convincing of the Confederate approach.  Iowan Charles Musser, 
assigned picket duty for the night of July 3, had been “told to Keep a watchfull eye, for the 
enemy was within a Short distance of town.”  At around 2:00 a.m., Musser “heard a few Shots 
fired on [his] picket line, and in about an hour it was increased considerable all along the line.”  
The soldiers in Helena’s garrison were part of Brigadier General Frederick Salomon’s Thirteenth 
Division of the Thirteenth Army Corps.  Although Prentiss retained overall command as head of 
the District of Eastern Arkansas, the Prussian-born Salomon held operational control of the 
garrison, and thus, made most of the pivotal decisions during the battle.  Colonel William E. 
McLean was in charge of Salomon’s left wing, and Colonel Samuel A Rice, a former Iowa 
attorney general, commanded his right.  Colonel Powell Clayton of the 5th Kansas Cavalry 
commanded the Union’s extreme right flank.41    
A half-mile from town, Price’s lead skirmishers engaged the federal pickets, and firing 
commenced at around 5:00 a.m.  Price’s division then formed two columns to prepare for the 
assault.  Parsons’s Missourians, occupying the right side of the formation, led the Confederate 
advance.  McRae’s Arkansans lingered behind on the left.  At the officers’ signals, the troops 
rushed over the hills toward town, ducking bullets and firing on the federal pickets as they 
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advanced.  Upon reaching the far side of each hill, they halted to rest and reform the lines.  
“[S]hots of the enemy . . . poured upon us from small arms and artillery from the time we 
appeared on the top of the hill until we were under the protection of the next hill,” Bull 
remembered.  As the fighting escalated, Price’s guides became frightened and fled the battlefield.  
Without guides, “confusion and consequent delay ensued.”  When a new guide was found, the 
column marched on, finally reaching the position at the base of Graveyard Hill from which the 
rebels would make their assault.  In accordance with the battle plan, Parsons halted his column 
(about 300 yards from the Union rifle pits) and waited for McRae’s troops to move into position 
on his left.  This delay gave the weary rebel troops a much-needed break from the action.  It also 
gave the Federals in battery C an opportunity to focus their artillery on another target.  Fagan’s 
column would be the unfortunate recipient.42 
South of town, Fagan’s brigade approached Helena from the lower Little Rock Road.  At 
dusk on July 3, Fagan sent Colonel W. H. Brooks’s 34th Arkansas Infantry, a battery of light 
artillery, and three cavalry companies ahead of his column to a position within three miles of 
town.  At 11:00 p.m., the rest of the brigade, spearheaded by Colonel Alexander T. Hawthorne’s 
Arkansas Infantry, left its encampment and marched toward Helena.  Fagan caught up with 
Brooks at the junction of the upper Little Rock Road (which Fagan called the “old hill road”) and 
lower Little Rock Road at 1:30 a.m.  There, he ordered the colonel to proceed toward Helena via 
the lower Little Rock Road, where he would protect Fagan’s flank and make a feint against the 
federal positions south of town.43 
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 At daybreak, Brooks’s skirmishers made contact with federal pickets.  After a short clash, 
the Federals fell back, and the Confederates advanced upon a contraband camp on the outskirts 
of Helena.  In his official report, Brooks—a Michigan native who had practiced law in 
Fayetteville before the war—claimed the camp was “abandoned, the occupants having fled to the 
town at the first alarm.”  Still, he reported, “Eight negroes were taken and sent to the rear.”  An 
infantryman in Brooks’s unit also declared that the regiment “had a little fight with the pickets 
about a mile and a half from town and killed 2 or 3 wounded several and took 8 of them 
prisoners together with 7 or 8 negroes.”  One of the infantryman’s comrades, however, said the 
rebels drove the Yankee pickets from their camp and “the negros from their quarters, killing two 
or three, wounding some, and capturing nine and [an] ambulance.”  A Union picket guard 
similarly recalled that the Confederates “fired on us as they came, but their attention was taken 
for a short time with a camp of negroes who had camped just inside our picket line.  How many 
of them were killed I never heard,” he confessed, “but their screams were terrible and the 
shooting by the enemy at close range soon ended the scene.”  Brooks later admitted that during 
the Confederate retreat around noon, his men “applied the torch to the negro quarters, which 
were consumed.”  Whether the camp was burned at the beginning of the battle or at its end, the 
results were tragic.  “The cabins were burned, and many of the aged and sick [black refugees] 
perished in them,” lamented a humanitarian worker who had left Helena a week before the battle.  
“The contrabands at that point were now left without shelter, and suffered greatly.”  Brooks’s 
comrade J. W. Paup—who, five days earlier, had expressed his desire to murder African 
Americans in Helena—must have been proud of his brigade’s actions.44 
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Continuing toward town, Brooks’s rebels assumed a position near a hill south of Helena.  
Almost immediately, federal soldiers in Battery K, 1st Missouri Light Artillery and the guns 
aboard the U.S.S. Tyler opened fire on them.  The Missouri battery’s shots had little effect on 
Brooks’s men, but the Tyler’s shells were destructive.  An eight-inch shell from the gunboat 
struck a rebel cavalry company, killing three horses and injuring three men.  Fontaine Richard 
Earle of the 34th Arkansas Infantry, who thought he was being attacked by two gunboats, was 
nonetheless impervious to the shots being fired at him:  “These boats and . . . batteries did a great 
deal of shooting at us, but we dodging behind trees were perfectly safe.”45 
 Brooks responded to the Tyler’s fire by ordering rebel guns to be positioned on the 
nearby hill.  All the while, the federal gunboat and battery continued to shell the Confederates, 
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limiting the rebel attack to only twenty-one rounds and eventually forcing them to withdraw their 
guns from the hill.  “The force in front and on the right was fully three times as large as mine,” 
Brooks later claimed.  Believing that a direct assault against the Union rifle pits would devastate 
his small unit, the colonel decided to keep his men behind cover and do his best to hold the 
Federals in check.  His troops spent the remainder of the morning using their six-pounder gun to 
divert the fire of the Missouri battery and the Tyler away from Fagan’s column as much as 
possible.  “In this,” Brooks later claimed, “I was entirely successful.”46        
Meanwhile, Fagan’s column continued its advance toward Hindman Hill along the upper 
Little Rock Road.  One mile from the Federals’ outer defenses, his lead units unexpectedly found 
the road into town obstructed with felled trees.  Fagan rode to the front and observed that his 
path was “completely filled with felled timber, the largest forest growth intermingling and 
overlapping its whole length, while on either side precipitous and impassable ravines were found 
running up even to the very intrenchments of the enemy.”  Like Price, Fagan decided it was 
impossible to move his artillery through the obstructions, especially if he wished to follow 
Holmes’s orders to assault Hindman Hill at daylight.  Furthermore, he believed his officers had 
no chance of navigating the dense brush on horseback.  Thus, he ordered his officers to dismount 
and his guns to be left behind.  Crawling through the “closely jutting limbs and boughs” for a 
mile, Fagan’s column reached the pickets below Hindman Hill and discovered that the Federals 
were “on the alert, and evidently expecting and awaiting an attack.”47 
As daylight arrived, Fagan’s regiments emerged one by one from the brush and attacked 
the entrenched bluecoats.  “[A]mid the leaden rain and iron hail,” they climbed up the side of 
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Hindman Hill, which “was so steep the men had to pull themselves up by the bushes.”  One 
Confederate soldier recalled that “the hills and hollows running parallel to [the federal] works . . 
. compelled us to charge over the hills exposed to a deliberate and murderous fire.  Then to make 
the matter worse the timber had been felled in such a manner as to make it next to impossible to 
pass over this ground at all.”  Reaching the first of five Union rifle pits protecting the hill, the 
rebels attacked and drove back the Federals.  At this point in the morning, Fagan’s brigade was 
the only Confederate force attacking the Helena garrison.  Price’s delay in front of Graveyard 
Hill freed the Union guns in battery C to aim elsewhere, and Fagan’s column bore the brunt of 
their fire.  Despite attracting the attention of batteries C and D, as well as the Union breastworks, 
Fagan’s men captured the first four rifle pits, sustaining heavy casualties in the process.48   
North of Helena, Marmaduke’s cavalry division vacated its camp at 10:00 p.m. on July 3 
and proceeded toward Helena along the Old St. Francis Road.  Like Price, Marmaduke followed 
local guides.  Three miles outside of town, the general ordered all but one company of his 
cavalrymen to dismount and continue on foot.  After only one mile of marching, they “found the 
road and country thoroughly obstructed, the enemy having chopped down the trees and rendered 
almost impassable that approach to the fort and town.”  The guides also lost their way in the 
woods, thus delaying the troops by about a half hour and preventing them from commencing 
their attack at the first light of day.49  
Three-fourths of a mile from battery A, Marmaduke’s advance unit, Shelby’s brigade, 
came upon a force of federal skirmishers and drove them back in the direction of the fort.  When 
Shelby’s force came within 200 yards of the federal battery, the rebel troops deployed on the 
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high ground opposite Rightor Hill.  Unlike Price and Fagan, Marmaduke was able to move his 
artillery through the federal abatis and set up a battery, albeit with great difficulty.  However, 
even with their guns, the rebel cavalrymen were in a precarious position.  The 29th Iowa, 
protected by rifle pits and artillery, sat entrenched in their front, while Colonel Powell Clayton’s 
5th Kansas Cavalry, alongside Colonel Thomas Pace’s 1st Indiana Cavalry, attacked their left 
flank.  Ensconced behind the levee, the federal cavalrymen harassed Marmaduke with a constant 
enfilading fire.50 
West of Graveyard Hill, Price’s delay was causing Holmes a great deal of anxiety.  The 
lieutenant general rode up to Price and asked why the attack against battery C had not been 
initiated.  Price, who had just ordered McRae’s column forward, agreed that his troops should 
have been advancing.  Therefore, he sent a courier to Parsons to inquire about the holdup.  
Parsons replied that he was waiting for McRae’s column to get into position on his left.  
Although he was not aware of it, by that time, McRae’s brigade was already moving forward.  A 
“high ridge” separated the two rebel columns, and Parsons had been unable to see that McRae 
was in position to attack.  Yet again, the natural environment seemed to conspire against the 
Confederates.  Price sent a messenger to Parsons informing him of McRae’s position and 
instructing him to charge.  When he received the message, Parsons immediately “ordered [his 
column] ‘forward’ at double-quick.”  Shortly thereafter, Price observed, “Both brigades moved 
forward on the instant . . . under a storm of Minie balls, grape, and canister, which were poured 
upon them not only from Graveyard Hill in their front but from the fortified hills upon the right 
and the left.”51 
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The rebel brigades under Parsons and McRae stormed the rifle pits protecting battery C 
and climbed up the rugged slope of Graveyard Hill.  General Salomon, seeing that most of the 
rebel forces were massed in front of batteries C and D, immediately reinforced those areas with 
reserve troops.  Edward Redington, who was stationed near battery B with the 28th Wisconsin, 
looked to his left and saw the rebels climbing Graveyard Hill:  “Oh, what terrible feelings came 
over us as they slowly made their way up the hill. . . .  On, on they went, yelling like demons, up 
to the breastworks.”  His fellow marksman, J. D. Cummings, remained confident thanks to his 
natural defenses.  “We had the prettiest chance you could imagine,” Cummings remembered.  
“We just picked them [the rebels] off like sheep as they marched up the hill.  We lay behind 
stumps and logs, and could see them fall eight or nine at a time.”  
At this point in the morning, the Federals had, for the most part, pinned down Fagan on 
Hindman Hill and checked Marmaduke’s assault on Rightor Hill.  Observing that battery C was 
in the greatest danger of being captured, Prentiss ordered the guns in batteries B and D, Fort 
Curtis, and those aboard the Tyler to concentrate their fire on Graveyard Hill.  The Tyler, after 
pinning down Brooks’s rebels south of town, steamed upstream a half mile and began dropping 
its shells on Price’s column.  The boat’s executive officer later estimated that the barrage was 
responsible for six hundred rebel casualties at Graveyard Hill.52   
The Confederate assault on Graveyard Hill was a horrifying spectacle for onlookers.  
Minos Miller, who sat on the far left of the Union line, witnessed the Confederates storming 
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battery C, as well as the devastation being wrought on them by Union guns:  “[W]e could see 
colum after colum pouring over the hills towards batterry C[.]  as soon as they come in sight Ft 
Curtis the gunboat and evry batterry that could get range of them let into them with a 
vengeance[.]  the air was full of shells and we could see the rebbels lines open and see them 
falling in all directions[.]  directly they began to give back.”  Another Union soldier, Lieutenant 
C. H. Glines, witnessed the Confederate advance on Graveyard Hill:  “[O]ver the Breast works 
came the Enemy and in five minutes the hole hills ware covered . . . and there was six Batries 
besides the fort [Curtis] and the gunBoat Tylor playing on them at the same time and still they 
kept coming.”53  
Despite suffering enormous casualties during their advance, the rebels still managed to 
reach the fort atop Graveyard Hill.  “[S]creaming and yelling at the top of their voices,” the 
“Rebel horde” attacked the fort twice and was repulsed.  On the third try, the Confederates 
succeeded in capturing the battery.  In Prentiss’s view, the rebel assailants who took Graveyard 
Hill exhibited “a courage and desperation rarely equaled.”  Edward Walden of the 28th 
Wisconsin, watching from his position near battery B, “saw the Rebels march up to the fort 
[battery C] and without scarce making a halt marched inside of the works, our men leaving as 
fast as their legs would carry them.”  The federal force driven from battery C consisted of 
members of the 33rd Missouri and 33rd Iowa infantry regiments.  As Walden observed, those who 
managed to escape fled toward the protection of Fort Curtis.  However, on their way out of the 
fort, the Federals swiped all of the “friction primers and priming wires, thus rendering the pieces 
[in battery C] useless” to the rebels.  When he learned that his plan to use the Federals’ own 
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artillery against them had failed, Price immediately ordered Confederate field pieces brought 
forward to the fort.  However, as a result of the rapidly deteriorating situation on the battlefield, 
as well as the rough terrain leading up to the hill, the guns did not make it there in time.54   
At 7:00 a.m., Fagan’s column had been attacking south of Helena for approximately three 
hours.  At that time, only the fifth rifle pit and battery D stood between them and the capture of 
Hindman Hill.  While reforming their lines in the security of the fourth rifle pit, they discovered 
that battery C’s guns had turned away from them and were focused on Price’s assault on 
Graveyard Hill.  It was the perfect time to continue the assault, but the rebel troops were 
exhausted, wearied by the summer heat and the Federals’ continuous fire.  “Numbers had fainted 
from excessive heat and fatigue,” recalled Colonel Hawthorne.  “Many had been killed and 
wounded, and a large majority in each of our three regiments were utterly unable to fight any 
longer.”  Nonetheless, Fagan knew he had to take advantage of the distraction at Graveyard Hill.  
He ordered a charge against the fifth and final rifle pit protecting battery D.  Intense fighting 
ensued, and the Federals fled their breastwork for the safety of their armed battery above.  With 
only one obstacle remaining, Fagan then ordered a charge against the fort.  However, by this 
time, the rebel ranks had been thinned substantially, and the troops who remained were plagued 
by fatigue.  Fagan’s final assault failed, leaving the brigade pinned in the innermost rifle pit at 
the mercy of battery D’s guns.  Here they remained for the balance of the morning, hoping to be 
relieved by rebel reinforcements.  Those reinforcements never came.55 
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 In the meantime, the situation atop Graveyard Hill had become chaotic.  In the words of 
Holmes, “Everything was in confusion, [and] regiments and brigades mixed up indiscriminately” 
as the rebels struggled to secure their captured battery, advance against the Federals, and shield 
themselves from the constant Union bombardment.  Adding to the chaos, Holmes entered the 
captured battery, and, at the most inopportune time, ordered one of Parsons’s colonels to assault 
Fort Curtis.  Holmes must have been distracted by the intensity of the fighting, for in giving the 
order, he violated a fundamental military concept, the chain of command.  Nonetheless, the 
colonel followed the general’s orders, leading his men down Graveyard Hill toward the fort 
without delay.  When the other officers saw the colonel’s advance, they assumed that Parsons’s 
entire brigade had been ordered forward.  Thus, they immediately directed their men to join the 
assault.  The Confederate troops stormed down the rear slope of Graveyard Hill, exposing 
themselves “to a fatal cross-fire from the [Federals’] artillery and musketry.”56   
Edward Redington observed the rebels’ reckless dash:  “As they charged down the hill 
(and a braver charge was never made) how grand they looked, and how for a moment, our hearts 
almost ceased to beat as those ranks of daring desperate men came over the hill, and we thought 
all was lost.”  When they reached the foot of Graveyard hill, the Confederates met an 
overwhelming volley of shots from Salomon’s reserves.  All the while, Fort Curtis’s guns 
pounded the bewildered rebels.  Redington continued to watch from nearby battery B:  “[T]hey 
were met by a storm of shot and shell . . . but still on they came, and some of them nearly 
reached the fort, but fiends themselves could not stand such a fire, and they broke in all 
directions.”  Realizing that they had run into a deathtrap, many of the Confederates turned back 
                                                 






and ran toward battery C.  Others took cover in ditches, buildings, or behind stumps.  William 
Bull of Parsons’s brigade was one of the soldiers pinned down in front of Fort Curtis:  “To 
prevent a charge upon our position we kept up a steady fire.  A few of us battery boys got 
together and would follow one after the other in firing over the top of a stump which stood on the 
brow of the hill.”  Iowan Minos Miller observed the pitiful sight from his post near Hindman 
Hill:  “[A]fter they got possession of batterry C they charged down a hollow towards Ft Curtis 
but our batterries poured the grape and canister to them so fast they tried to shelter in a large 
brick house[.]  about a hundred of them got into it and some of them under it when our Cavelry 
charged on them and took about 150 of them prisoner[.]  the [Infantry] surrounded the rest of 
them and took them in.”  The reckless advance on Fort Curtis devastated the Confederate ranks 
and essentially nullified the advantage they had gained in capturing Graveyard Hill.  “It was 
here,” Parsons later lamented, “that my loss was the heaviest.  Not more than half of those that 
went in that direction [toward Fort Curtis] returned.”57 
 Apparently unaware of the damage he had done, Holmes continued to issue dubious 
orders from his post atop Graveyard Hill.  By this time, Holmes knew that Fagan was pinned 
down on Hindman Hill.  In an effort to relieve him, he ordered Parsons to lead his column 
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toward battery D and attack it from the rear.  Holmes then relayed that order to Price (who 
apparently had issued similar instructions to Parsons) and left Graveyard Hill for his 
headquarters.  Two or three hundred yards behind the hill, Holmes spotted General McRae.  
According to his own report, Holmes then instructed McRae to join his brigade in battery C.  
However, McRae later claimed that Holmes ordered him to aid Fagan.  If McRae’s account is 
true, the looming prospects of rebel defeat must have been clouding Holmes’s mind at this 
critical moment; if the commanding general’s orders had been followed, all the rebel troops 
occupying battery C would have abandoned the hill they had fought so desperately to capture.  
Nevertheless, Holmes’s potential blunder did not alter the battle.  Parsons and McRae convened 
and decided that McRae’s column would assist Fagan, while Parsons’s brigade, the stronger of 
the two, would continue to hold battery C.58 
 With a force of only two hundred men, McRae set out to attack battery D.  Arriving at the 
foot of Hindman Hill, he found the fort thoroughly fortified with rifle pits and protected by a 
deadly enfilading fire.  McRae decided that an attempt to scale the hill would be suicidal, so he 
ordered his men to shoot at the rifle pits in hopes of making a diversion for Fagan.  In the end, 
McRae’s attempt to relieve Fagan failed.  When he learned of this outcome, Holmes decided that 
the battle was lost.  At 10:30 a.m., he ordered a general retreat.59                  
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North of town, the Federals continued to attack Marmaduke’s left flank, thereby 
preventing him from capturing Rightor Hill.  Marmaduke twice sent couriers to ask Walker for 
help in removing the threat along the levee.  To Marmaduke’s dismay, no help came.  On the 
evening of July 3, Walker’s cavalry—which included Helenian Archibald S. Dobbins’s 
Arkansans—had left its encampment on the lower Little Rock Road, four miles west of Helena, 
and galloped fifteen miles to the Sterling Road, north of town.  There, the cavalrymen waited 
until 2:00 a.m., when they began their advance.  A mile short of Helena, they predictably came 
upon a timber roadblock.  Walker dismounted approximately three hundred troops as skirmishers 
and sent them forward while holding the majority of his brigade north of the blockade.  For the 
balance of the morning, Walker’s skirmishers engaged Clayton’s bluecoats, although most of the 
fighting consisted only of skirmishing and long-range sniping.  According to Walker and his 
subordinates, additional rebel companies were sent forward throughout the morning, repelling 
the federal forces along the levee on several occasions.  However, Walker’s brigade was unable 
to dislodge those Federals, and therefore, it was impossible for Marmaduke to capture Rightor 
Hill.  At 11:00 a.m., Marmaduke received orders from Holmes to withdraw.  Furious, he left the 
field without notifying Walker, who did not retreat until 2:00 p.m.  William W. Garner, a 
cavalryman in Walker’s brigade, summed up the day for the rebels fighting north of town:  
“They [the Federals] . . . let on to know nothing of our approach and we thought that we would 
take the place easy, and perhaps without a fight; but we were disappointed.”60  
 After the battle, Walker claimed to have fulfilled his obligation to prevent the Federals 
from reinforcing Rightor Hill and to have assisted Marmaduke as much as possible.  Marmaduke 
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thought otherwise.  He blamed Walker for his failure to capture battery A, claiming that if the 
Federals on his left and rear had been removed, his troops “would have carried it.”  Marmaduke 
maintained that the force opposing Walker consisted of no more than five hundred troops, 
making Walker’s actions even more inexcusable.  According to Holmes, Walker gave “no 
satisfactory reason” for why he failed to protect Marmaduke’s flank.  The animosity between 
Marmaduke and Walker did not end at Helena.  In early September, while Union forces under 
General Frederick Steele threatened Little Rock, Marmaduke publicly accused Walker of 
cowardice.  Walker responded by challenging him to a duel, and on September 6, Walker was 
mortally wounded in the gunfight.61 
 By the time Holmes’s issued his orders for a retreat, his rebel army had deteriorated into 
a collection of dispersed, diluted units.  The Federals took advantage of the isolated, bewildered 
Confederates by capturing as many prisoners as possible before they fled the field.  Under the 
direction of Colonel Cyrus H. Mackey, the Federals captured “several hundred prisoners and two 
stands of colors” near Hindman Hill.  In front of Graveyard Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. 
Pace witnessed the surrender of about one hundred rebels, and then joined in the recapture of 
battery C.  All the while, the Confederates hastily fled the field, leaving many of their dead and 
wounded behind.  With their rear guard skirmishing to cover their withdrawal until the early part 
of the afternoon, the battered rebels retreated toward the Polk house.62 
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 Throughout the morning, nurses and surgeons on both sides had worked continuously to 
care for the wounded soldiers.  Surgeon William McPheeters accompanied Price on the 
battlefield during the early part of the fight.  “[R]emembering that Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston 
probably lost his life [at Shiloh] by not having a surgeon with him,” McPheeters was determined 
to be with his general in the case of his fall.  However, as the number of wounded troops began 
to accumulate, McPheeters moved behind the lines to assist his fellow surgeons.  When the 
Confederates started their retreat, the surgeons were ordered to move all the wounded men off 
the field and transport them to the Polk house, which became a rebel hospital.  In his personal 
memoir, Confederate cavalryman Jacob Rockwell devoted almost half of his reflection on the 
battle to a description of “the grand exhisibition [sic] of the glorious heroism of the heaven-
inspired women of our dear old Southland in our field hospital.”  Forever grateful for the tender 
care the nurses had provided for his cohorts, Rockwell described a scene in which the nurses 
used their “linen under garments” as dressings because the field hospital had run out of 
bandages.  After the battle, Helena’s Catholic nuns turned the St. Catherine Convent and 
Academy into a morgue and a hospital.  Moreover, the Little Rock Road was reportedly “lined 
with citizens who come to see if any of their friends had been hurt, and to assist in taking care of 
the unfortunate wounded.”63 
 The white women of eastern Arkansas did more than nurse wounded soldiers; they also 
cheered for their rebel liberators.  According to the accounts of both Union and Confederate 
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soldiers, the white citizens of eastern Arkansas almost universally supported the rebels during the 
engagement.  Given the region’s antebellum sympathies, as well as the hardships that many 
civilians suffered during the federal occupation of Phillips County (and Curtis’s march toward 
Helena), this is not surprising.  As Price’s troops passed through Augusta en route to Helena, 
they saw “a great many ladies who expressed themselves glad to see us and shouted us on as they 
thought and we hoped to victory.”  Before the battle, civilians in the countryside briefed 
Confederate cavalrymen on the size of the Helena garrison—at least until Prentiss forbid them 
from coming near federal lines.  When that happened, a Union trooper observed that the civilians 
“already on the inside were quiet, reserved, and extremely reticent.”  Apparently, the citizens of 
Helena knew, or at least sensed, that an attack was coming.64  
 On the day of the battle, many Helenians—especially the pro-Confederate women—
openly displayed their allegiances.  “Some of the ladies of Helena wore the Confederate colors 
publicly in the streets,” observed Iowan Charles Musser.  “Some of the boys told General 
Prentiss about it, and in less than no time 14 of them were going up to Memphis.”  Confident of 
victory, a group of women reportedly prepared meals for the Confederates, waved white 
handkerchiefs, and were “very saucy” as “the rebs were cuming over the hights.”  A soldier from 
Wisconsin remembered this “display of ladies on the bluffs, who waved their handkerchiefs and 
hurrahed for Jeff Davis.”  He also recalled that a number of citizens came to Helena “from miles 
around with a train of 40 wagons drawn by oxen, mules and horses, loaded with good things for 
                                                 
64 James T. Wallace Diary, 1862-1865, 25 June 1863, Southern Historical Collection, 
Wilson Library, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; William W. Garner to Henrietta 
Garner, 23 June 1863, in McBrien, ed., “Letters of an Arkansas Confederate Soldier,” 172; W. 
A. Jenkins, “A Leaf From Army Life” [Read December 8, 1887], in Military Essays and 
Recollections, Papers Read Before the Commandery of the State of Illinois, Vol. III, Military 






the occasion.”  Black Helenians, for their part, did more than simply encourage the Federals.  A 
Union gunner in Fort Curtis marveled at “a negro worker that left his spot and come up in the 
fort and got a gun and went over on the hill where the rebs was and took a prisoner and marched 
him over to the fort.”  In the same letter, the gunner declared that he had “never com in to the 
service to fight for the freedom of the niger,” but “if it had not ben for the negros, the troops at 
this place last spring would have had a hard time.”65 
 African American troops fought in the battle, but because they were positioned on a part 
of the field that saw little action, they did not significantly alter its outcome.  The Second 
Arkansas, A.D., was not officially mustered into service when the Confederates attacked on July 
4, so it is likely that some of its soldiers lacked proper training.  This, in conjunction with the 
novelty of black combat troops in the summer of 1863, probably explains why the Second 
Arkansas was assigned to guard the Federals’ extreme left flank—a position unlikely to face a 
direct assault.  Still, the regiment faced sporadic enemy fire during the engagement, and at least 
two black soldiers sustained injuries.  Late in the battle—after the Confederates had captured 
battery C—some forty to fifty “infirm and aged contrabands” reportedly joined the Second 
Arkansas in the rifle pits.  Recruited and armed by Chaplain Samuel Sawyer, the Superintendent 
of Contrabands at Helena, the African American refugees “willingly lent a helping hand in this 
hour of need.”  A newspaper sympathetic to their plight proudly reported that the contrabands 
                                                 
65 Charles Musser to Dear Father, Mother and Sisters, 9 July 1863, in Popchock, ed., 
Soldier Boy, 67; Floyd Thurman to Marion, Brother & Friend, 7-8 July 1863, O. V. Brown 
Papers, Indiana State Library, Manuscripts and Rare Books Division, Indianapolis; “Helena,” 
National Tribune, August 18, 1887; David T. Massey to Dear Father [Nathan Massey], 8 July 





“stood their ground nobly and won golden opinions from all quarters.  They felt more like men 
that they had an opportunity to defend their wives and children and country.”66   
As expected, the Second Arkansas’s white officers praised their regiment’s performance.  
“[T]he 2nd. Arks was on the Extreme left Supporting a Battery,” explained the regiment’s 
orderly sergeant.  “[O]ur Battery Done great Execution[.]  We was not in Gun Shot of them But 
Could See them Fighting all the time & there Balls whistled all arround us & Amongst us[.]  one 
Ball wounded 2 Darkies in the Arm not Dangerous.”  Lieutenant Minos Miller similarly bragged, 
“[O]ur black boys behaved well[.]  they was placed in a position wher [sic] they could be fired 
on and no chance to return the fire and if there is anything that will discourage man it is that[.]  
but they took it calm and cool yesterday when the alarm was given[.]  men that stood off and 
looked on say they never seen a regt form as quick as ours did in their lives.”67 
 Newspapers that supported the use of black troops in combat picked up on such praise, 
and, in some cases, exaggerated the Second Arkansas’s role in the battle.  The pro-Union 
Memphis Bulletin was one of the first papers to report on the battle of Helena, and it accurately 
declared that the “negro regiments fought well, fully demonstrating their usefulness as soldiers.”  
Eight days later, however, the New York Times reprinted the Bulletin’s account under a different 
(and misleading) headline:  “The Battle of Helena; The Rebels in a Tight Place—Gallantry of 
Negro Regiments.”  On July 19, the Times ran a second account of the battle whose embellished 
contents better reflected the first report’s title.  “The negro troops stripped off everything but 
pants, and fought with the most persistent courage,” the correspondent declared.  “It is said that 
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they could with difficulty be restrained from breaking out of the intrenchments and pursuing the 
enemy in the open field.”  The author also erroneously claimed that black soldiers constituted 
one-half of Helena’s victorious garrison.68 
 Some Union soldiers doubted the black troops’ contributions, and they resented reporters’ 
aggrandizement of the Second Arkansas’s role.  Edward Walden of the 28th Wisconsin 
sarcastically recorded that the African Americans “fought so desperately, without firing a gun.  
Bully boys are they!  They get a good deal of praise for what they did not do.”  Walden’s 
compatriot Edward Redington also rebuffed the papers’ adulation for the Second Arkansas, but 
he admitted that the African Americans’ position on the battlefield had prevented them from 
proving their mettle.  “I do not think but that they would have fought if they had had a chance,” 
Redington declared, “but they were placed on the extreme left between the Levee and river bank 
close to their camp, and stayed there all day and were not molested and of course could not 
fight.”  Iowan A. F. Sperry concurred:  “In the newspaper reports of the action, much credit was 
given to a colored regiment which held the left of the works, extending from the bluffs to the 
river; but the truth was that they were not attacked at all.  If they had been, they would doubtless 
have done their duty bravely, but they deserve no especial credit as it was.”  A number of 
Federals also begrudged the newspapers’ excessive praise of the gunboat Tyler and General 
Prentiss.  Wisconsinites, in particular, believed their home-state hero, Frederick Salomon, 
deserved most of the credit for the Union victory.69 
                                                 
68 “Latest from Helena,” Memphis Bulletin, July 7, 1863; “The Battle of Helena; The 
Rebels in a Tight Place—Gallantry of Negro Regiments,” New York Times, July 15, 1863; “The 
Surrender of Vicksburgh; An Account from Another of Our Special Correspondents.  Barricades.  
Holes in the Ground.  Still Another Fourth of July Victory [V]alor of the Negro Troops in 
Arkansas,” New York Times, July 19, 1863. 
69 Walden Diary, 4 July 1863, in Kirkman, ed., “The 28th Wisconsin Infantry Regiment at 





 Their interpretive quibbles aside, the victorious bluecoats were jubilant following their 
crushing Independence Day victory.  “I have Spent Several fourths of July but never celebrated it 
with so much fire works before,” exclaimed Charles Musser.  “I would not have missed that day 
for Six months wages.”  When they saw the dead and wounded sprawled out on the battlefield, 
other Federals were more somber.  “It was a revolting & sickening sight to see the pile of 
deceased . . . thrown here & there,” lamented John Savage of the 28th Wisconsin.  “[A]ll 
semblance of humanity knocked out of some of them by the explosion of the shells, heads 
dissevered, arms & legs torn off, some of them completely disemboweled.  There they lay in all 
shapes, postures & positions, under this blazing sun with the flies creeping in & out of their 
wounds.  What a work for the anniversary of American Independence, American against 
American.”  Fellow Wisconsinite Edward Walden was also repulsed by the battlefield scene.  
The sight of the rotting bodies even made him feel sorry for his rebel counterparts.  “The 
battlefield is no pleasant place to visit, covered with men wounded in all ways—some with 
brains exposed, others shot through the body with a grape shot,” Walden wrote.  “But if there is 
anything that calls on the sympathy of a man it is to look upon a wounded man, with deathlike 
and pale face, groaning and wreathing with the greatest possible pain.”70 
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 The bodies left lying on the slopes of Helena’s hills were a telling sign of the battle’s 
outcome, as the engagement had been a disaster for the Confederates.  Of the 7,646 rebels 
involved, Holmes estimated that his army had suffered 173 killed, 687 wounded, and 776 
missing and captured for a total of 1,636 casualties, over twenty-one percent of his command.  
As with most defeated generals, Holmes probably underestimated his casualties (On July 6, 
Prentiss claimed to have captured over 1,100 prisoners and buried almost 300 rebel dead.).  
Prentiss and Salomon, on the other hand, had engineered a defensive masterpiece.  Of the 4,129 
Union soldiers in action, there were 57 killed, 127 wounded, and 36 missing for a total of 239 
casualties.  Newspapers that reported on the battle were predictably biased toward the sides they 
supported.  “The casualties on our [Confederate] side were about 400 killed and wounded,” 
reported the editor of the Arkansas True Democrat on July 8.  “[T]he number taken prisoners is 
variously estimated, but it is not large. . . . Our army is yet around Helena, but the enemy will not 
venture out of their defences and give us an open battle.”  The New York Times, though in 
support of the Union, was not as erroneous in its assessment:  “Further particulars of the late 
battle show that the repulse was very decided and disastrous to the enemy [rebels].”71  
While the bulk of Holmes’s army withdrew from Helena, Prentiss made no attempt to 
follow up the retreat.  On July 6, he wired General Grant and informed him of his “regret that the 
number and condition of [his] small force [would] not warrant a pursuit.”  However, Prentiss did 
believe the Confederates would eventually renew their attack against Helena, so he made the 
precautions necessary to ensure the garrison’s defense.  Around mid-afternoon on July 4, 
Prentiss wired Hurlbut in Memphis with news of his victory and asked the general for 
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reinforcements and an additional gunboat.  He also made sure that his garrison remained on 
constant guard for several days following the engagement.  “It was expected that the Rebels 
might make an attack in the night,” Edward Walden wrote on July 5, “and our forces slept 
behind the earth-works with their tools by their side ready to receive them and give them the 
same warm greeting that they did the morning previous.”  Thomas Stevens of the 28th Wisconsin 
also noted the garrison’s post-battle vigilance:  “We laid in the trenches all the time (except 4 or 
5 hours Sunday afternoon) (5th) from 4 A.M. on the 4th till 6 ½ A.M. on the 6th as it was 
apprehended that they would return & renew the conflict.”72 
 Prentiss waited two days before sending a cavalry patrol outside Helena to investigate the 
Confederate retreat.  The patrol, led by Colonel Clayton, ventured out from the garrison on July 
6 and came upon the rebel hospital at the Polk house.  Unaware of the yellow hospital flag flying 
outside the building, the Federals fired on the building when they arrived.  Surgeon McPheeters, 
caring for the wounded inside, “ordered a large white flag to be raised fearing that we might be 
injured by the shell falling thick around us.”  When Clayton noticed the flag, he ordered a 
ceasefire and went inside to investigate.  There, he met McPheeters, who informed him that the 
building was only a hospital.  When they saw suffering, wounded men, the Federals offered to 
take some of them back to Helena, “where they could have ice and other comforts.”  Although he 
declined their offer, McPheeters later explained that he “had nothing to complain of in [the 
Federals’] treatment.”73   
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Before leaving the Polk house, the Federals gave McPheeters one last bit of information.  
“They informed me that Vicksburg had surrendered to Gen. Grant on the 4th with 20,000 
prisoners,” the surgeon explained.  “This was sad news to me and although I did not fully credit 
it—the Federals being such enormous liars—it nevertheless disturbed me a little.”  McPheeters 
would have been even more distressed had he known that the Federals were telling the truth.  On 
the same morning that the rebels were repulsed at Helena, three hundred miles to the south, white 
flags appeared on the defenses at Vicksburg, the most important Confederate bastion on the 
Mississippi River.  As the days progressed, other rebel soldiers who had fought at Helena heard 
the news of Vicksburg’s fall.  “Our own defeat could have been more cheerfully borne had it not 
been so closely followed by the news that Vicksburg had fallen,” complained Fontaine Richard 
Earle of the 34th Arkansas.  “This Department is now fully cut off from the Eastern portion of the 
government, and we must stand or fall alone.”  When the federal victories at Helena and 
Vicksburg were coupled with news of Lee’s retreat from Gettysburg, July 4, 1863, was indeed a 
gloomy day for the Confederacy and a glorious one for the Union.74   
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Years after the battle of Helena, Confederate cavalryman Jacob Rockwell discussed the 
engagement in his memoir.  The “object” of the campaign, he said, was “to relieve Gen. 
Pemberton, then besieged by Grant’s army at Vicksburg, Missippi [sic].  But if we had won at 
Helena, it would have been too late.  For on that same day Pemberton was forced to capitulate.”  
Rockwell may not have known it when he wrote his account, but his analysis of the Helena 
campaign would stand the test of time.1 
The rebel assault on the Union garrison at Helena was intended as a key strategic 
operation to relieve pressure on the collapsing Confederate garrison at Vicksburg and secure a 
strategic rebel position on the Mississippi River.  The Federals secured control of Helena in July 
1862, and for the next year, they used it as an important supply depot and staging ground for 
military operations on the Mississippi River, especially those aimed at Vicksburg.  The Union 
presence in Helena was a constant threat to the Confederacy’s control of the Mississippi River 
and the Arkansas interior.  The rebels expected the Helena campaign to eliminate that threat.  In 
the end, the attack was too little and too late to save Vicksburg, which surrendered on the same 
morning.  However, over 1,800 casualties were incurred in the fight (15% of those involved), 
and the outcome ensured Union control of the Mississippi River.  It also preserved the federal 
toehold in eastern Arkansas, which served as the staging ground for General Frederick Steele’s 
capture of Little Rock in September 1863. 
The Union commanders at Helena, Benjamin M. Prentiss and Frederick Salomon, did a 
masterful job preparing their garrison for the fight.  Prentiss had been surprised and routed at 
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Shiloh in April 1862, and he came to Helena determined not to be caught off guard again.  He 
and Salomon adapted the hilly, wooded landscape to their defensive advantage by erecting 
artillery batteries on the hills commanding the western approaches to town.  They supervised the 
digging of rifle pits in front of the batteries, as well as the felling of trees in the roads leading 
into Helena (and on the slopes leading up to the batteries), creating abatis to obstruct the rebel 
advance.  Additionally, they took full advantage of their intelligence.  When Prentiss learned that 
the Confederates were advancing toward Helena, he ordered his entire garrison to be up and 
under arms at 2:30 a.m. for an entire week before the battle.  He required a consistent regimen of 
drilling and picketing for every soldier under his command.  Prentiss’s troops loathed the hard 
work required to strengthen Helena’s defenses, but they respected their commander’s vigilance.  
When he learned that the rebels were massing within fifteen miles of Helena, Prentiss cancelled 
the garrison’s Independence Day festivities to ensure that his soldiers would be ready for an 
attack.   
On the day of the battle, Salomon made most of the crucial tactical decisions.  He 
performed brilliantly, promptly reinforcing the areas on the battlefield that needed it most.  When 
the Confederates captured battery C, the Prussian-born general did not panic.  Anticipating that 
the rebels would next attack Fort Curtis, he rapidly reinforced the ground in front of the fort with 
artillery and infantry, devastating the rebel advance.  After the battle, Prentiss emphasized his 
subordinate’s noteworthy performance, as did many of the Union rank and file.2   
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Prentiss’s role during the fight was also noteworthy.  When he saw that the rebels had 
massed their forces against battery C, he ordered the guns at battery B and D, Fort Curtis, and 
those aboard the Tyler to concentrate their fire on Graveyard Hill.  According to the generals’ 
published reports, as well as the letters and diaries of common soldiers, this concentration of fire 
had a devastating effect on the attacking rebels.  Late in the morning, when the Confederates had 
been repulsed, Prentiss did not let his soldiers become complacent.  Anticipating that the rebels 
would renew their attack, he wired General Stephen A. Hurlbut in Memphis and requested that 
reinforcements and an additional gunboat be sent to Helena.  Furthermore, he kept his men on 
constant guard for several days after July 4.3 
Prentiss’s only mistake was that he failed to follow up on his victory with a pursuit of the 
retreating rebels.  It was July 6, two days after the battle, before he dispatched a reconnaissance 
force to inspect the Confederate retreat.  However, Prentiss’s mistake was a common one for 
Civil War generals.  Furthermore, he believed his force was not sufficient to pursue the fleeing 
rebels.  He told General Ulysses S. Grant on July 6, “I much regret that the number and condition 
of my small force will not warrant a pursuit.”  In the end, Prentiss fended off a rebel force of 
7,600 with only 4,100 men, sustaining a relatively minor 239 casualties in the process.  His own 
assessment of his garrison’s performance adequately underscores the Union accomplishment:  
“[M]y whole command not only succeeded in repulsing the enemy’s attack, and thus holding 
Helena, which, if I mistake not, is all that was expected of it, but, in addition, administered to the 
enemy as severe punishment as he ever received west of the Mississippi, and this, too, with a loss 
to itself so small as to seem almost miraculous.”4 
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The Union victory at Helena was undoubtedly aided by the presence of the U.S.S. Tyler, 
whose powerful guns fired upon the rebels throughout the engagement.  The gunboat’s executive 
officer later claimed to have fired 413 rounds during the battle, killing or wounding about 600 
men.  Prentiss was so impressed by the Tyler’s impact that he recommended its commander, 
James M. Pritchett, for a promotion following the battle.  Contemporary newspapers stressed the 
Tyler’s contributions, while most of the previous scholarship on the Helena campaign has 
highlighted the crucial, if not decisive role that the gunboat played in the Union victory.  Edwin 
C. Bearss, for example, cited the Tyler as one of the seven principal reasons why the Federals 
triumphed.5 
While the Tyler certainly helped the Union cause, the evidence suggests that its 
contributions may have been exaggerated.  Edward S. Redington of the 28th Wisconsin 
questioned the gunboat’s influence on the battle.  “The gunboat Tyler lay in front of the town and 
threw shells away over our heads, not knowing where they were going any more than a boy 
knows where a stone will fall that he has thrown into the air,” he declared.  “All the damage we 
can hear of being done by them was by a shell that went full a mile beyond us and happened to 
fall in the woods where a Rebel surgeon was dressing their wounded and killed twenty already 
more than half dead.”  Iowan Lurton Ingersoll also believed the gunboat’s impact had been 
embellished.  “The gun-boat Tyler . . . rendered most valuable assistance during the entire 
engagement,” he wrote, “but not enough to justify the dispatch . . . that it had ‘saved the day.’”  
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A Confederate who was positioned near the river during the fight similarly recalled that the Tyler 
“shelled us nearly all day but with out any damage.”6   
A number of Union soldiers believed the Tyler’s shells were more psychologically 
overwhelming to the rebels than they were physically devastating.  “The gunboat Tyler, steaming 
up and down the river and keeping up an incessant fire from her sixty-pounders, gave great 
assistance by the excellent ‘moral effect’ if not by actual execution,” recalled Iowan A. F. 
Sperry.  “The rebels believed there were several gunboats operating against them.”  Adjutant 
John A. Savage, frustrated that the press had overlooked the performance of his fellow 
Wisconsinite, General Salomon, disparaged the Tyler’s performance:  “You can judge then of 
our surprise when we saw the Northern papers giving entire credit of the battle to Gen Prentiss & 
the Gunboats!  (There was but one gunboat there – the Tyler – a wooden steamer which shelled 
the woods, exercising a moral effect, perhaps accidentally killing & wounding some of the 
enemy out in the woods).”  In his later examination of the Tyler’s role, author Steven Jones 
similarly argued that the gunboat’s contribution was mostly psychological.  In the end, the 
evidence suggests that the Tyler, while certainly an important factor in the battle, did not “save 
the day” for the Federals.7 
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The commanding Confederate at the battle of Helena, Theophilus H. Holmes, deserves 
much of the blame for Confederate defeat.  He was an unproven general who came to Arkansas 
in the summer of 1862 after several failed efforts in the East.  A friend of Jefferson Davis, 
Holmes was appointed commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department despite his protests 
against it.  He claimed that he was neither qualified for nor desired the position, but Davis 
selected him anyway.  Holmes’s troops called him “Granny,” and at least one doctor diagnosed 
him with “softening of the brain.”  By the summer of 1863, Holmes had been subordinated to 
commander of the District of Arkansas, and it was from this post that he coordinated the attack 
against Helena.8  
 Holmes approved the attack after receiving information from his subordinate, General 
John S. Marmaduke, which indicated that “all [federal] troops that [could] be spared [were] 
being sent to re-enforce Grant.”  Marmaduke believed this movement had left Helena “very 
weak.”  His report, coupled with a recommendation for an attack from Secretary of War James 
A. Seddon, convinced Holmes that the time was right to reclaim Helena for the Confederacy.9 
 General Sterling Price, Holmes’s second in command, believed that Helena could be 
taken if the rebels moved with “celerity and secrecy.”  However, the natural environment of the 
Arkansas Delta—and the Union army’s strategic use of that environment—prevented the 
Confederates from achieving those ends.  When the rebels converged outside Helena on July 3, 
Holmes learned that he had severely underestimated the garrison’s defenses.  “[T]he place was 
very much more difficult of access,” he wrote, “and the fortifications very much stronger, than I 
had supposed before undertaking the expedition, the features of the country being peculiarly 
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adapted to defense, and all that the art of engineering could do having been brought to bear to 
strengthen it.”10 
Faulty intelligence, poor reconnaissance, and the Federals’ strategic use of their 
environment placed the rebels in a precarious position before the fight had even begun.  
Nonetheless, Holmes stayed committed to the attack.  He called for a three-pronged assault 
against heavily fortified, entrenched federal positions on high ground, a plan that arguably had 
little chance of succeeding from the beginning.  In order to achieve coordination, Holmes 
ordered the attack to begin at “daylight,” a vague time designation that had disastrous effects the 
following morning.11 
 When the Confederates moved toward their positions the night before the battle, they 
unexpectedly found their paths blocked with felled timber.  These abatis forced them to leave 
their artillery behind and severely hindered their advance toward the town.  Because of poor 
reconnaissance and a lack of knowledge about the approaches to Helena, the Confederates were 
forced to use local civilian guides to lead them to their positions.  When the fighting began, 
many of the guides fled the battlefield, further delaying the rebel advance.  By the time they 
reached their attack positions, most men were exhausted from the long night’s march through 
thick timber and deep ravines.  They also lacked artillery support. 
 On the day of the battle, Price misinterpreted Holmes’s orders to attack at “daylight” to 
mean “sunrise,” and he halted his men until then.  Once the rebels resumed their march, a lack of 
communication between Generals Parsons and McRae further hindered the attack against battery 
C.  While Price’s men dallied below Graveyard Hill, Generals James Fagan and Marmaduke 
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launched their assaults, thus ending any possibility of a synchronized attack.  The Confederates’ 
poor coordination allowed the Federals to concentrate their fire on whichever point the rebels 
threatened, a luxury that had devastating effects on the rebel assailants.  After the battle, Holmes 
reported that “Price did not make his attack till after sunrise, and more than an hour after the time 
named in the order.”  However, Price claimed that Holmes actually accompanied his column 
during the idle time and “remained with the division until the dawn of day, when the line of 
march was resumed.”  If this was the case, Holmes could have easily prompted Price to advance 
his column.  Regardless, the situation could have been prevented had Holmes chosen a more 
specific time at which to begin the assault.12 
 Holmes’s blunders did not end with his vague battle plan.  After the Confederates 
captured battery C, he rode into the fort and ordered one of Price’s battalion commanders to 
attack Fort Curtis.  His order, which violated the chain of command, had disastrous 
consequences.  The other Confederate commanders on Graveyard Hill saw the advance on Fort 
Curtis and, believing that a general attack had been ordered, instructed their men to charge the 
fort.  The dashing rebels, who immediately became the target of Fort Curtis, the batteries, the 
Tyler’s guns, and a hail of enfilading rifle fire, were either captured or massacred.  It is important 
to note that it was Parsons, not Holmes, who described this incident in his battle report.  
However, Holmes did admit that most of his loss in prisoners “resulted from not restraining the 
men after the capture of Graveyard Hill from advancing into the town, where they were taken 
mainly without resistance.”13 
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 North of town, the absence of cooperation between Marmaduke and General Lucius M. 
Walker doomed the attack on Rightor Hill from the very beginning.  Marmaduke’s advance was 
continuously thwarted by a federal force ensconced behind the levee on his left.  Marmaduke 
believed it was Walker’s job to remove that threat, and he twice asked him to do so.  In his 
report, Walker claimed to have engaged those Federals throughout the morning, pushing them 
back on several occasions, and in the end, succeeding in protecting Marmaduke’s left flank.  He 
also maintained that he had fulfilled his duty to prevent the Federals from reinforcing Rightor 
Hill.  However, the reports also indicate that throughout the fight, Walker held a sizeable portion 
of his force north of Helena, presumably preparing to invade the town as soon as battery A was 
captured.  For whatever reason, Walker did not dislodge the Federals behind the levee, and thus, 
Marmaduke was unable capture Rightor Hill.     
 Holmes blamed the rebel defeat in large part on Price’s delay in attacking Graveyard Hill 
and the failure of Price and others to direct the men after the capture of battery C.  Furthermore, 
he publicly accused McRae of “misbehavior before the enemy,” presumably for his alleged 
shirking below battery C.  However, Price praised McRae’s performance in his report, and a 
court of inquiry later acquitted McRae of the charge.  While the Confederate defeat at the battle 
of Helena was certainly a combined effort, the evidence indicates that Holmes’s mistakes were 
the most crippling of the lot.  A month after the battle, Fontaine Richard Earle, an infantryman in 
the 34th Arkansas, made no attempt to hide his opinion of who should shoulder the blame for 
rebel defeat:  “Poor old soul . . . the whirring 64 pound bombs was to[o] much for him [Holmes].  
He is . . . verr[y] sick, in which condition I leave him and hope he will stay so.”14 
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 The Helena campaign was a disaster for the Confederates, due in no small part to their 
commander’s blunders.  And yet, Holmes should not shoulder all of the blame.  The 
unpredictable forces of nature, as well the Federals’ strategic use of the natural environment, 
were decisive in the campaign’s outcome.  Those involved in the battle understood this fact.  
Reflecting on the battle the following month, one Union soldier believed “it was not alone the 
bravery of our men that saved Helena.  It was the defences & the manner in which the troops 
were disposed in readiness for any emergency & the untiring vigilance which prevented the 
enemy from gaining a foothold.”  Tellingly, a defeated Confederate offered similar analysis:  
“The facts can be summed up in very few words.  We were badly whiped—not from any want of 
bravery on the part of men or officers, but the natural position together with the ‘fortifications’ 
around the place would have defied almost twice our numbers.”15 
The Helena campaign cannot be understood without some consideration of the ways in 
which soldiers manipulated, and were shaped by, their natural environment.  Historians have 
proven that nature played an important, sometimes paramount, part in the Civil War, and the 
Helena campaign offers a vivid illustration of that fact.  And yet, the natural environment alone 
did not determine the outcome at Helena.  Other variables, including the decision-making of such 
individuals as Theophilus Holmes and Benjamin Prentiss, were also consequential.  Nature was 
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but one actor in the Helena story, albeit a crucial one.16  Still, an environmental interpretation of 
the Helena campaign is instructive because it demonstrates that “battlefield tactics and outcomes 
are not merely the products of military minds and soldierly actions but also of the dynamics of 
weather, terrain, soil type, disease, and other nonhuman entities and forces.”  This, ultimately, is 
environmental history’s most important contribution to our understanding of the Civil War and 
the past generally.  In the words of one scholar, environmental history “might not have the 
potential to transform Civil War studies in the way that social histories have,” but it “can tell us 
many things we didn’t know before and can also allow us to reassess some things we thought we 
knew.”17 
The Helena campaign was a failed Confederate attempt to relieve pressure on the 
collapsing rebel bastion at Vicksburg.  The fortified, entrenched Federals at Helena repulsed the 
poorly coordinated Confederate attack, inflicting severe rebel casualties in the process.  
Reminiscing about the battle three years later, Horace Greeley sarcastically wrote that 
“Holmes—who had been grossly deceived both as to the strength of our [the federal] works and 
the number of their defenders—had never a reasonable chance of success.  His only ground of 
rational hope was that he might be confronted by a coward, a traitor, or an idiot; and that did not 
happen to be the case.”  Greeley’s Unionist leanings aside, his analysis was only slightly 
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exaggerated, although ultimately, the reason for Confederate failure did not matter.  On that 
same morning, General John C. Pemberton surrendered to Grant at Vicksburg.  In the end, the 
battle of Helena was too little and too late to save Vicksburg, but for those who fought and died 
there, the campaign was of no less consequence than those that transpired elsewhere.18 
The same goes for the soldiers and civilians who survived the fight—and for those who 
endured the ordeals of secession and war in Phillips County.  Today, most students of the Civil 
War remember Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg, not Helena, but while 
overshadowed and mostly forgotten, Helena was by no means unimportant.  Rather, it is an ideal 
vantage from which to study the “real war” because its people experienced the conflict’s 
political, social, economic, military, and environmental effects from 1861 to 1865 and beyond.   
Before the war, Phillips County was planter-dominated slave society whose white 
residents exploited their Delta environment and slave labor to grow cotton and corn for regional, 
national, and international markets.  Accordingly, they were linked to a wider antebellum world 
defined by partisan politics, Protestantism, a slave-based economy, and a devotion to a Union 
that most believed was a democratic beacon for the rest of the world to see.  As late as December 
1860, most of the county’s citizens wanted to remain a part of that Union. 
When Abraham Lincoln was elected U.S. president, unionism decreased in Phillips 
County, but it did not disappear.  Tellingly, the county’s citizens responded to the Republican’s 
election by adopting a resolution urging the Arkansas legislature to call a meeting of the southern 
states to demand southerners’ rights in the Union.  When South Carolina seceded in December 
1860, support for separation grew in both Phillips County and Arkansas at large, and in early 
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1861, a statewide election was called so that voters could decide whether to hold a secession 
convention and choose delegates to that convention.  Ten days before that election, Phillips 
County militiamen helped seize the federal arsenal in Little Rock, thus exacerbating sectional 
tensions in the state. 
 On February 18, Arkansans overwhelmingly voted to hold a secession convention, and 
Phillips County, like most counties in southern and eastern Arkansans, sent pro-separation 
delegates to that meeting.  However, most counties in northern and western Arkansas chose 
unionists, so when the convention adjourned in late March, Arkansas remained in the United 
States.  By that time, most of the state’s unionists were cooperationists, meaning they were 
willing to secede if the U.S. government failed to protect slavery or tried to force the states that 
had already seceded to rejoin the Union.  
In April 1861, the U.S. government tried to do just that.  After Confederate troops 
captured Fort Sumter, Lincoln requested that states still in the Union supply troops to crush the 
Confederate rebellion, and in the ensuing days, cooperation in Arkansas collapsed.  By late April 
1861, support for secession among whites in eastern Arkansas was almost unanimous.  In 
Phillips County, the militia drilled in anticipation of secession and war, Helena’s three 
newspapers endorsed separation, anti-northern vigilante activity increased, and Helenians seized 
northern-owned boats that passed on the Mississippi.  By the time a reconvened convention 
announced Arkansas’s secession on May 6, some 500 militiamen from five counties, including 
Phillips, were already mobilized to fight for the Confederacy. 
 In the war’s opening months, some 400 of Phillips County’s 2,000 adult white males 
volunteered to fight, and over the next four years, at least seven infantry regiments came from 





Arkansans—who constituted a majority of Phillips County’s population—quietly took advantage 
of the turmoil to revolt.   
 By June 1861, all of the companies raised in Helena had departed, but the residents of 
Phillips County continued to experience the consequences of the war.  In the war’s first year, 
slaves, civilians, and Confederate troops moved in and out of the county, while white residents 
suffered from cash and manpower shortages, a credit crunch, inflation, and ultimately, 
Confederate conscription and impressment.  Floods, droughts, and hog cholera also wreaked 
havoc on the county’s residents.    
In July 1862, approximately 20,000 Union soldiers under General Samuel R. Curtis 
invaded Phillips County.  They seized buildings, confiscated crops and livestock, and freed more 
than 2,000 slaves, most of whom ran to federal lines to secure their freedom.  Tragically, many 
of these refugees moved into decrepit camps, worked for wages that most never received, and 
died due to hunger and disease. 
The arrival of Curtis’s army marked the beginning of a continuous Union occupation of 
Helena that spanned the remainder of the war.  The town served as a permanent federal enclave, 
supply depot, coaling station, cotton-trading hub, and staging ground for Union operations in the 
Mississippi valley, particularly those aimed at Vicksburg.  The federal occupation of Helena 
threatened the Confederacy’s control of the Mississippi River and the Arkansas interior, and 
throughout 1862 and 1863, the rebels considered removing that threat.  They finally attempted to 
do so in July 1863, but harsh environmental conditions during the Confederate approach to 






Years after the war, a Wisconsin soldier who fought in the battle of Helena recalled that 
the town was “situated on the right bank of the Mississippi river, and on the only high ground on 
that side, between Memphis and Vicksburg.  The occupation of it,” he continued “completely 
blockaded the Mississippi as that of either Memphis or Vicksburg.  This fact gave its occupation 
by our forces, and hence the battle of Helena, an importance which it has never received in 
history.”  The white civilians, black refugees, Yankee merchants, northern aid workers, and 
federal troops who joined him in Helena undoubtedly would have agreed.19 
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Figure 1:  Helena, Arkansas, on the Mississippi River.  Reproduced from Vicksburg Is the Key:  
The Struggle for the Mississippi River by William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winshel by 
permission of the University of Nebraska Press.  Copyright 2003 by the University of Nebraska 





Figure 2:  Arkansas Delta Subregions.  Jeannie Whayne and Willard B. Gatewood, eds., The 





Figure 3:  “The War in Arkansas—Helena, Arkansas—From a Sketch by Our Special Artist, 
Fred. B. Schell.” Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, January 23, 1864:  276.  19th Century 
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